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THE JURY AND THE ENGLISH LAW OF
HOMICIDE, 1200-1600
Thomas A. Green*t

T

early English jury was self-informing and composed of per-

sons supposed to have first-hand knowledge of the events and
persons in question. The judge instructed the jury on the law, but
was himself almost entirely dependent upon the jury for his knowledge of the case. By stating the evidence in a way that made the
result it wanted a necessary conclusion, the medieval jury was able
to alter the impact of formal rules of law to conform with prevailing
social attitudes.
I have demonstrated elsewhere that before there emerged a judicial distinction between murder and noncapital manslaughter, juries
employed this power to prevent the execution of certain kinds of
slayers. I suggest in the present article that this pattern of jury
behavior had significant effects on the development of the law of
homicide from c. 1200 to 1550. It tended to hide those close and
difficult cases that, had they come forward, might have forced the
bench to refine the law of homicide, and, in a curious manner, it
produced rigid adherence by bench and legislature to the older strict
rules.
At the beginning of the thirteenth century and for some time
thereafter, the formal law of homicide was rigidly bifurcated. While
there existed a narrow category of nonfelonious slayings (that is,
slayings that led to acquittal or royal pardon), the vast majority of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1961, Columbia
University; Ph.D. 1970, Harvard University; J.D. 1972, Harvard University.--Ed.
t I would like to thank the staff of the Public Record Office, London, England,
for their invaluable service. I am especially indebted to R.F. Hunnisett and D.G.
Clark of the Record Office. Dr. John Baker of Cambridge University and Professor
James S. Cockburn of the University of Maryland extended helpful advice on several
important aspects of this article. Three research assistants contributed significantly
to the preparation of this article: Rita Bums, Jean Prchlik, and Linda Schwartzstein.
I am also very grateful to Professors Charles Donahue, Richard Lempert, and Peter
Westen of The University of Michigan Law School, to Professors Morris Arnold of
Indiana University Law School, John Langbein of The University of Chicago Law
School, and Stephen White of Wesleyan University, and to Ruth Brownell Green for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to the William W. Cook Endowment Fund for its generous financial support.
Quotations from foreign-language sources have been translated by the author
unless otherwise indicated. Spelling and punctuation of English sources have been
modernized.
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homicides, including what today we would call manslaughters, were
considered capital offenses. In part I of this article, I shall briefly set
forth the history of this legal distinction, contrast it with medieval
community attitudes toward homicide, and describe the means by
which the community was able to bring its sentiments to bear on the
criminal justice system.
In part II, I shall examine in somewhat greater detail the early law
of nonfelonious homicide and set forth the evidence supporting the
proposition that medieval juries frequently manipulated this area of
the law. I shall argue that this jury manipulation significantly affected
the growth of the substantive law of homicide-stunting it in some
ways and causing it to develop in an inconsistent manner in others.
While there was relatively little development in the law of homicide before the sixteenth century, there was one important initiative
for change in the late fourteenth century. That initiative, which I
shall analyze in part IlI, was Parliament's attempt to set limits on the
royal prerogative to pardon for felonious homicide, a legislative program that led to a temporary distinction between "murder" and less
serious forms of felonious homicide (i.e., "simple" homicide). For
reasons set forth, that distinction did not produce a change in the
substantive law of homicide.
The sixteenth-century reform of the institution of benefit of clergy
produced the main outlines of the modem law of homicide. That
development in the substantive law depended on both the specific
procedural context in which benefit of clergy was pleaded and the
new role that the trial jury had by then come to play. In part IV, I
shall analyze those developments in order to demonstrate how, after
several centuries of discontinuity between formal rules and community attitudes, the rules were finally reconciled with public sentiment in
the modem law of homicide.
I.

INTRODUCTION:

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Homicide was a daily fact of life in medieval England. Brawling
was common; serious physical violence routine.1 Provocation
produced retaliation, often by knife or staff, and relatively superficial
blows sometimes resulted in death from ensuing shock or infection.
Then, as now, much of the violence that proved fatal grew out of
sudden fights between neighbors or relatives. Other homicides, however, were committed in cold blood, for example, in the course of
1. B. Hannawalt, Violent Death in Fourteenth and Fifteenth Century England 78 (forthcoming in J. FOR THE COMP. STUDY OF Soc. & HIST.).
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settling an old grudge. The slayer in such a case sought to take his
victim off-guard and to make death a certain result. Deliberate
homicide was also perpetrated by members of roving gangs of thieves
who accosted highway travelers or broke the calm of villages, bur2
gling houses and slaying resisting residents or potential witnesses.
These facts are not startling. Sudden wrath and murderous
design have lain side by side in almost all societies. But the incidence
of homicide may have been greater then than now: Poor medical
techniques meant the injured often died; inadequate policing mechanisms encouraged those prone to a life of violent theft.
Nor is it startling that community attitudes distinguished between
cold-blooded killing and slaying in the heat of passion. Certainly a
distinction between intentional and unintentional homicide seems
natural. Deaths in brawls often resulted from blows that were not
intended to be fatal. Thus, it may have been difficult for community
members to conceive of the slayer's act as truly deliberate. Those
who sanctioned execution or retribution in the case of truly premeditated homicide might not sanction it for homicide perpetrated out of
sudden anger. The execution of those who slew of a sudden would
have meant not only a dramatic increase in the numbers sent to death,
but also the frequent condemnation of neighbors and friends, persons
of generally good reputation. In medieval England, as I have argued
elsewhere, the local community considered the drastic sanctions appropriate mainly for the real evildoer: the stealthy slayer who took his
victim by surprise and without provocation.
This distinction between slaying by stealth and slaying openly and
of a sudden was embedded in Anglo-Saxon criminal law and survived
after the Conquest at least until the middle of the twelfth century.
Capital punishment was reserved for only the former. 4 Though little
is known about the exact scope of "slaying by stealth," it surely
included killing by poison and possibly by ambush or other forms of
surprise attack.5 These were "botless," or unemendable crimes; that
2. See note 173 infra.
3. See Green, Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability for Homicide in Medieval
England,47 SPECuLUM 669, 689-93 (1972).
4. N. HuRNARD, THE KING'S PARDON FOR HOMICmE 1 (1969).

5. See Green, supranote 3, at 689 (footnotes omitted):
Originally, murder was "secret" in the narrow sense that slayer hid his victim's body to conceal the deed, but it probably was soon used more broadly to
refer to any homicide whose perpetrator was unknown. ...
It is likely, however, that murder already in Anglo-Saxon times might have referred to the fact
that the slayer's identity was concealed from his victim, so that the latter was
taken offguard.
See also 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 486 (2d ed.
1968); Kaye, Early History of Murder and Manslaughter (pts. 1 & 2), 83 L.Q. REv.
365, 571, at 366-67 (1967); Pollock, The King's Peace in the Middle Ages, 13 HAv.
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is, they could not be remedied through the payment of compensation
(bot) by the slayer or his kin to the kin of the slain.6
With the exception of these unemendable homicides, or "murders," slaying was a matter for compensation. 7 The rules governing

compensation were, within a century of the Anglo-Saxon invasion of
England, already embodied in the dooms, "legislation" declaring

social custom.8

The earliest dooms merely recorded the levels of

compensation; later dooms established the local pretrial and trial

procedures required before compensation could be adjudged in a
given case.' Failure to stand to justice or, thereafter, to pay the
required sum gave the slain person's kin the right to prosecute the
feud and even to take the life of the slayer. 10

But it is likely that

most slayings led to "composition," payment and re-establishment of
relative harmony between kin groups."
The legal distinction between these two types of homicide wasobliterated in the course of the reforms of Henry 1[(1154-1189).12
L. REv. 177 (1900), in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 403,
404 (1908).
6. See J.GOEBEL, FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR 381-82, 431 (1937); N. HURNARD,
supra note 4, at 1-12; 2 F. POLLOCK &F. MAITLAND, supranote 5, at 449-51.
7. While slaying through accident and self-defense were, in theory, emendable
homicides for which compensation was owing, there is evidence of an attempt by king
and Church in the tenth and eleventh centuries to limit the amount owed. Of the
success or failure of these attempts we know nothing. It seems likely that the king,
as fount of justice, employed his power to extend mercy to such slayers, at least to
the extent of excusing the collateral payment to the Crown (the wite) owing in cases
of emendable homicide. Pollock and Maitland state that the king might not insist
upon the wile in cases of misadventure. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note
5, at 483. Although self-defense might have been treated similarly, more likely it
was treated as an ordinary intentional homicide. Only one Anglo-Saxon doom (that
is, "legislation" declaring social custom) gives substantial consideration to mitigation, and it distinguishes between accident resulting from the slayer's negligence and
accident resulting from the victim's carelessness. Alfred 36, in THE LAWS OF THE
EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS 79-81 (F. Attenborough trans. & ed.) [hereinafter Attenborough]. See N. HURNARD, supra note 4, at xiii-xiv. For a discussion of the influence of the Church on criminal liability in the tenth and eleventh centuries, see
Whitelocke, Wulfstan and the Laws of Cnut, 63 ENG. HIST. 'REv. 433 (1948).
8. See generally Attenborough, supra note 7; 1 F. LIEBERMANN, DIE GESE1TE
DER ANGELSACHSEN (1903); H. PCHARDSON & G. SAYLES, LAw AND LEGISLATION
FROM AETHELBEHRT TO MAGNA CARTA 1-29 (1966).
9. Compare the laws of Aethelberht, in Attenborough, supra note 7, at 4, with
the laws of Alfred, in id. at 63.
10. See Alfred 42, in Attenborough, supranote 7, at 83-85.
11. We shall never be certain as to the relative frequency of composition and
blood-feud. One scholar suggests that feuding continued after Alfred's time (the late
ninth century), perhaps into the eleventh century. See D. WmrTELOCKE, THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH SOCIETY 38-45 (1965). The evidence of some continued feuding,
however, does not preclude a general pattern of composition. By the twelfth century,
it seems fair to say, the attitude of the community, if not that of the kin of the slain,
was that compensation was appropriate in cases of nonstealthy homicide.
12. On the legal reforms of Henry II, see, e.g., H. RICHARDSON & G. SAYLES, THE
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Whatever the real ends of monarchical policy-deterrence, financial
gain, or political centralization-the Angevin reform of the criminal
law established a system of substantive law that was sharply at odds
with prevailing social practices. The sudden twelfth-century growth
in royal criminal law, in theory implementing the ancient royal obligation to enforce the king's peace throughout the land,"3 was principally a jurisdictional development. Henry II effected this development by ordering his justices to ride circuit and his local officials to
produce before those justices good and loyal men of the county who
had knowledge of recent felonies and other, lesser, breaches of the
king's peace. 14 The justices heard the accusations, or "presentments," of these embryonic grand juries, ordered the sheriff to arrest
suspects named in the presentments, and put to trial suspects already
arrested. As had formerly been the case in the local county courts,
felony trials proceeded by way of ordeal. 5 Those found guilty
through this ancient method of proof, however, were now to be
hanged. 16 The growth of royal jurisdiction over all felonies and.the
consequent imposition in these cases of the blood sanction blurred the
former distinctions among felonies. No longer were there botless and
7
emendable felonies; all were capital.1
GOVERNANCE OF MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO MAGNA CARTA 251300 (1963); R. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BrTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 40-41,
72-75 (1973).
. 13. See generally J. GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 423-40; H. RICHARDSON & G.
SAYLES, supra note 12, at 173-215; D. STENTON, ENGLISH JUSTICE BETWEEN THE NORMAN CONQUEST AND THE GREAT CHARTER 1066-1215, at 65-82 (1964); Humard, The
Jury of Presentment and the Assize of Clarendon, 56 ENG. HIST. REV. 374 (1941).
14. Assize of Clarendon (1166) in SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 76, 77 (C. Stephenson & F. Marcham trans. & eds. 1937) [hereinafter Assize
of Clarendon]. The Assize of Clarendon may have consolidated and enhanced
earlier practices. Hurnard argues that the system of communal accusation had its
roots in the early twelfth century, if not before. Hurnard, supra note 13, at 37896. As a practical matter, Henry 11 appears to have made such sporadic practices
routine.
15. Assize of Clarendon, supra note 14, at 77. For discussion of the ordeals in
the twelfth century, see R. VAN CAENEGEM, supranote 12, at 62-68.
16. According to the Assize of Northampton (1176), those who failed the ordeals to which they had been subjected pursuant -to the Assize of Clarendon lost a
foot. Hurnard, supra note 13, at 396. The death penalty eventually replaced mutilation; for homicide this may have happened during the reign of Henry II. See
F. POLLOCK &F. MAITLAND, supranote 5, at 461.
17. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 5, at 458-60. Hurnard suggests
that many felonies, including some homicides, had become unemendable as early as
the reign of Henry I (1100-1135). N. HuRNARD, supra note 4, at 8-9. The king's
peace was extended to cover slayings that occurred at specified places or on certain
occasions. Thus, in Hurnard's view, the reforms effected by Henry H1 represented
a coalescence of earlier, piecemeal extensions of the king's peace. While this militates against a very sudden change in the law of homicide, it does not materially
affect the argument I am setting forth.
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The felonies over which the royal justices had jurisdiction included, of course, homicide. Though felonious homicide soon came
to be defined as slaying through malice (malitia,malitia precogitata),
"malice" stood only for a threshold degree of mens rea, not for true

malice aforethought. 18

Within this category, then, as within the

entire class of felony, the old distinction between botless and emenda-

ble acts disappeared. All felonious homicide was considered capi19
tal.
There were now two main categories of nonfelonious homicide:
justifiable homicide and excusable homicide. Though these categories did not become firmly established until the early thirteenth century, it is likely that they took form during the reign of Henry II and
his immediate successor. 20 The category of justifiable homicide included executions pursuant to a royal order and the ancient practices
of slaying thieves caught escaping with the goods and outlaws who
resisted capture.2 ' Slayers deemed justified were acquitted by the
royal courts.
Excusable homicide, on the other hand, did not lead to acquittal;
rather the slayer was required to obtain a royal pardon, which absolved him from liability to royal suit but left open, at least in theory,
the right of the victim's kin to prosecute an appeal. 22 There were two
18. See Kaye, supra note 5, at 371-77. Of course, the king, exercising his discretion, might pardon some who had committed felonious homicide. See notes 52-55
infraand accompanying text.
19. The term "murder" was no longer commonly employed as a term of art for
particularly heinous homicide. But the concept of murder was reflected in the name
given to the fine imposed on the local community for an unexplained homicide
("murdrum"). Many, but not all, such homicides had been committed in secret, the
slayer taking his victim by surprise and making his escape without detection by third
parties. See T. PLUCKNElT, 'A CoNcIsE HisToRy OF THE COMMON LAW 88, 444-45
(5th ed. 1956); CROWN PLEAS OF THE WILTSHIRE EYa, 1249, at 61-65 (C. Meekings
trans. & ed. 1961) [hereinafter WwmrsnrnE EYRE]; Hurnard, supra note 13, at 38593. The murdrum fine was abolished in 1340. 14 Edw. 3, stat. 1, c. 4. By that time,
the term "murder" was once again coming to be identified in official documents with
slaying itself. See, e.g., Post, Some Limitations of the Medieval Peace Rolls, 4 J. Soc.
OF ARCHVISTS 633, 639 (1973). See note 175 infra and accompanying text.
20. There is some, but slight, evidence that as early as the reign of Henry I,
slaying in self-defense did not lead to payment of the wergild. Nevertheless, the defendant had to make "honorable amends" ("dignis satisfactionibus hoc monstrare
liceat"). LGEs HENiuci PRibi c. 87, at 6 (L. Downer trans. & ed. 1972).
21. See authorities cited in notes 84-86 infra.
22. The appeal was a form of private prosecution. By the late twelfth century,
it involved a suit in a royal court leading to trial by battle. In the case of homicide, only certain close relatives could bring an appeal, and the charges had formally
to be lodged in very specific terms. The system of presentment instituted by Henry
II provided an alternative and, from the point of view of the royal justices, preferable
method of trial. Especially after trial by jury became common, the number of successful appeals declined rapidly. Judges frequently quashed appeals and held the appellee for trial by jury at the suit of the king. See generally R. HuNmsETr, THE
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main classes of excusable homicide: accidental homicide23 and homicide committed in self-defense. 24 Accidental homicide was unintentional homicide: The slayer had not intended to slay (or, we may
suppose, seriously to harm) the deceased. The category thus encompassed negligent acts or even reckless ones. 25 The category of selfdefense was an extremely important one; except for the very narrow
class of justifiable homicide, it represented the sole body of intentional homicides that were nonfelonious and hence not punishable by
death. By the early thirteenth century, this crucial category had
come to be defined as slaying out of literally vital necessity: the
slayer, under mortal attack, had acted as a last resort to save his own
life.
In an age when fighting was common and death could result from
even a superficial wound, the new rules of homicide must have
clashed with community instincts about just deserts. Many slayings
occurred within the small village community, 2 and, had the formal
rules been successfully implemented, many persons would have been
hanged who, under earlier rules, would have been allowed to compose
with the kin of the slain. It is therefore surprising that for four
centuries, from the time the Crown took jurisdiction over all felonies
until the middle of the sixteenth century, the legal distinction between
felonious and nonfelonious homicide remained fixed and all felonious
MEDIEVAL CORONER 55-65 (1961); PLACITA CORONE xxiv-xxviii (J.M. Kaye trans. &
ed. 1966) [hereinafter PLACrrA CORONE]; WILTSmrn EYRE, supra note 19, at 69-81.
Hurnard develops a brilliant argument linking the institution of private appeals to
the origin of the system of pardoning perpetrators of excusable homicide. See N.
HuRNARD, supra note 4, at 1-30. Her argument assumes that homicides committed
in self-defense and by accident had traditionally led to a valid claim for compensation. The king could not easily abolish the right to such compensation and determined to allow appeals to continue in such cases. But it would have been dangerous
to assert the principle that these homicides did not have to be presented at all: presenting juries might then conceal homicides at an early stage by declaring them outside of royal concern. The kin of the slain, for their part, might even try to characterize felonious homicides as killings in self-defense or through accident so that they
could press an appeal leading to compensation. Thus, all homicides had to be presented; where the royal justices found no liability, a royal pardon, reserving to kin
their right to appeal, was granted. Such appeals were in fact very rarely if ever,
successful, and it is doubtful whether as a matter of law they could be brought after
1250. See id. at 204; PLAcrrA CORONE, supra, at xxxii.
23. See text at notes 115-34 infra.
24. See text at notes 56-81 infra. A third small category of excusable homicide,
not discussed in this essay, was slaying excused by insanity. On this subject, see N.
HURNARD, supra note 4, at 152-70; N. WALKER, 1 CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND
15-51 (1968).
25. See note 115 infra and accompanying text.
26. With regard to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, see B. Hannawalt,
supra note 1, at 15-16. Comparable studies do not exist for the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but there is no reason to believe that homicides became more local
in the ensuing period than they had been before.
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homicide remained capital. For the stealthy slayer and for the one
who acted on sudden impulse, the official sanction was the same.
Why did the distinction between capital and noncapital felonious
homicide remain submerged for so long? Why did it finally emerge
when it did, and what dictated the form that it took? It is my thesis
that the pace and nature of the development of the substantive law of
homicide was heavily influenced by the interaction of the self-informing jury and the medieval pardoning system. Hence these institutions
and procedures require discussion.
It is important to recognize that from its very inception the new
system of criminal law both compelled and depended upon widespread lay cooperation. After the Assize of Clarendon in 1166,
presentment depended upon the cooperation of men of the hundredal
divisions of the counties. These men were supposed to present not
only those whom they suspected on the basis of their own knowledge,
but also those who were suspected generally in the hundred. In
some cases, therefore, the presentments reflected the jurors' own
willingness to accuse; in others, they reflected the willingness to accuse of other, perhaps less substantial, members of the community.
For a half century the suspect, once presented, was at the mercy
of those who oversaw the ordeals. After the ordeals were abolished
in 1215, 2 however, the Crown, in search of a new method of proof,
turned once again to lay cooperation. If the defendant agreed to
"put himself on the country," a lay jury of twelve rendered a verdict
as to his guilt or innocence.2 9 This petty or trial jury, including at
first members of the presentment jury, was sworn to state whether the
defendant had in fact committed the felony for which he had been
presented. Thus, from the third decade of the thirteenth century,
both presentment (or indictment, as a somewhat different version of
the process came later to be called) and the verdict of the "country"
stood between the accused and the gallows. By then, it would seem,
27. Assize of Clarendon, supra note 14, at 77 ("whether in their hundred or in
their vill there is any man accused or publicly known as a robber or murderer or
thief. . ."). In theory there was no room for discretion of the sort usually associated with a grand jury; this jury was a reporting body. Failure to report anyone
suspected of any acts specified in the bill of the eyre could result in a fine, or
"amercement." See WiL-rsHmE EYRE, supra note 19, at 92-93.
28. By an order of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, clergy were prohibited
from playing any role in the ordeals, which had depended upon religious sanction.
See T. PLuCENETr, supra note 19, at 118-19; R. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 12, at
69.
29. See S. MLsoM, HisrorctA FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 358-60
(1969); T. PLUtCKNEr, supra note 19, at 118-21; Maitland, Introduction to PLEAS
OF THE CROWN FOR THE COUNTY OF GLOUCESTER at xxxvi-xli (F. Maitland ed. 1884)
[hereinafter PLEAS OF GLOUCESTER]; Stenton, Introduction to ROLLS OF THE JUSTICES
IN EYRE at lxviii-lxxi (D. Stenton trans. & ed. 1934).
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the opportunity existed for the community to impose its own views
within and upon the legal process.
A review of the procedures involved from the time of the slaying
until the final resolution of the case reveals the manner in which such
community sentiment might be expressed.

In all homicide cases, the

coroner, a Crown official at the county level, was required to hold an
inquest as soon as possible. ° Usually within a day or two of the
discovery of the body, 31 the coroner assembled the inquest jury,
composed of representatives of the vill in which the slaying occurred
and of several neighboring

vfis,

32

and conducted the inquest.

He

there noted the cause of death, took down the names of suspects
mentioned by the jurors, and ordered the sheriff or hundred bailiff to

arrest the suspect if this had not already been done.33 The suspect
was held for trial before the royal justices, whose circuits or "eyres"
were held infrequently throughout the thirteenth century. From
early in the fourteenth century, the itinerant royal justices came twice
yearly to the county town for delivery of its gaol.34 A record of the
coroner's inquest was available to the court, as was the record of any
presentment made either before the royal justices or before the jus35
tices of the peace.
Typically, at gaol delivery, the suspect being held for trial was

brought forward by the sheriff. The justices inquired about the
charges, and the sheriff, presumably relying on the enrollment of the
30. R. HuNImsEyr, supranote 22, at 13.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 13-14.
33. Id. at 22.
34. See generally R. PUGH, IMPRISONMENT IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 255-314
(1968). Until the late thirteenth century, judicial business was transacted mainly
at the eyres, plenary judicial circuits held at seven-year intervals to deal with civil
pleas, criminal cases ("pleas of the crown"), and various administrative and economic matters. See generally WLTsHmE EYRE, supra note 19. Because of the infrequency of the eyres, incarcerated homicide defendants frequently obtained orders for
special inquisitions into the circumstances of the alleged slaying. Upon a finding
of excusable homicide the defendant might be either pardoned or bailed until the next
eyre. See R. HuNNisET, supra note 22, at 77-78; N. HURNARD, supra note 4, at 3742; text at notes 75-76 infra. This article will be concerned chiefly with gaol delivery, the main context of fourteenth-century felony trials. There is no printed edition
of selected gaol delivery rolls. The rolls are described and discussed in M. Gollancz,
The System of Gaol Delivery (unpublished M.A. dissertation, University of London,
1936). All of the extant rolls are deposited at the Public Record Office, London,
England.
35. On the justices of the peace, see T. PLUCINETr, supra note 19, at 167-69;
Harding, Origins and Early History of the Keeper of the Peace, 10 TRANSACTIONS
OF THE ROYAL HIST. Soc. 85 (5th series 1960). PROCEEDINGS BEFORE TII JUSTICES
OF THE PEACE IN THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH CENTURIES xxvi, IV, xciv (B. Putnam ed. 1938) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS], discusses the sending of indictments by
justices of the peace to justices of gaol delivery. Many of the gaol delivery enrollments after 1350 include indictments made before justices of the peace.

HeinOnline -- 74 Mich. L. Rev. 422 1975-1976

January 19761

The Jury and the English Law of Homicide

coroner or justice of the peace, 36 stated the charges to the court.3 7 The
defendant was then asked how he pleaded, and, in response to the
almost invariable plea of not guilty, the bench ordered that the jury be
selected and sworn. 38 The twelve trial jurymen generally came from
the hundred where the homicide had taken place. 39 Until the late
thirteenth century they were drawn from the grand jurors; 40 subsequently they were chosen from a group of eighteen sent by each
hundred to sit on all trials relating to that county subdivision. 41 Close
relatives 42 of the deceased were excluded, as were those known to
bear a grudge against him; 43 with these two exceptions, familiarity

with the facts of the case was a desideratum rather than a bar to jury
service.

The surviving trial rolls record the selection of a jury and, in the
next sentence, the jury's verdict. Except in cases of excusable homicide, where details of the accident or act of self-defense were enrolled,

the verdict was generally recorded solely in the conclusory terms of
guilt or innocence.

The enrollments do not often reveal where the

36. Itis possible that the sheriff relied on a highly abbreviated form of the presentment or indictment that had been set forth in the order from the coroner or justice of the peace that the suspect be taken.
37. See, e.g., PLAcrrA CORONE, supra note 22, at 19.

Cf. J. BELLAMY, CRIME

146 (1973) ("Mhe
indictment was read out").
38. See, e.g., JUST 3/1-400, passim.
39. Pugh studied the gaol delivery rolls for Newgate Prison, in London, during
the reign of Edward I (1272-1307). Pugh, Some Reflections of a Medieval CrimAND PUBLIC ORDER IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES

inologist, 59 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BmiSH ACADEMY 1 (1973).

On the basis of this

study, he concluded that juries usually included representatives of the place where
the alleged offense had been committed, and he states:
Generally this was secured, and when charges were laid in two or more venues
all the venues were summoned. Besides this, surrounding venues might be added
-a reflection perhaps of the "four neighbouring towns" normally assembled after
presentments in eyre. This was, in some years at least, particularly true of the
London wards. Thus full coverage of the site venue was assured. In addition,
however, -thereare many instances where the suspect's home venue, or what looks
like it, was added to the site venue. Besides the site and home venues a jury
might also come from the venue where the felon was arrested, which could be
far from the scene of the crime. . . . Finally, in order to prove an alibi, juries
might additionally come from a place capable of substantiating that claim.
Id. at 13.
40. T. PLucKNETr,
supra note 19, at 126. Plucknett suggests that, as of the
middle of the thirteenth century, petty juries commonly had among their number
some who had been on the presenting jury, although it is unlikely that juries were
composed solely of presenters. Before 1352, a defendant was not able to challenge
a member of the petty jury on the ground that he had served on the grand jury. Id.
at 127.
41. See, e.g.,
C 260/4, no. 19 (1288); C 260/6, no. 7 (1292); C 260/16, no. 12
(1306).
42. J.BELLAMY, supra note 37,at 145-46.
43. 2 H. BRACrON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 405 (S.Thorne
trans. & ed. 1968) (f. 143b).
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jury got its information or how it reached its verdict. One obvious
source of information was the defendant. Though his statement was

not recorded, there is evidence that, after denying his guilt, the
defendant generally related an alibi or admitted having slain the
deceased and explained how he had acted in self-defense. The judge
apparently then questioned the defendant, who responded in terms
calculated to save his own skin. 44 The jury's opinion, however, may

also have been based on what it had long known about either the
homicide or the defendant, or on what it had just learned in the
rumor mill of the gaol delivery session.45 It was the jurors' duty to
r'ender a verdict on the basis of their knowledge of the facts, whether

that knowledge was first-hand or gleaned from those whom they
chose to believe. They were gatherers as well as weighers of evidence, and their sworn verdict regarding the facts was determinative.

Though the judges might occasionally pause to question the jury," in
all but unusual cases the jury firmly reiterated its verdict and thereby
ended the matter. Judgment was thereupon entered by the court in
stark formulae: for acquittal, "quietus est"; for conviction, "suspendatus est" ("he is hanged"); for excusable homicide, "remittitur ad
gratiam domine regis" ("he is remitted to the grace of the king").
It is clear that the trial jury possessed the power to state the

verdict in a form that compelled the judgment it believed the
defendant deserved.

The jury could produce a verdict of clear-cut

malicious homicide; it could absolve the defendant of all liability by
stating either that he had not committed the act or that he had

committed it in the course of taking a felon; it could state that the
defendant slew by accident or in self-defense. The jury's choice of
44. See, e.g., PLACrrA CORONE, supra note 22, at 19-20. J.M. Kaye, the editor
of Placita Corone, describes the procedure in cases on indictment as "inquisitorial":
"rTlhe justice conducts the case in person as an examination in chief, seeking to
induce each prisoner either to confess or to put himself upon a jury." Id. at xxxv.
Kaye asserts that the justices were not above tricking the defendant where they could
do so. Id. But the successful tricking of defendants into admissions of guilt must
have been very rare; the trial rolls reflect the fact that very few defendants ever confessed. The one example of an indictment for homicide in Placita Corone led to
a verdict of self-defense, and it demonstrates how easily the defendant and jury could
deter the bench from having its way with the defendant. Id. at 19-20.
45. Jurors were sworn to tell the truth "to the best of their knowledge. If, however, they did not know it or possessed imperfect knowledge they could not then support the prosecution, for they must not reach their verdicts on the basis of mere
'thoughts."' Pugh, supra note 39, at 17-18. It is doubtful, however, that jurors could
swear only to what they had themselves witnessed. Presumably, they had to have
become convinced to the point of virtual certainty, but we cannot determine by what
standards they were to assess the evidence and testimony brought to their attention
before or during trial.
46. The evidence on this point, however, is by no means clear. See N. HuRNARD,
supranote 4, at 258.
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verdict, its concept of the defendant's liability, did not have to square
with the formal rules of the law. Even if the bench suspected that
juries took advantage of their evidence-gathering role in this way, the
justices had no means in any given case for getting behind the jury's
47
formulistic verdict to the truth of the matter.
If convicted, the defendant was hanged, usually within a matter of
hours and nearly always within several days. His lands and goods
were forfeited. 48 The acquitted defendant was immediately released,
though he, too, suffered forfeiture of goods if initially he had fled
from justice.4 9 A finding of excusable homicide resulted in the
defendant's remand to gaol until he obtained a pardon from the king,
a procedure that delayed his release for several months. 50 Until the
1340's, the excusable slayer, like the acquitted defendant, suffered
forfeiture only if he had refused to surrender upon first becoming a
suspect. Thereafter, forfeiture of goods became automatic in such
cases; it had in effect become a penalty attached to the pardon for
accidental homicide or homicide in self-defense.51
47. See, e.g., PLACrrA CORONE, supra note 22, at 19-20. The procedure of "attaint" of the jury "was never extended -to the criminal jury ... ." S. MIIsoM, supra
note 29, at 366. Judges could threaten juries with fines and imprisonment, but it
is difficult to see how these could have been used in "suspicious" self-defense cases:
too many such cases occurred, and the medieval bench lacked a source of evidence
against which to test the juries' verdicts. In the great majority of cases, the coroner's
or justice of the peace's indictment was too spare to provide the bench with an alternative to the jury's recitation of the facts.
48. Escheat of lands was to the feudal lord except in cases of high treason where
escheat was to the king. Forfeiture of chattels was to the Crown. S. MLSoM, supra
note 29, at 370.
49. N. HuRNARD, supra note 4, at 144-45. It is not clear from the trial rolls how
often the court put to the jury the question whether or not the defendant had fled.
See note 51 infra.
50. T. Green, Pardonable Homicide in Medieval England, Dec. 1, 1969, at 170
(unpublished dissertation, Harvard University).
It appears that at least by the late fourteenth century, some defendants were released to the custody of trustworthy persons (a procedure known as mainprise) pending their receipt of the pardon. The gaol delivery rolls indicate that some justices
"mainperned" pardonables who were able to find four "gentlemen" from the county
to stand as sureties. There is some Year Book support for this procedure as early
as 1330. See A. FTZHERBERT, LA GRAuNDE ABRIDGEMENT, Corone, pl. 361 (1329)
(1565). The earliest such enrolled cases, however, date from the mid-1340's. See,
e.g., JUST 3/134, m.24/4, m.24d/3 (1347). Nearly all the other enrolled cases
showing release until pardon date from 1370 and after. See, e.g., JusT 3/156,
m.10/4 (1370); JUST 3/161, m.18/2, /3 (1375); C 260/103, no. 30 (1391); JUST
3/179, m.21d/9 (1397). The defendant was released after trial, "so that he might
in the meantime seek the king's grace," and, theoretically, he was bound to appear
at succeeding deliveries until the pardon had been received, claimed, and formally
proclaimed.
51. N. HuRNARD, supra note 4, at 147. See generally 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 5, at 481. It is not possible to determine the exact moment this
new policy came into being. The first Year Book reference to a general rule of forfeiture is Y.B. Hil. 21 Edw. 3, pl. 23 (1347). See also Y.B. Mich. 44 Edw. 3, pl.
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Until the thirteenth century, pardon in cases of excusable homi-

cide was a matter of royal discretion; by the end of that century, it
had become in practice a matter of the common law,5 2 issuing automatically and gratuitously,5 3 as a matter "of course" (de cursu). In
contrast, pardons in all other cases of homicide were and remained
true acts of discretion.

These pardons "of grace" (de gratia) were

granted in theory out of mercy, but in fact often as a political favor or
for revenue. From the 1290's on, they were employed openly as a
55 (1370); Y.B. Easter 2 Hen. 4, pl. 6 (1400). Examination of the gaol delivery
rolls yields very uncertain information. Clerks did not always record forfeitures,
and, even before 1340, they often failed to note flight. Recording flight was unnecessary before forfeiture became general: where forfeiture was indicated there must
have been flight. Afterward, since flight was no longer a prerequisite for seizure of
goods, it was an equally purposeless point for the busy clerks to make. Hence, neither the failure to indicate forfeiture nor the indication of forfeiture without mention
of flight necessarily indicates whether the automatic forfeiture rule was in effect. For
gaol delivery rolls evidencing the haphazard application of the new rule, see JUsT
3/129 (1336-1346); JusT 3/131 (1337-1355); Jusr 3/134 (1341-1351), passim.
See note 158 infra and accompanying text.
52. N. HupNA, supra note 4, at 224. The source of the pardon was the royal
prerogative, a power and a duty combined. As the fount of justice, the king was
expected to do justice or to extend mercy wherever warranted. See H. BRACTON,
supra note 43, at 378 ("Ihe king] is sometimes bound to grant his life to a man
of grace, as where he has killed a man by misadventure, or in self-defense . . ."
(emphasis added; footnotes omitted)). See also 2 FLETA 61 (H. Richardson & G.
Sayles trans. & eds. 1955) [hereinafter FLETA].
A 1329 Year Book statement reflects the automatic nature of pardons: "Note that
when a man is acquitted before the justices errant for the death of a man in selfdefense [soy defendo], the process is such, that he shall have the writ of the Chief
Justice, within which writ shall be contained the record of his acquittal to the Chancellor, who shall make him his writ of pardon without speaking to the king by course
of law." A. FrrZERBERT, supra note 50, Corone, pl. 361. (All quotations from
the Year Books have been translated from the original Law French.) Cf. id., pl.
295 (1330): "Scrope, C.J., and the other justices ordered the prisoner to remove the
record into the Chancery; and the Chancellor made him a charter in such a case
without speaking to the king." Compare the Commons' petition to the king and the
latter's reply in 1309. 1 ROTULI PAPLIAMENTORUM 444b; note 162 infra.
53. See 3 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 38 (1883), suggesting that the king granted pardons to those who slew in self-defense and misadventure "upon terms as to fines and forfeitures which would depend on the degree
of blame which might be considered to attach to the defendant by reason of the
avoidable nature of the necessity under which he had killed the deceased, if the case
was one of self-defense; or the amount of carelessness he had shown if the case was
one of accident." Although this may have been true during the early thirteenth century, the records are too sparse for a conclusion to be drawn on this point. The
available evidence does suggest that this was only rarely the case after 1250, when
special inquisitions were held in large numbers. The verdicts in self-defense cases,
especially, were phrased in a way that did not allow for blame to "attach to the defendant." Certainly this is true for fourteenth-century gaol delivery enrollments.
Payment (not, however, depending upon "degree of blame") was sometimes required
for special inquisitions and pardons in cases of excusable homicide in the thirteenth
century. N. HuRNARD, supra note 4, at 41-42. By the fourteenth century, only formal proclamation of the pardon was likely to require a fee, and this was not a necessary procedure. Id. at 65.
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means of raising a military force. 54 Pardons of grace immunized the
recipient from prosecution for felony. They almost always issued
before trial, and they prevented further proceedings.55 They could
not easily be obtained after conviction, except by those rich or powerful enough to buy time to approach the king.
Defendants who were known to have committed felonious homicide (especially those who had committed "simple" homicide), but
who had not obtained pardons of grace before being brought forward
at trial, might still hope to be the beneficiaries of community sentiment. Because medieval juries in homicide cases might employ their
de facto power to present the evidence in the form they pleased,
defendants might be acquitted or they might be found to have slain in
an excusable manner. In treating such defendants in this way, juries
would be relieving the tension between community sentiments and the
formal rules of the law. They would also, however, be shaping the
development of the formal law in ways they could not easily have
foreseen.
I1.

THE TRIAL JURY AND THE LAW OF
NONFELONIOUS HOMICIDE IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

In this section, I shall first set forth the evidence that medieval
juries tended to characterize felonious but not especially heinous
homicides as acts of self-defense. I shall then argue that this jury
behavior affected the development of the law of nonfelonious homicide in at least three identifiable ways. First, this jury behavior was
responsible in part for the retention of the strict legal rules defining
self-defense. Second, judicial suspicion that juries manipulated the
self-defense category led to an uneven development in the law of
justifiable homicide: Although, in response to a perceived rise in
professional crime, the category of justifiable homicide came to include slayers of those caught in the act of committing certain felonies,
such as robbery or burglary, it did not come to include slayers of
those engaged merely in personal assault. Third, jury behavior led
to the retention of the royal pardon requirement and automatic forfeiture of goods for the category of self-defense long after courts began to acquit defendants in cases of accidental homicide. While true
self-defenders may have deserved at least as much consideration as
negligent or unwitting slayers, they continued to be treated harshly
54. See H. HEwrrr, THE ORGANIZATION OF WAR UNDER EDWARD III 29-31
(1966); N. HuRNARD, supra note 4, at 311-26.

55. Examination of four rolls showed that 40 out of 456 defendants produced pardons at trial. See JUST 3/137A (1351-1353); JusT 3/149, mm. 1-14 (1351-1366);
JusT 3/142 (1366-1371); JusT 3/167 (1377-1385) (homicide cases only).
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because the courts could not distinguish them from alleged "self-de-

fenders" who had in fact committed felonious homicide.
A.

Homicide in Self-Defense

The self-defense rules were among the least elastic of medieval
criminal law.

By the middle decades of the thirteenth century, the

legal category of slaying in self-defense had been judicially formulated to include only acts of last resort, undertaken by persons who
could not otherwise save their own lives.56

Moreover, the test was

objective; it was not enough for the jury to agree that a defendant
5 7
subjectively believed he had no other recourse.

Jury verdicts soon came to include a formulistic response that the
defendant "could not otherwise have escaped death" (recorded on the
rolls, "aliter mortem suam non evadere potuit").5 8 But the jury's

initial assertion to this effect was not always sufficient. The trial rolls
indicate that the justices sometimes questioned the jurors closely,
particularly when the jury's original statement left unclear whether
the defendant had in fact been placed in a position from which he
could escape only through physical retaliation." In a few such cases
56. N. HuRNARD, supra note 4, at 92-93. Hurnard's definitive discussion of the
substantive and procedural elements of the law of excusable homicide in the thirteenth century has replaced all earlier studies. The present essay deals mainly with
the period after 1300, with which Hurnard does not deal. For a critique of Hurnard's
view that thirteenth-century excusable homicide verdicts were relatively truthful,
see Green, supranote 3, at 683-86.
57. As late as 1454, it was stated authoritatively by Justice Prisot:
[I]f
a man assaults you in order to beat you it is not lawful for you to say
you want to kill him and to endanger his life and limb: but if the case is such
that he has you at such advantage that he intends to kill you as you seek to
flee and he is swifter than you and pursues you so that you are unable to escape;
or if you are on the ground under him; or if he chases you to a wall or hedge
or dike, so that you cannot escape, then it is lawful for you to say that if he
won't desist, you want to slay him to save your own life, and thus you may
menace him for such special cause ....
Y.B. Easter 33 Hen. 6, pl. 10 (1454).
In many, perhaps most, cases, physical obstacles to further retreat did not in fact
exist. The assailant had endangered the defendant's life and retaliation probably
seemed wiser than an attempt to flee. One judge admitted as much in 1414 when,
after it had been remarked that the defendant was bound to attempt flight, Cokeyn
added: "But I am not bound to wait while the other fellow lands a blow for perchance it will be too late." Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 6, f. 8, pl. 40 (1414).
58. See, e.g., C 260/13, no. 5 (1302); C 260/72, no. 38 (1361); C 260/79,
no. 38 (1364).
59. See, e.g., C 260/7, no. 46A (1293). (All quotations from the trial rolls are
translated from the original Latin.) In this case, the jurors stated that Gregory le
Waleis threw Thomas de Gloucester "to the ground, lay upon him, and drew his knife
desiring to kill him. Thomas, perceiving this, and fearing likewise his own death,
drew his knife and struck Gregory as the latter lay upon Thomas' stomach." The
justices then asked the jury whether in fact Thomas might have escaped without
killing Gregory, to which the jury responded, "No, because Gregory lay upon
Thomas' stomach and held him tightly and firmly to the ground" ("et ipsum strite
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the jurors responded that the defendant might have turned tail and

outrun his assailant, an assertion that condemned the defendant. 60

But in the vast majority of self-defense cases, including virtually all
enrolled self-defense cases from the last quarter of the thirteenth

century and beyond, the jury's first statement left no room for effective judicial challenge. Nearly every act of self-defense was said to
have been undertaken by a cornered defendant; ditches, walls, and
hedges had constrained fleeing defendants at every turn. 61 More-

over, all juries, when questioned by the incredulous bench, tenaciously repeated these assertions.
et firmiter ad terrain tenuit"). Their reply satisfied the court, and the defendant was
remanded to prison to await his pardon. The pardon is recorded in CALENDAR oF
THE PATENT ROLLS, 2 Edw. 1, at 40 (Oct. 11, 1293).
A similar example is found in C 260/6, no. 28 (1292). The jurors stated that
Gilbert, son of William de Cherneleye, struck Robert de Caterhale
upon the head with his bow so that the bow broke; and Gilbert struck him again
with the remaining part of his bow. Robert, fleeing, sought to cross a ditch in
which a hedge grew and in saving himself grasped a branch from the hedge
which broke off so that he fell with the stick into the ditch. Gilbert soon arrived, assailing Robert with his fractured bow. Robert, considering this, struck
back at Gilbert with the broken branch hitting him in the head so that he died.
The jurors were asked whether Gilbert had a sword or a knife and, if so, whether
he had drawn either. When they replied that Gilbert was so armed, but had drawn
neither weapon, the court, obviously doubtful as to the lethal nature of the broken
bow, asked the jurors once again whether Robert could have escaped without slaying
Gilbert. The jury reiterated their opinion that he could not have done so. This
failed to satisfy the court, however, and only after a second jury had been impaneled
and had supported the verdict of the original jury was the defendant awarded a special verdict. The enrollment indicates in a later hand that Gilbert was pardoned.
In a third case, C 260/6, no. 16 (1292), the petty jury stated that Alan de ]a
More killed John Tyrel in self-defense after a great chase. The -two had argued until
John ran home to fetch a sword. "Alan, seeing John approaching, and desiring to
evade John's malicious intent, kept himself underneath the horse his father, Robert,
was riding. Robert did all in his power to prevent John from striking Alan, but John
chased Alan into a certain corner . . . " where, as a last resort, Alan retaliated with
a mortal blow. The court asked whether Alan could. have fled before John returned
from his house armed. The jury replied that the defendant could not have fled because John was faster than he ("Johannes erat celorior predicto Alano"). Compare
C 260/23, no. 23 (1332), where the jurors testified that the defendant fled as fast as
he could ("velociori curru quo potuit"), but his assailants were even fleeter and
caught up with him ("velociores demure ipsum . . . attinxerunt").
60. See, e.g., 43 LE LwRE DES Assrsns ET PLEAS DEL'CORONE EN TEMPS DU ROY
EDWARD LE TERS, pl. 3 (1370) (1679) [hereinafter AssizE].
61. See, e.g., C 260/13, no. 32 (1302) (wall); C 260/14, no. 10 (1302) (door);
C 260/15, no. 18 (1305) (wall and ditch); C 260/85, no. 31 (1374) (between two
hedges).
During the fourteenth century, enrollments of jury verdicts tell even more elaborate tales: The deceased had started an argument with the defendant, had struck him
and wounded him severely, and the latter had retaliated with only one blow. See,
e.g., JUST 3/142, m.6d/2 (1366); JusT 3/142, m.10d/2 (1370). These embellishments were not required by the law of self-defense, but juries set them forth in an
effort to convince the bench that the defendant had met the basic requirements. They
also convinced the bench that further questioning would not be fruitful.
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Verdicts of self-defense were not only elaborate and expressed in
the most exculpatory terms, they were also extremely common. One
gaol delivery roll covering the years 1351 to 1353 reveals that 21 (30
per cent) of 68 defendants in cases of homicide were found to have
slain in self-defense; 62 in the first section of another roll containing
cases from the period 1351 to 1366, 19 (59 per cent) of 32 homicide
defendants were categorized as self-defenders; 63 fifty-nine (37 per
cent) of 157 homicide defendants on a roll from the years 1366 to
1371 were said to be self-defenders; 64 and, on a roll from 1377 to
1385, there were 24 alleged self-defenders of 199 individual homicide
defendants (12 per cent).65 On this last roll, only 2 more defendants
(26) were convicted of felonious homicide than were found to have
slain according to the strict rules of self-defense.
Although the frequency of elaborate tales of self-defense alone
justifies the conclusion that fourteenth-century juries fabricated evidence on the defendant's behalf, it is extremely difficult to demonstrate that they did so in particular cases. The only feasible approach
is to compare the coroner's indictment with the trial enrollment in
cases ending in verdicts of self-defense. Unfortunately, many coroners' rolls have not survived, and many of those that do exist, like
the rolls of the justices of the peace, set forth indictments in curt and
highly formulistic phrases that reveal practically nothing about the
facts of the case. 60 The process of matching coroner and trial enrollments has, nevertheless, produced some striking results that I have
reported elsewhere: in a number of cases in which the coroner reported sudden arguments that led to violence, or attacks that could
have been avoided without deadly force, the jury set forth a verdict
that met the strict rules of self-defense. 7 None of the cases evidenc62. JusT 3/137A.
63. JusT 3/149, mm.1-14.
64. JusT 3/142.
65. JusT 3/167.
66. Many coroners used the term "felonice interfecit" ("slew feloniously") in virtually every case, since the inclusion in the indictment of the inquest jurors' finding
of self-defense had no legal significance.
67. See Green, supra note 3, at 676-83. An example of what appears to be conversion of the facts of a felonious homicide may be summarized as follows: According to a coroner's inquest jury, William de Walynford, "brewere," quarreled with
Simon de Parys and the latter followed William home, threatening him as they went.
The coroner recorded that William forbade Simon to insult him in his master's house
and then immediately William fetched a knife and plunged it into Simon's chest.
CALENDAR OF CORONERS ROLLS OF THE CITY OF LONDON, A.D. 1300-1378, Roll C,

13, at 80 (R. Sharpe trans. & ed. 1913) [hereinafter LONDON CORONERS' ROLLS]. In
the petty jury's account, however, the facts were somewhat different: Simon had attacked William with a knife as they stood in the king's highway. William fled to
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ing transformation of the facts involved a defendant who had been

described at the coroner's inquest as having slain through stealth or
on account of a long-held grudge. The available evidence from cases
ending in self-defense verdicts, then, suggests that the frequent recourse to such findings resulted mainly from the jury's desire to save
the lives of defendants who had committed simple homicide.

In addition to this evidence, there is other support for the proposition that the jury's behavior was related to the nature of the defen-

dant's act. First, it is worth noting that, in the fourteenth century,
there were even more acquittals in homicide cases than there were
verdicts of excusable homicide, so that the proportion of convictions
on charges of homicide was generally relatively low, from ten to
twenty per cent. 68 For a variety of reasons, it is not possible to
determine whether juries systematically acquitted defendants in cases
of simple homicide in the period before 1390.69 But there is very
clear evidence of such jury behavior during the several decades

immediately following 1390. In that year, a century of protests
against indiscriminate grants of pardons of grace culminated in a
statute restricting the king's pardoning power when the accused had
committed "murder," that is, (roughly) homicide perpetrated
his master's house, where, being cornered by his assailant, he slew Simon as a last
resort. JUST3/43/1, m.21/1 (1325).
It is not possible to determine precisely where society drew the line between
homicides viewed as excusable self-defense and homicides viewed as nonexcusable but
not deserving of capital punishment. The following two cases may be taken to illustrate the social view of self-defense. In both, the coroners' inquest jury characterized
the slaying as self-defense, though neither case met the legal standard for excusable
homicide. In the first case, the inquest reported: "William put his hand to his knife
in order to draw it and strike Robert. Robert, fearing that William wanted to kill
him, in self-defense struck William on the head with a hatchet." JUST 2/102, m.9/2
(1363). The trial record has not been located, but the slayer was pardoned for selfdefense. CALENDAR OF THE PATENT ROLLS, 41 Edw. 3 pt. 1, at 395 (May 6, 1367).
In the second case, the coroner's jury stated: Walter Clerk and Thomas Clerk
argued until Thomas, threatening to kill Walter, "suddenly jumped from the cart and
took up an iron fork, intending to run at Walter, but Walter immediately grabbed
the fork in his own hand and threw it from Thomas lest he do further damage with
it; for which Thomas took Walter by the beard; Walter, because of this, drew his
knife and in self-defense struck Thomas in the left arm so that he died." JUST 2/18,
m.45d/5 (1356). Perhaps the jurors were lenient in this case because the blow that
proved fatal was delivered to the victim's arm, rather than to his head, heart, or stomach. Perhaps Thomas committed the ultimate insult when he "took Walter by the
beard." In any event, the suspect's deed clearly did not meet the required standard
for excusable homicide in self-defense. No trial enrollment has been located in this
case.
68. The conviction rates on the four rolls discussed at notes 62-65 supra are as
follows: JuST 3/137A, 20 per cent; JUST 3/149, mm. 1-14, 6 per cent; JuST 3/142,
10 per cent; JUST 3/167, 13 per cent. Hannawalt found a conviction rate of 17 per
cent for the fourteenth century in Northamptonshire. B. Hannawalt, supra note 1,
at 23.
69. See Green, supra note 3, at 674.

HeinOnline -- 74 Mich. L. Rev. 431 1975-1976

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 74:413

through stealth or planning, at night or by ambush. 70 While all
felonious homicide remained capital, "murder" as a term of art now
found its way into some homicide indictments because the validity of
a royal pardon of grace might depend upon whether the felony had
been murder or simple homicide. Analysis of several trial rolls that
include indictments by coroners and justices of the peace who bothered to discriminate between murder and simple homicide reveals that
juries rarely convicted those indicted for simple homicide but sent
7
alleged murderers to the gallows about fifty per cent of the time. '
The rate of conviction was the same or somewhat higher than the pre1390 rates.7 2 But the correlation between conviction and the seriousness of the act had become visible.
To review the evidence: Both before and after 1390, juries convicted only about twenty per cent of all homicide defendants. After
1390, it is clear, those convictions occurred mainly in cases of "murder." Before 1390, cases not leading to conviction were dividedroughly sixty to ninety per cent resulting in acquittals and ten to forty
per cent in verdicts of self-defense. The scanty evidence available
suggests that self-defense verdicts were set forth in many cases of
simple and, therefore, felonious (capital) homicide.
Thus, it appears that during the later Middle Ages jury convictions were largely limited to the most culpable homicides. Defendants
who had committed simple homicides, loosely corresponding to the
modern categories of unpremeditated murder and manslaughter, received acquittals or were found to have killed in the course of excusable self-defense.
One further problem deserves consideration. It is not altogether clear why a particular defendant who had committed
simple homicide received one exculpatory verdict rather than
another. The result in individual cases was likely determined in
part by medieval criminal procedure. 73 In the thirteenth century,
when judicial visitations (eyres) were infrequent, 74 defendants who
claimed they had acted accidentally or in self-defense could obtain a
writ ordering a special inquisition into the nature of the homicide. 70 If
70. See text at notes 161-202 infra.
71. See Green, supranote 3, at 672-73.
72. JusT 3/188 (1399-1415), conviction rate of 23 per cent; Jusr 3/203 (14221430), conviction rate of 20 per cent; JUST 3/205 (1424-1430), conviction rate of
33 per cent.
73. The following discussion, through text at note 77 infra, remains highly tentative.
74. See note 34 supra.
75. See R. HuNNmsrr, supra note 22, at 77-78. See generally N. HurNAnD,
supranote 4, at 37-42.
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the defendant's claim was upheld, he was pardoned or bailed until the
next eyre, when he was required to stand trial.78 Defendants not
making such a showing at a special inquisition remained incarcerated
for months or years before being tried at the eyre. Doubtless, this led
many who were confident of obtaining an eventual acquittal instead
to seek immediate freedom by demonstrating excusable circumstances.
When gaol deliveries subsequently became frequent, the situation
changed radically. There was no longer a need to obtain a special
inquisition; nearly all defendants awaited the arrival of the royal
justices at gaol delivery. Those who had committed an excusable
homicide, as well as those guilty of simple homicide, now had more to
gain from acquittal than from a special verdict (with remand to gaol
to await a pardon). In order to obtain an acquittal, some who could
have obtained a pardon probably avoided making an in-court assertion that they had slain in self-defense. This was so since, once the
defendant admitted that he had done the act, the jury was hardly in a
position to acquit. There was, however, some risk in declining to
assert self-defense. Suspects who were unsure of their neighbors'
attitudes toward them or their act might have preferred to admit the
deed and to assert that there had been extenuating circumstances such
as self-defense, rather than pretend to noninvolvement. Moreover,
those who truly deserved a pardon-certainly those who had turned
themselves in and established their defense at the time of the coroner's
inquest-may have felt more secure in sticking to their story. Quite
possibly, as well, pardon carried the reward of social respectability
while an acquittal based on community generosity involved some
77
measure of stigma.
That juries manipulated the evidence in a large class of cases can
hardly have escaped the bench. Although the justices insisted that
nothing less than dire necessity justified killing in self-defense, it is
possible that they tolerated with some aplomb the juries' leniency in
76. See generally N. HuRNAr,
supra note 4, at 37-42, 51. If the defendant was
bailed, he was subsequently retried, and, if the original finding was confirmed, the
defendant was pardoned of the king's suit. In theory, it was still possible for the
kin of the slain to appeal the defendant. For this reason, even those pardoned after
special inquisitions were to appear at the eyre in case an appeal were brought. As
a practical matter, pardon was rarely, if ever, followed by an appeal. See note 22
supra.
77. These considerations also seem to rule out an alternative hypothesis: that
jurors convicted perpetrators of serious homicide, contrived pardonable circumstances
for perpetrators of simple homicide, and acquitted true self-defenders along with the
innocent. Some true self-defenders may have been so treated, but the defendant's
choice of strategy in court must frequently have frustrated juries inclined to follow
this pattern of response.
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the face of the strict rules. Nevertheless, from the point of view of
the bench, remand to gaol to await a pardon and the automatic loss of
goods probably seemed a small enough price to pay for those who
had in fact committed capital felony. This fact, then, may have left
the justices loath to undertake any extension of the formal law of selfdefense. Rather, in every case in which self-defense was alleged, they
pressed the jury on two questions: Had the defendant acted out of
total desperation? Had he acted without malice?
The jury's inclination to shape the facts in the most positive way
for many favored defendants appears to have significantly retarded
development of the substantive criminal law. Doctrinal development
in the common-law system depended heavily upon a flow of cases
raising problems for which the law had no seemingly appropriate
answer. This flow was choked off early and effectively by the forms
and procedures of the criminal law. The absence of special pleading
and the inability to raise questions of law by way of appeal from the
courts' decisions were detrimental enough.78 But jury behavior
played an additional and key role: juries' efforts to preclude completely the possibility that the defendant might be hanged led them to
adopt a few existing and predictable patterns of response to cover a
wide variety of situations. Had trial juries put forward in candid
terms the details of homicides, as inquest juries often did before a
coroner, the history of the law of homicide might have been very
different.
For example, research reveals no settled doctrine during this
period regarding slaying in defense of one's kin (as opposed to the
established right to defend oneself). Indeed, no discussion of the
question by the bench can be found. It is difficult to believe that
slaying in such circumstances was in practice capital felony. 7 If it
was lawful, why does the legal process hide that from our view? One
theory might have it that, when a slaying had been in defense of kin,
78. See S. MiLsom, supranote 29, at 363-65.
79. One late thirteenth-century treatise, in dealing with homicide that was not felonious, refers to a person "who slays a housebreaker, at least if he is defending himself or his household at the time . . . ." 2 FLETA supra note 52, at 61. Compare
1 BarrrON 113 (F.M. Nichols trans. & ed. 1865):
Or he may say, that although he committed the act, yet he did not do it by felony prepense, but by necessity, in defending himself, or his wife, or his house,
or his family, or his land, or his body, from death; or that he killed the man
in defense of our peace, or by some mischance, without any thought of felony;
in all which cases, if proved, the appellees shall have judgment of acquittal.
Britton is here concerned only with defenses to a private appeal. He does not suggest that all these defenses would result in an acquittal if the trial were pursuant to
a royal indictment. Certainly, self-defense would not lead to acquittal in such circumstances. Nor, for that matter, is the passage clear evidence for the proposition
that one who defended his kin was entitled de cursu to a pardon of the king's suit.
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the defendant, after the formulistic "not guilty," entered a special plea
stating the true facts, and the court accepted such a defense when it
was corroborated by the jury. The clerk might then have enrolled

the details, simply as a matter of form, in a manner consistent with
the rules of defense of one's person. But that theory would have the
clerks engaging in deliberate, uniform, and pointless falsification of

the record.

It is more reasonable to suppose that the defendant

expressed his case in the strongest and safest possible terms, or that
the jury did so on his behalf, and that always the litany of deliberate

but excusable homicide was built upon the foundation of saving one's
own life. 0 Defenders of kin (or of any other person, for that matter)
were reported as self-defenders. The concealment of the true facts
was total, and the courts never had to grapple with the question of

defense of another. The formulae of the law had, in the hands of the
self-informing jury, indirectly stunted doctrinal growth."
80. See Green, supranote 3, at 680-82.
Two cases illustrate this reliance on self-defense. In C 260/105, no. 13 (1393),
John Colles Jr. was tried for the death of William Shepherde. According to the
enrollment of the coroner's inquest testimony, the defendant, seeing Shepherde strike
the defendant's father, John Colles, Sr., "drew his knife and struck Shepherde in the
right part of the neck wounding him mortally and thus he slew him feloniously." At
the trial, the jury told a different story. Colles Jr., it asserted, had interceded to
part Shepherde and his father. Shepherde then turned on Colles Jr., who fled as far
as a wall between two houses, where he was forced to slay his attacker in self-defense.
John, son of Robert de Uptone, was tried in 1339 for the death of Simon Chaucer.
According to a London coroner's enrollment made in 1336, Simon Chaucer and Robert de Uptone quarreled on the street. Simon struck Robert, wounding him on the
upper lip. John, who was present and saw the incident, seized a "dorbarre" with
which he beat Simon on the hands, side and head, killing him. LONDON CoRoNms'
ROLLS, supra note 67, Roll F, 4, at 175-76. The petty jury told an elaborate story,
which made John eligible for a royal pardon:
A quarrel broke out between Simon and Robert over certain pennies which
Simon owed the latter. Simon took up a staff and wanted to strike Robert, but
Robert grasped it firmly in his hands . . . Simon drew a knife and stabbed Robert in the mouth so that blood flowed. John, sitting in a shop, saw the fight
and rising and taking up a dorbarre ran to the fight to pacify the two if he could.
When Simon saw John coming he left Robert and went after John with the knife.
• . . He chased John as far as a wall . . . and held him tightly against the
wall so that John could not escape, and he wanted to kill John with the knife
which he held in his right hand; and John, seeing that his death was imminent
and not being able to escape in any direction, nor otherwise able to save his
own life without defending himself, struck Simon in the head with the dorbarre
which he held in his hands, wherein Simon died ....
C 260/50, no. 60 (1339).
81. In 1506, it was held that a servant might justifiably slay in defense of his
master if his master were otherwise unable to escape, Y.B. Mich. 21 Hen. 7, f. 39,
pl. 50 (1506), but the first clear reference to defense of kin that I have found dates
approximately from the 1530's. Spelman noted that
Fitzherbert presented an indictment to the effect that one Parker found a man
lying between his wife's legs committing adultery and he killed the man, and
all the justices held this to be felony, but I [Spelman, the reporter] put [the
case] where a man wants to ravish my wife against her will and I kill him, it
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It is also probable that the conclusory character of jury verdicts inhibited the development of more subtle rules on the standards to be
met by defendants claiming self-defense. If the judges had had to
pass upon a wide variety of fact situations, ranging along a spectrum
from murderous attack to genuine last resort, they might have developed a series of doctrinal principles and distinctions. The bench
might have developed rules to deal with defendants who had come under attack and feared for their lives, but had acted somewhat too hastily in retaliation; or with those whose temper had gotten the better of
them, whose malicious intent was of the moment and less than homicidal, but whose blow had been deadly. Instead, the courts were presented with only two types of homicide defendants: those said to
have acted feloniously, with malitia precogitataand without evidence
of mitigating circumstances, and those said to have slain in extremis,
in self-defense. Both judicial suspicion of the large latter group and
the failure of the system to present "close cases" perpetuated the
82
strict division between felonious and nonfelonious homicide.
B.

JustifiableHomicide

The category of justifiable homicide, meriting acquittal rather
than pardon and forfeiture, was extended in the fourteenth century to
include the slayers of felons caught in the act of burglary, arson, or
robbery. An examination of this development may suggest why
those who acted in defense of property fared better under the evolving
law than those who acted solely in defense of their person.
The line between justifiable and excusable homicide had long
been unclear and prone to inconsistent judicial treatment.8 3 From
early times, execution upon a legal order was justifiable.8 4 Slaying
manifest felons 5 and those formally outlawed,8 6 if they resisted arseems that I am able to do this in defense of my wife, as in the case where
he wants to kill her.
Spelman's Reports, British Library, Hargrave ms. 388, f. 188a (translated from the
original Law French).
82. The speculative nature of this section should be obvious. The direct evidence
on judicial behavior that would provide the most satisfactory support for these conclusions is simply unavailable. My argument concerning jury behavior and judicial response is developed more fully at notes 152-59 infra. The problem is discussed in
the light of general developments in the law of nonfelonious homicide and the role
that automatic forfeiture came to play in the fourteenth century.
83. See N. HURNARD, supranote 4, at 88-92.
84. See 2 H. BRACTON, supranote 43, at 340 (f. 120b).
85. These included "hand-having" thieves, notorious malefactors, and slayers attempting to escape from the "hue and cry" raised against them. For slayers of handhaving thieves, see, e.g., A CALENDAR OF THE LANCASHIRE AssizE RoLLS 87 (J.
Parker trans. & ed. 1904); PLEAS OF GLOUCESTER, supra note 24, pl. 89; THREE
EARLY Assize ROLLS FOR T
CouNTY oF NoRTHumBERLAImD 78-79, 80, 84 (W.
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rest, also came to be justified. Initially, this may have represented an
attempt to harness the ancient custom of private retaliation, perhaps

because it could not be entirely prevented, by legitimating it solely

where the wrongdoer refused to submit to the judicial process. 87 As

the judicial system and the test for refusal to submit to it developed,88

these slayings came to be seen as on behalf of the law (pro lege).
While for a time some tension between the private deed and that pro
Page ed. 1891) [hereinafter NORTHUMBERLAND AssIZE ROLLS]; YEAR BOOKS OF THE
REIGN OF EDWARD THE FIRST, 30-31 Edw. 1, at 512 (1302) (A.J. Horwood trans. &
ed. 1863). For slayers of notorious malefactors, see e.g., Jusr 1/734, m.22d/9
(1256); JuSn 1/60, m.23/5 (1272) (keeper of the peace in Buckinghamshire slew
a reputed malefactor who refused to give assurance that he would not harm the
countryside and who sought, with drawn sword, to avoid arrest); KB 27/297,
m.26d/1 (1334); C 260/55, no. 58 (1343); C 145/21/36 (undated); Plea Rolls of
the Reign of Hen. III, in 4 COLLECTIONS FOR A IISTORY OF STAFFORDSHME 214-15
(G. Wrottesley trans. & ed. 1883); Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its
History, 7 HARv. L. REv. 315, 323 (1894). For slayers of would-be escapers from
the hue and cry, see, e.g., JUST 1156, m. 44d/1 (1249); NORTHUMBERLAND AssizE
ROLLS, supra, at 80, 84.
86. 2 H. BRACrON, supra note 43, at 362 (f. 128b) ("An outlaw also forfeits everything connected with the peace, for from the time he is outlawed he bears the
wolf's head, so that he may be slain by anyone with impunity, especially if he resists
or takes to flight so that his arrest is difficult").
87. As early as the seventh century, slayers of outlaws or of manifest felons who
would not surrender to the "peace of the king" were protected by the law against
retaliation by the kin of the slain. See Ine 33, in Attenborough, supra note 7, at
47: "He who kills a thief shall be allowed to declare with an oath that he whom
he killed was a thief trying to escape, and the kinsmen of the dead man shall swear
an oath to carry on no vendetta against him. If, however, he keeps it secret, and
it afterwards comes to light, then he shall pay for him." Ine's dooms date from about
694. H. RICHARDSON & G. SAYLES, supra note 8, at 13. For a later (tenth century)
law to the same effect, see 2 Aethelstan 1.2, in Attenborough, supra, at 127 ("If however, he [the thief] tries to defend himself, or if he takes to flight, he shall not be
spared"). Cf. Alfred 5 to Alfred 5.3, in id. at 67. Alfred employed the ecclesiastical "sanctuary" laws in his own legislation concerning "house protection," i.e., the
protection of a suspect who remained in his home and voluntarily gave himself up
to stand trial. See generally C. RIGGS, CRIMINAL ASYLUM IN ANGLO-SAXON LAw 3136 (1963).
88. Riggs describes the procedure that had come to replace the automatic prosecution of the feud as follows:
Furthermore, not only was summary police action called for in cases where
"known" thieves took to their heels, but it was also extended to cases where men
were accused of theft and remained obstinately in contempt of summons. In
such cases the procedure to be followed was as follows. Those accused were
to be summoned to appear in the district court. If after three summonings they
failed to appear in court they were to be fined [H Aethelstan 20]. If the accused still refused to either pay the fine or appear in court the law stated that
"the chief men who belong to the borough shall ride [to his house] and take
all that he owns, and place him under surety" [11 Aethelstan 20.1]. In short,
if the defendant refused to appear in court to answer the charges brought against
him, the chief men of the district were to distrain (seize) his chattels. If the
defendant still held out, "all the chief men who belong to the borough shall ride
and take all he possess and the king shall receive half and the men who ride
to apprehend him the other half, and they shall place him under surety" [II
Aethelstan 20.4]. And if, after his lands and chattels had been seized, the defendant remained in contempt of summons, 'they shall put him to death, unless
he escapes" [II Aethelstan 20.6].
C. RIGcs, supranote 87, at 41-42.
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lege may have existed, we may suppose that the latter eventually won
out.
By the thirteenth century, most localities were no longer allowed

to execute captured outlaws and manifest felons without trial; that
custom had become, by and large, frontier law. 9 Indeed, so profound was the impress of royal law that thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century judges sometimes insisted that the slayer of a resisting
outlaw or manifest felon show that he had acted as a royal official or
pursuant to an official order before he could be acquitted. 0 Other
such slayers required royal pardons, usually for self-defense. 1 Here
there was confusion. While it appears that it was lawful for anyone
to slay an outlaw or manifest felon who resisted arrest, it was not
uncommon for nonofficial slayers to be recorded, in addition, as
having suffered attack and slain to save their lives.92 This, indeed,
was the surest defense for one seeking to show that he could not
otherwise have taken his victim and may have been an embellishment
intended to allay judicial suspicion of nonofficial slayers. Yet the
inclusion of details of self-defense, which ought to have strengthened
the defendant's claim to an acquittal, may well have been responsible for the inconsistent judicial treatment of nonofficial slayers. 3 By
89. See, e.g., NoRaT-uInmERLANID AssiZE RoLLs, supra note 85, at 70. In a case
where a felon was slain, but not while in flight, local officials informed the court
that it was the custom in Northumberland summarily to dispatch robbers taken with
the goods in hand. The late thirteenth-century law book 1 BalTroN, supra note 79,
at 36-37, probably reflects the older rule rather than contemporary practice: "If any
man be found killed, and another be found near him with the knife or other weapon
in his hand all bloody, wherewith he killed him, the coroner shall be presently
fetched, and in his presence the felon shall, upon the testimony of those who saw
the felony done, be judged to death."
90. See, e.g., KB 27/343, m.2/4 (1346) (defendant commissioned by the sheriff
of Norfolk was acquitted); JUST 3/139, m.27d/1 (1356) (five men joined two constables in arresting a person who laid waste to goods and chattels of a resident of
Norfolk; all were acquitted; the court ruled: "And because it seems to the court that
what they did in this case, they did through the law [per legem] and through maintenance of the law, it is considered that the aforesaid seven ought to go quit"); JUST
3/135, m.16/2 (1343) (defendant and thirty-four others pursued and slew a person
who had been indicted for several felonies. The court, after determining that the
deceased had been indicted before his death and that the defendant had a commission
based on that indictment, acquitted the defendant and his posse); A. FITZHERBERT,
supra note 50, Corone, pl. 288 (1330); 22 Assizn, supra note 60, pl. 55 (1349).
91. See N. HuRNARD, supra note 4, at 90.
92. See, e.g., JUST 1/65, m.47/15 (1286); JUST 3/43/1, m.14d/7 (1325).
93. See N. HuRNARD, supra note 4, at 91, suggesting that in the thirteenth century, courts may occasionally have seized upon details of self-defense in cases of justifiable homicide and thought, somewhat irrationally, in terms of excusable homicide.
Hurnard observes that courts more often acquitted where the alleged felon had been
slain while resisting arrest than where he had been slain attempting to commit robbery, and she speculates "that it was all too easy for the courts to assimilate [the
latter] cases to slaying in self-defence." Id.
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the middle of the fourteenth century, however, the confusion was
resolved. Most slayers of outlaws and manifest felons were acquitcourts required neither a pardon nor a theory of self-deted; the
94
fense.
The class of manifest felons included the ancient "hand-having
thief"-quite literally, a felon caught with the stolen goods.9 5 But it
did not include one intercepted in an attempt unlawfully to take
goods or commit an assault. In the course of the fourteenth century,
however, the courts began to acquit as justifiable slayers some of
those who had acted to forestall an attempted felony: those who had
slain burglars or robbers.9 6 The mere self-defender, on the other
hand, was subjected to the rigor of the law of self-defense for at least
another two centuries. 97 This uneven development requires explanation. Why the one change without the other?
While thirteenth-century records reveal occasional acquittals of
defendants who slew those attempting burglary or robbery, 98 most
such cases resulted in the granting of a pardon for actual, or alleged,
self-defense. 99 As with the other early cases, embellishment by the
94. For example, in KB 27/297, 26d/1 (1334), a certain William, son of Ralph.
was acquitted for the death of Adam Doughty, whom he had decapitated. According
to the jury, Adam was a notorious robber who had feloniously burgled the house of
Thomas, son of Jordan, in Lancashire. William tried to arrest Adam, but Adam
stabbed William and fled. William pursued and slew Adam. The court specifically
asked the jurors whether William could have taken Adam in any other way, to which
they replied that he could not. There is no indication that the bench questioned the
jury with regard to self-defense. In JUST 3/135, 13d/3 (1344), the defendant, taking
part with others responding to the hue and cry, shot a fleeing suspect with an arrow.
The court ruled that the defendant had acted as an executor of the peace ("ut executor pacis") and acquitted him. In KB 27/528, Rex xlvi/1 (1393), according to
the indictment, the defendant saw a stranger ("extraneus") leading away two horses
belonging to others. He raised the hue and pursued the stranger and, in apprehending him, struck him in the neck with a sword so that he fell to the ground. Whereupon the defendant beheaded the thief. The court considered the indictment "insufficient" and acquitted the defendant. For further examples, see Just 3/43/1, m.14d/7
(1325); Jusr 3/137A, 21/2 (1353); KB 27/519, Rex i/2 (1391).
95. See note 85 supra.
96. See text at notes 101-02 infra. It was not until the sixteenth century that
the new policy became embodied in a statute. See 24 Hen. 8, c. 5 (1532); text
at notes 242-46 infra.
97. See text at notes 242-46, 293-94 infra.

98. See, e.g., Just 1/642, m.16/13 (1256)

(NORTHUMBERLAND

Assiz

ROLLS,

supra note 85, at 94). Pollock and Maitland cite this case as an unusual one and
assert that the defendant was fortunate. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArMAND, supra note
5, at 478. A late thirteenth-century legal treatise refers to such slayings in somewhat
ambiguous terms: "Anyone, however, who slays a thief by night is not held to be
a homicide [non teneatur], and he who slays a housebreaker, at least if he is defending himself or his household at the time, slays justly [iuste interfecit], and in the
same way he who slays another to save himself from death." 2 FLETA, supra note
52, at 61. Fleta groups such acts with excusable slayings in self-defense, for which
a pardon was required.
99. See, e.g., PLEAS OF GLOUCESTER, supra note 29, pl. 362 (1221); C 145/11/33
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defendant, repeated by jurors under oath, produced a sure result
where judicial response to the bare truth was uncertain. The judges
accepted the implications for legal theory of this factual grafting.
Thirteenth-century treatises dealt with defense of property as an extension of self-defense. 0 0
In the fourteenth century, however, the judges formulated a new
doctrine giving the victim of housebreaking greater latitude in repulsing his assailant. The proposition was first stated laconically, as if an
intonement of the hoary law: "It was presented that a man killed
another in his own house se defendendo. It was asked whether the
deceased came to rob him: for in such a case a man may kill another
though it not be in self-defense."' 1 1 Moreover, the court sanctioned
outright acquittal in this case, thus bringing the defendant under the
ancient rule applicable to slayers of manifest felons. In 1348, Justice
Thorpe restated the rule more broadly: "And in many other cases a
man may kill another without impeachment, as if thieves come to rob
a man, or to burgle his house, he may safely kill them if he cannot
take them."10 2

For a time, however, the courts were not positive about the
breadth of the rule.

In 1357, Thorpe and his fellow justices were

confronted with a defendant who had slain a burglar.
ruled: "Because.

.

The couit

.what the defendant did he did in saving his own

life in circumstances in which anyone ought to be able to do so
lawfully, it is considered that he be quit."'" 3 This seems to indicate
that, while a pardon was not necessary, the defendant had to show he
had acted in self-defense.
The hesitation of the bench to separate such cases from those of
excusable homicide was reflected in another case. It seems to have
(1259); C 145/13/21 (1266); C 145/32/20 (1274); C 145/49/49 (1290); JuST
3/91, m.10d/10 (1293).
100. See, e.g., 2 H. BRACTON, supranote 43, at 408 (f. 144b):
If anyone slays a night thief, he will do so with impunity only if he could not
spare him without danger to himself; if he could it will be otherwise. For the
life and death of men are in the hands of the kingi (as in the case of a certain
man. ., to whom the king granted a pardon for a death in such circumstances.)
And so where one defends himself against hamsocn, which [the English call]
the entering of a house in breach of the peace, and the intruder is slain, he will
be free of liability if he who killed could defend himself in no other way.
(Footnotes omitted.) For Bracton, to be "free of liability" does not mean, in these
circumstances, to be free of the need for a pardon: "[H-le who kills a thief, either
a day thief or a night thief, is not liable, [that is], if he could not otherwise escape
danger; if he could he is liable. Nor is he liable who kills by misadventure . ..."
Id. at 438 (f.155). Bracton seems to equate cases of misadventure, where pardons
were required, with cases of slaying a thief to "escape danger."
101. A. FTZHERBERT, supra note 50, Corone, pl. 305 (1330).
102. 22 AssizE, supra note 60, pl. 55 (1349).

See A. FrrHERBERT, supra note

50, at Corone, pl. 261 (1349); 26 AssizE, supra, pl. 23 (1353).
103. JusT 3/139, m.29d/4 (1357).
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been settled doctrine by 1356 that a man might slay someone who
had entered upon his property with the intention of setting his house
on fire.10 4 Yet ten years later, the justices of gaol delivery of Leicester Castle, Thomas de Ingleby and John Cavendish, showed indecision as to treatment of the defendant in Neel's Case:
Reginald Walshman . . . came at night around midnight to the
house of John Neel and called to John who lay there asleep in his bed
to let him come in; he wanted to slay John in John's house; and John
refused him entrance, so that Reginald began to -break the doors and
windows and he said he would burn the house and John and John's
wife and everything within the house unless John permitted him to
enter. And he intended to burn the house, and John for fear of
his death .and the burning and for salvation of his life and family
got out of bed and went to the door; and Reginald was there with
a rock which he threw at John's head, and John ducked and Reginald
stood there with a knife drawn in order to kill John and attacked
him wanting to kill him, and John being naked and believing that
Reginald intended to burn his house and that Reginald wanted to
kill him, in saving his own life, stabbed Reginald with a knife wherein
Reginald was slain. And the jury say that John could not otherwise
have saved his own life.10 5
Neel was released in surety pending a gaol delivery seven months
later, when he was acquitted. The court had evidently first considered requiring Neel to obtain a pardon, and it appears likely that the
element of self-defense was crucial to the judgment of acquittal.
Because the natural inclination of the jury was to embellish
instances of defense of property with details of defense of one's
person, few cases presented the courts with the critical test of pure
defense of property. And those cases that did come forward may
have been perceived as ordinary homicides with some embellishments
concerning defense of home and hearth. The mingling of defense of
property with defense of person may have resulted in judicial caution
toward allegations of the former, and it may have slowed the expansion of the category of justifiable homicide to include defense of
property. Nevertheless, that the court in the end granted an acquittal
in Neel's Case suggests that, whether or not self-defense remained a
necessary element, this expansion had been accomplished. Moreover, by the last third of the fourteenth century, slayers of nocturnal
housebreakers no longer appear among those pardoned for homicide
se defendendo, though eaflier such cases had been abundant. 10 8
104. 26 AssizE, supra note 60, pl. 23 (1353).
ABRmmrENT,

See R.

BROOxE, LA GRAUNDE

Corone, pl. 100 (1576); A. FrrzmmBntaT, supra note 50, Corone, pl.

192 (1353).
105. JusT 3/142, m.17d/1 (1366).
106. See note 99 supra.
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Thorpe's 1348 ruling had pertained not only to housebreaking,
but also to attempted robbery.107 This position, or something very
close to it, was adopted by the whole court when Thorpe put the
following case four years later: "A man was indicted for homicide; it
was found that the deceased was a thief who assailed the defendant
and pursued him closely so that the defendant slew him . . . [AIll

say that he will go quit."'1 8 Here, too, it appears that some element
of self-defense remained crucial to the finding of justifiable homicide.
The effect of this ruling is more difficult to ascertain from the rolls
than is the effect of the ruling concerning the slaying of burglars.
Again, the records of acquittals provide very few details about the
cases. Moreover, the absence of victims of attempted robbery among
those pardoned for self-defense is not helpful here. An attack in the
open had always been described as an assault with intent to slay, since
this was a necessary allegation in self-defense. Other motives, such
as robbery, had rarely been mentioned.
This part of Thorpe's ruling was nevertheless of considerable
significance because, at least in theory, it broadened the scope of
justifiable homicide to include slaying to prevent felony. The new
rule concerning the slayers of housebreakers was perhaps less novel;
the wrongdoer had already committed the ancient but nonfelonious
breach of the peace known as hamsocn.'0 9
The extension of justifiable homicide to include slayers of wouldbe burglars and robbers was very possibly a response to what was
thought to be-and may in fact have been-an unprecedented contemporary rise in professional crime."" Thorpe's ruling was not
expanded, however, to include slayers of criminals who assaulted with
intent to kill rather than to rob, not even to include slayers of wouldbe "murderers," as those who committed homicide through stealth
were coming once again to be known."' The failure to treat the
107. See text at note 102 supra.
108. 26 AssizE,supra note 60, pl. 32 (1353).
109. Bracton defines hamsocn as "the entering of a house in breach of the peace."
2 H. BRACTON, supra note 43, at 408 (L144b). See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND,
supra note 5, at 454-58. In two early thirteenth-century cases, SELECr PLEAS OF THE
CRoWN, pl. 60, 86 (F. Maitland trans. & ed. 1888), hamsocn (or hamsoken) was
complicated by theft.
110. See note 173 infra.
111. For "murder" as a term of art, see note 19 supra. The person who slew
in repelling such a heinous assault was not acquitted, but had to obtain a royal pardon. See, e.g., C 260/120, no. 28 (pardon for self-defense, CALENDAR OF THE
PATEr ROLLS, 3 Hen. 4, at 427 (May 22, 1408)); C 260/92, no. 40 (pardon for
self-defense, CALENDAR OF THE PATENT ROLLS, 4 Rich. 2, at 620 (May 1, 1381)).
It was not until the 1500's that slayers of would-be murderers were given a statutory
right to acquittal. See text at notes 242-46 infra.
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slaying of a would-be murderer as justifiable homicide is particularly

puzzling since, by the end of the fourteenth century, murderous
assault was considered especially heinous.

This is shown, for exam-

ple, by the 1390 statute greatly restricting the grant of pardons "of
112
grace" to perpetrators of stealthy homicide.

The courts may have drawn this line between professional robbers
and stealthy killers because the former were considered to be a threat
to the entire community, while the latter were deemed a threat only to

their intended victims. But it seems more likely that the judges were
responding to the juries' practice of finding self-defense in many

less serious, yet felonious and undesirable homicides.

The bench

must have realized that many homicides described as se defendendo
had in fact been committed in the course of drunken brawls and

similar rows. Against these, -too, the law had to provide deterrence,
and the procedure of pardon and forfeiture, which was a quasi-

sanction, may have seemed an appropriate deterrent. The true selfdefender, however, especially the one who had repulsed a murderous

assault, might have deserved better; moroever, in his case even the
logic of deterrence mandated acquittal. But how were the judges to
identify the true self-defender? Jury testimony and the defendant's

own story were so formulistic that discrimination among alleged selfdefenders was an impossible task. Evidence as to the exact nature of

the victim's alleged assault would have been difficult to obtain, as
would have been the truth regarding the defendant's efforts to escape

without dealing a mortal blow.
The theory of royal mercy that underlay the granting of pardons
may also have had something to do with the retention of pardons in

self-defense cases. Although, by the fourteenth century, pardons for
self-defense and accidental homicide were granted de cursu," 3 the

vestiges of the earlier idea of special consideration survived at least in
the formulae that were inscribed on charters of pardon."'

Neverthe-

112. See text at notes 179-80 infra.
113. See note 52 supraand accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., C 66/230, m.21 ("Moved by mercy, we have pardoned . .
("Nos pietate moti perdonavinus . . .")). The pardon still carried the proviso that
the defendant "stand to right" ("ita tamen quod stet recto in curia nostra") should
the kin of the slain wish to bring an appeal (literally, "should anyone wish to speak
against him"). By the late thirteenth century, if not long before, the kin's right to
appeal a pardoned slayer had lapsed. It is unlikely that it remained even in theory,
though the form of the pardon was unchanged. See note 22 supra. Nevertheless,
it is still barely possible that this ancient claim to private compensation against an
excusable slayer accounted in part for the retention of the pardon requirement. One
would still have to explain why a pardon was required, rather than acquittal with
an obligation to stand to right. The rule of automatic forfeiture suggests that pardoned slayers were disadvantaged for reasons other than the kin's right to appeal.
Moreover, the expansion of the class of justifiable homicide was accomplished with-

HeinOnline -- 74 Mich. L. Rev. 443 1975-1976

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 74:413

less, pardons for excusable homicide were retained as a matter of
policy as well as of tradition. For, as we shall now see, while selfdefenders required pardons in virtually every case, those who slew by
accident did not. "Mercy" was required, it seems, only where suspicion of wrongdoing remained.
C. Accidental Homicide
Throughout the thirteenth century, the prevailing rule in cases of
accidental homicide was that the slayer was required to obtain a royal
pardon. The pardon issued as a matter of course upon a finding of
unintentional homicide (misadventure). Even grossly negligent slayers were included within this class of excusable homicide. 15 By the
late fourteenth century, however, the courts frequently granted an
immediate acquittal for accidental homicide, no longer insisting that
the slayer forfeit his chattels and secure a royal pardon. Though
there is no clear evidence as to when and how the new policy was
formulated, its widespread application is clear from the rolls. 110
The majority of all homicide defendants delivered before the
justices were acquitted outright. The clerk in most of these cases
recorded on the trial roll only the homicide for which the defendant
had been indicted, the date and place of that act, the jury's verdict of
"not guilty" ("non est culpabilis"), and the court's judgment of
acquittal. The evidence does not permit us even to estimate how
many such cases were acquittals on verdicts amounting to misadventure. Occasionally, however, the clerk did record the facts of the case
in more detail, and, from this small body of hard evidence, it is
possible to discern a new departure in the courts' handling of accidental homicide. Judges now acquitted many defendants who had received a jury verdict of accidental homicide. There is additional
support for this conclusion: late fourteenth-century trial rolls contain
few pardons for misadventures,"17 and coroners frequently neglected
out concern for the rights of the deceased kin. It led to acquittal of some who formerly required a pardon for self-defense. As we shall see, judicial policy changed
with regard to accidental homicide with the same potential effect on the theoretical
right of the kin to bring an appeal. See text at notes 115-51 infra.
115. See generally N. HURNARD, supra note 4, at 99-108.
116. But see Y.B. Hil. 44 Edw. 3, pl. 44 (1371); A. FrrHERBERT, supra note
50, Corone, pl. 94 (1371) (judicial statements that acquittal is appropriate in accidental homicide cases). For a discussion of an unsuccessful attempt during the reign
of Edward I (1272-1307) to reform the law in this direction, see N. HURNARW, supra
note 4, at 279.
117. The four rolls discussed at notes 62-65 supra, dating from the period 13511385, contain no cases ending in the defendant's remand to prison to await a pardon
for accidental homicide.
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to record an indictment where the inquest jury found misadventure,
as though they believed that the courts were not concerned with such
8

cases."1

The gradual disappearance in the fourteenth century of the pardon requirement for accidental homicide may have been the natural
outgrowth of an older distinction between homicides resulting from
the slayer's act alone and homicides produced by intervening circumstances over which the slayer had no control. Thirteenth-century
courts had already more or less systematically acquitted in some
accidental homicide cases-those, for instance, involving carts and
ploughs. 119 From one perspective, acquittal in these cases may be
taken as a "rough-and-ready" approach to -the problem of negligence.
More often than not the victim, rather than the driver, had failed to
use care.120 In shooting accidents and other cases where the slayer

was more likely to have been -the negligent party, the pardon requirement was maintained. A second plausible explanation of the early
resort to acquittals in driving cases is that, by and large, the slaying
could be attributed to a nonhuman agent. The cart, plough, horses,
or oxen, rather than the driver, might be perceived as the responsible
agent. There is an evident confusion between an embryonic concept
of fault and the ancient -theory governing homicide committed by a
21
nonhuman agent, for which payment of a "deodand" was required.'
The courts' stress on the driver's absence of intent, rather than upon
his lack of negligence, is therefore revealing. Frequently, when a
court had determined -that the driver had not "intended" to strike the
victim, it concluded that his horse or cart was to blame. The horse
might as well have been riderless or the cart empty, for the courts
treated such a case as no different from that of2 a death caused by a
tree that had been blown down in a windstorm.
Most of the late fourteenth-century accidental homicide cases in
which the defendant was acquitted involved situations where it was
perceived that either the slain person himself or an intervening object
had been the real cause of death. In this sense, these cases represented
118. See note 149 infra.
119. See N. HuRNARD, supranote 4, at 101-04.
120. Id. at 102.
121. The deodand (literally, "to be given to God," but in fact given to the
Crown) represented the value of the agent that caused the death. See P. HuNNzsrnT,
supra note 22, at 32-34; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 473-74.
122. See, e.g., 3 RoLLs or =a JusTICEs IN EYRE AT BEDFORD, 1227, at 2, 153
(G. Fowler trans. & ed. 1916) (carts) [hereinafter BEDFORD EYRE]; Jusr 1/28D,
m.18d (1286) (cart); LONDON CORONERS' ROLLs, supra note 67, A, at 30 (1301)
(horse ran over deceased "against [the rider's] will").

HeinOnline -- 74 Mich. L. Rev. 445 1975-1976

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 74:413

a logical extension of the earlier pattern of acquittals for accidental
homicide.
Archery accidents were among the most common causes of unintentional slaying throughout the Middle Ages. 123 Target shooting, a
favorite sport, continued to take its toll despite attempts to require
strict safeguards. 1 24 Arrows went off course in several recorded
instances, for example, one after striking a tree branch 1 25 and another
after glancing off the ground. 12 6 The defendant in each of -these
cases was acquitted, though, in the second, only after the court took
the matter under advisement.' 27 Of the shooting-accident cases,
these two are the closest in nature to the thirteenth-century acquittals.
The defendant had set in motion the agent of death, but circumstances perceived to be beyond his control had determined the outcome; on the other hand, in no way could it be said that the deceased
1 28
had been responsible for his demise.
Cases in which the deceased was said to have been at fault were
not uncommon, 29 however, and in the late fourteenth century they
began to play a significant role. A few shooting cases suggest that
the deceased's behavior-contributory negligence, as it were-had
become a matter of great concern. Indeed, it is in the context of the
victim's action in these cases that the term negligence first gained
prominence on the medieval criminal trial rolls. Only on the rarest
occasion was that term associated with the slayer; his negligence was
almost never at issue.' 30 To the modern mind, it might seem strange
123. T. Green, supra note 50, at 77-82.
124. Jurors at a coroner's inquest, JusT 2/207, m.2d/1 (1397), described an accident resulting from the slain man's negligence in the course of an event subject to
specific regulations at a well-marked area: "'l]t happened that . ..William Swayn
negligently [necligenter] and in a disorderly way stood beyond the marker within
the limits and bounds set up for the shooting match so that while William Swayn
stood negligently in the said manner, William Stonehale shot him with one of his
arrows." Compare Jusr 2/59, m.18/3 (1387), where the defendant had yelled a
warning to someone who was crossing the shooting area.
125. JusT 3/167, m.72/1 (1384).
126. JusT 3/177, m.47d/2 (1391).
127. In this case, the court also ordered forfeiture of chattels. Jusr 3/177,
m.47d/2 (1391).
128, For an early example of acquittal in a shooting case, see Jus" 1/1060,
m.13d (1279), and the discussion in N. HuiNARD, supra note 8, at 279.
129. See text at note 120 supra.
130. In a 1416 case, Jusr 2/170, m.1/2, a coroner recorded the following:
"Geoffrey Angulluskey drove a cart . . .[and] through his negligence and inebriation the nearside wheel of the cart ran across the head of Julia who lay at the foot
of the wall of her mother, Lucy, without any unusual motion of the cart or horses
..m
The value of the wheel is twelve pence; the said wheel killed Julia . .. and
Geoffrey fled and he has no goods . . . ." The coroner assigned the negligence to
the driver, the only such case I have found on any of the extant coroners' rolls, but
he then treated the death as a misadventure due to other than a human agent. He
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that the law was more lenient toward those who had used lethal

weapons in a negligent or even reckless manner' 31 than toward those

who had retaliated against murderous assaults. 132 But the paradox is
easily explained.

The court looked solely to the slayer's intent.

Slaying without malice was not felonious. If it could be shown that
the deceased had caused his own death in a manner that the slayer

could not have predicted, there was a strong presumption of nonmalicious homicide. It was to that end that the allegations in shooting
cases leading to acquittals recited that the deceased had gotten in the
33
way and been slain "by his own fault" ("in defectu sue proprio"),1
or that the deceased had run into the target area through his own
foolishness or negligence. 34
The allegation that the deceased had been foolish, reckless, or at

fault runs through the largest and, for legal theory, the most important class of cases identifiable as resulting in acquittal for misadventure.

These are cases in which the defendant had the weapon

causing death more or less under his control but the deceased, it was
said, ran or fell upon it. What came to be of critical importance were

the attendant circumstances. Acquittals were gained easily in homicides caused by accidental contact with sheathed knives in games of
football and wrestling.

35

More problematic were cases on the bor-

blamed the death on the wheel, and assessed its value for purposes of the deodand.
See note 121 supra. Geoffrey's goods were assessed presumably because he fled
rather than remain and give evidence. The coroner was subsequently amerced; an
assize clerk later added: 'The coroner is at fault for failing to mention who ought
to respond." Most likely the assize clerk, like the coroner, treated the case as a misadventure due to other than a human agent, and the amercement was for failure to
note who ought to respond for payment of the deodand. It is possible, although I
believe very unlikely, that the clerk, noting the coroner's reference to the driver's
"negligence," believed an indictment was merited and was assessing the coroner for
failure to frame one.
131. See, e.g., C 145/11/30 (1261) (defendant threw knife at a cat but hit and
killed his wife instead); C 145/85/18 (1320) (defendant threw knife at a wall but
hit and killed his wife instead).
132. Maitland remarks: 'That a man who kills another in self-defence should
require a pardon will seem to us even more monstrous than that pardons should be
needed where there has been misadventure, for the 'misadventure' of this age covers
many a blameworthy act." 2 F. POLLOcK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 483. In
my view, however, the formal rules of self-defense took account of the fact that jury
verdicts of self-defense concealed many blameworthy acts. While this does not account for the leniency toward negligence, it does help explain the relative severity
of the self-defense rules.
133. See, e.g., Jusr 3/180, m.24d/8 (1393).
134. See, e.g., JusT 2/207, m.2d/1 (1397).
But see JUST 3/185, m.8d/3
(1398), where similar allegations as to the deceased's behavior led to defendant's
remand and pardon.
135. See, e.g., JusT 1/1194, m.1/1 (1272) (football); C 145/38/20 (1280)
(football); JusT 3/167, m.30/1 (1381) (football); BEDFOR EYRE, supra note 122,
at 1 (wrestling). Cf. C 144/27/31 (1287) (dancing).
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der between self-defense and accident in which the deceased allegedly

launched a deadly attack upon the defendant only to die "through his
own fault," unintentionally plunging upon his intended victim's weapon.1, 6 In essence, these were cases in which the situation of selfdefense had been transformed into one of accidental homicide.
Accidental death in the course of deadly assault, which appears
occasionally on the early trial rolls, 137 became very common in the
late fourteenth century.13 8 By then, of course, a great deal more was

at stake and much depended upon the characterization of the defendant's act. According to the policy initiated in the 1340's, the excusa-

ble slayer not only was required to obtain a pardon but lost his
chattels whether or not he had fled. 1 39 By the later fourteenth
century, however, if the excusable slaying were accidental, the slayer
stood an excellent chance of acquittal and retention of goods. 4 ' The
court was therefore careful in these cases to determine-or at least to
elicit a sworn assertion-that the defendant had drawn the knife or
sword solely for the exigency of self-defense and had held it steady as
a bar to further assault, and that the deceased had of his own motion
plunged onto the defendant's weapon. The defendant, it was some-

times said, had not supplied any motion or force at all.' 4 ' The tenor
and form of the testimony bears a greater resemblance to that

produced in the late fourteenth-century shooting accidents' 42 than to
that set forth in the thirteenth-century cases of deaths suffered by
negligent assailants.' 4 3
136. Compare JusT 3/176, m.6/2 (1390); Jusr 3/181, m.7d/1 (1390); JusT
3/179, m.6/2 (1391); Jusr 3/183, m.2/1 (1395); JusT 3/179, m.49/1 (1397);
JUST 3/205, m.ld/7 (1427) (cases ending in acquittals); with JUST 3/179, m.31
(1387); JusT 3/179, m.28d/6 (1393); JusT 3/179, m.38d/3 (1394); JUST 3/180,
m.46d/3 (1395); JusT 3/180, m.14/8 (1397) (defendants ordered to obtain pardons).
137. See, e.g., C 260/2, no. 47 (1280); C 144/31/12 (1292); C 260/20, no. 16
(1309). See also N. HUrlNAU, supra note 4, at 95-96."
138. See cases cited in note 136 supra.
139. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
140. See text at notes 115-18 supra. But see Just 3/177, m.47d/2 (1391),
where the defendant was acquitted but forfeited his chattels.
141. See, e.g., JusT 3/137A, m.8/4 (1351) (after the deceased had struck the defendant and gravely wounded him, he ran after the defendant, who held a pitchfork
between himself and his attacker; the deceased then "stupidly ran upon the pitchfork"); Just 3/176, m.6/2 (1390) (the deceased had thrown the defendant into a
ditch and had fallen accidentally on the latter's knife; the court asked whether the
defendant had, out of any malice, held his knife upward toward the deceased ("ex
aliqua malitfa sursum potuit cultellum suum versus . . .")); JusT 3/179, m.6d/2
(1391); JusT 2/60, m.13/2 (1394) (defendant held a sword between himself and his
assailant without moving it); JusT 3/179, m.3/1 (1389) (the jurors stated that the
defendant had not moved his weapon but held it still; he nevertheless had to obtain
a pardon for self-defense).
142. See text at notes 133-34 supra.
143. See cases cited in note 137 supra.
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Even with explicit, sworn statements from the jurors, the bench
appears to have been cautious with allegations of death resulting from
negligent assault. The acquittal rate when the jury brought back a

finding of this kind seems to have lagged behind that for misadven-

tures surrounded by other less suspicious circumstances. 144 Indeed,

the fact that very few of these latter cases, such as deaths resulting
from target shooting, appear on the rolls suggests that they led
automatically to acquittal with relatively little testing of the evidence.

The more frequent enrollment of details in cases where "accidents" stemmed from fights suggests that the courts had some difficulty in determining liability in such cases. Perhaps the judges

suspected that jurors had now found a convenient way to obtain
acquittals for those who had perpetrated simple homicide: rather than
portray them as self-defenders who struck the fatal blow, jurors could
go one step further and turn them into "accidental" slayers on whose

weapons murderous assailants had, through their own fault, flung
their bodies (or into "nonslayers," the deceased having "slain him-

self").' 45 Evidence of the bench's suspicion regarding such verdicts
144. Compare cases cited in note 136 supra, with cases cited in note 135 supra.
It is interesting to note that Thomas Cauteshangre, one of the coroners who responded to the new judicial policy of acquitting in accidental homicide cases by not
framing indictments in many such cases, see note 149 infra, did continue to frame
indictments in cases where the deceased was said to have run against a knife held
up in self-defense. See, e.g., JusT 2/155, m.9/3 (1382); Just 2/155, m.10/3 (1383);
JusT 2/155, m.11/5 (1385); Just 2/155, m.16/1 (1389); Jus 2/155, m.21/3
(1392).
145. For cases in which the formula "the defendant slew himself" ("se ipsum interfecit") appears, see, e.g., Just 3/179, m.4d/2 (1390); Just 3/179, m.6/2 (1391).
In a Year Book case, Y.B. Mich. 44 Edw. 3, pl. 55 (1371), Justice Knivet stated
that, had the defendant slain in self-defense, pardon and forfeiture would have been
required; here they were not required because the deceased, in attacking the defendant, had fallen upon the defendant's knife and had thereby killed himself.
A sixteenth-century treatise groups this genre of case with suicide ("felo de se").
W. STAUNDFORD, PLEAS OF TE CRowN 20 (1557). At another point, however,
Staundford treats such cases as though they turned upon the question whether the
defendant had any recourse other than to draw his knife. Id. at 16a. The implication is that such homicides were perceived as accidents for which no blame attached
to the defendant, rather than as true suicides. Staundford distinguishes two fourteenth-century cases in an effort to explain why one required pardon and forfeiture
while the other did not. Id. A defendant who had held his knife in his hand as
he lay on the ground had been acquitted while a defendant who had remained on
his feet and had held a pitchfork against his assailant's charge was pardoned. In
both cases, the deceased had plunged onto the weapon, but in the latter, Staundford
asserts, the defendant had other means of escape. While fourteenth century courts
did not in fact adhere consistently to a distinction between defendants lying upon
the ground and those on their feet, it is possible that in an attempt to weigh the credibility of the jury's testimony, the bench found the former cases more persuasive than
the latter. It is also possible that the former cases more often led to acquittals because they were easier to assimilate to accidental homicides where parties engaged
in sporting events had fallen upon one another.
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can be gleaned from the fact that many of those defendants who were
not acquitted, but who were instead required to obtain a pardon, were

pardoned for self-defense rather than for accident. 14

Judicial cau-

tion in the face of the new formula is understandable, yet at times

appears extreme. One court, for example, went so far as to discuss
whether a pardon was required for a defendant who allegedly ran
from his assailant and was spared when the latter slipped and fell

upon his own knife. 147 Perhaps the cases involving assailants said to
have fallen upon their own weapons had multiplied beyond all belief.' 48
This convergence of the self-defense and accident formulae came
at a moment when the law of misadventure was in flux'4 9 and the
146. See, e.g., JusT 3/179, m.3/1 (1389); Jusr 3/179, m.28d/6 (1393).
147. Just 3/182, m.18/6 (1395). The defendant was eventually acquitted.
148. See, e.g., JusT 3/179, m.27/2 (1388); JusT 3/179, m.27/3 (1388); JusT
3/179, m.4d/2 (1390).
149. The new judicial approach to accidental homicide also caused some coroners
to be in doubt as to whether indictment was appropriate in cases of accidental homicide. The nature and extent of the confusion, however, are difficult to trace. When
a human agent was involved, the coroner was supposed to record the suspect's name,
the value of his goods, and, if he had not taken to flight, in whose custody the suspect
had been placed. Unfortunately, the extant coroners' rolls reveal very sloppy recording of the essential details so that it is often difficult to determine whether or not
the coroner recorded an indictment. Failure to assess the suspect's goods and to note
his present whereabouts does not necessarily mean there was no indictment. Each
individual enrollment must be interpreted in the light of the entire roll. Some coroners marginated "felonia" beside their indictments, and omission of "felonia" only
in cases of misadventure almost certainly indicates failure to indict. Failure to assess
goods only in misadventures indicates that no human agent was being held responsible. On the basis of a thorough study of the extant rolls dating from 1350
to 1422, it is clear that treatment of misadventures was highly erratic, depending only
in part on who was coroner; some coroners followed contradictory policies in identical cases.
In many misadventures where no indictment was recorded, the coroner stressed
the element of contributory negligence or attributed the death to the force of the
weapon itself. John Cook, coroner for Leicester in the late fourteenth century, recorded that "various men . . . were shooting at targets; among them was a certain
W. . . . and J. son of J. by misfortune ran between the targets.. . and he received
a mortal wound from the violent motion of the arrow [of W.] and not from the
malice aforethought or felony of W." JusT 2/60, m.12/4 (1400). There is no evidence of an indictment in this case. Similarly, another Leicester coroner, John Folvyll, recorded that the deceased, who had been shooting at targets with several others
"ran to the target to extract his arrow [and thus T. was slain through his own fault
and not through the malice aforethought or felony of R.]." JusT 2/61, m.6/5
(1412). The bracketed phrase and several marginalia, "infortunium," "non felonia,"
and "deodandum," were added in a new hand over erasures that perhaps had stipulated, as in fact the law required, a felony had been committed. The margination
"infortunium" is without exception an indication that the homicide had been written
off as a mere misadventure without human agent. Negligence of the deceased was
perhaps the determinative factor in this case. Folvyll's roll shows that, into the reign
of Henry IV, he had systematically taken indictments whenever there had been a
human agent, regardless of the degree of contributory negligence. E.g., JusT 2/61,
m.3d/3 (1400). There is no apparent reason for the sudden change.
Thomas Cauteshangre of Hampshire also stressed the negligence of the slain man
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complaints about professional crime were intense. 1 0

The converg-

ence offered an opportunity for carving out a species of justifiable
self-defense leading to acquittal: Only those who truly repulsed murderers would fit within the class; less worthy "self-defenders" would
continue to move through the pardoning process, suffering forfeiture
of goods and chattels. But the new category was based upon a
fiction of accidental homicide that itself depended upon a tenuous
distinction. It is impossible to determine how well it worked in

relieving true self-defenders of the strictures of the law of excusable
homicide, or even how long it persisted.

The fifteenth-century rolls

are too incomplete for us to judge.
It appears that within two centuries of its inception this trend
toward acquittals in cases of misadventure was reversed. In the

sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the rolls once again reflect a need
for pardons in cases of accidental homicide. It is possible that one of

the underlying reasons for judicial insistence upon pardons in misad-

venture was the invention and widespread distribution of firearms.1 51

and often did not make out indictments in such cases. Inone case a wrestler carried
a knife that his opponent "through his own stupidity and through accident fell upon
...
so that the knife wounded him in the stomach." JUST 2/155, m.15d/1 (1389).
An even more extreme case on Cauteshangre's roll recorded that the deceased had
run between two men who fought with knives and "through his own folly came
against the knives and was slain." JUST 2/155, m.8d/2 (1383). (A similar case
recorded by another coroner, is JUST 2/59, m.18/3 (1387).) Here, the homicide
flowed from an illegal act, but the slain man had himself been foolish; any felonious
intent on the slayer's part had not been directed at the eventual victim. Cauteshangre marginated "infortunium" in both of these cases, whereas in all other homicides he recorded the suspect's name in the margin, an infallible indication of indictment.
Many, perhaps most, coroners never deviated from their clear responsibility to
consider all human agents as suspects in homicides. One indicted a man for the
death of his wife after she ran upon his knife against his will, ("Ricardus [the husband] invitus,") in an attempt to separate him and another man. JUST 2/164, m.6/5
(1390). While William Hatfield, a coroner in Buckinghamshire, seems not to have
indicted the bailiff of Wendover for the accidental slaying of a person who responded
to the hue (the bailiff "not seeing him"), JUST 2/12, m.30/2 (1367), a Gloucester
coroner noted "felonia" in the accidental homicide of a malicious assailant whom the
constable of Westbury had ordered to stand to peace: "W., not wanting to stand to
peace, attacked the constable. He wanted to kill P. [the constable], and P., wanting
to fend off the malice of W., accidentally wounded W. in the right side, from which
wound W. died . . . . mhe jury says that W. was the cause of his own death."
JUST 2/40, r.1/1 (1387). Similarly, John Atherston of Worcester marginated "fe"
"felonia") in an accidental homicide resulting from the victim's negligence.
(i.e.,
JUST 2/207, m.2d/1 (1397). Compare JUST 2/102, m.lld/2 (1363), m.14d/1
(1360). Another coroner did the same in a case in which the assailant, struggling
with his intended victim, fell upon his own knife. JUST 2/133, m.l/1 (1377).
Finally, while some coroners dismissed simple accidents occurring during play where
no weapon had been drawn, e.g., JUST 2/69, m.7/8 (1367); JUST 2/126, m.ld/3
(1383), no clear rule appeared in this area. See, e.g., JUST 2/85, m.10d/4 (1396).
150. See note 173 infra and accompanying text.
151. See text at notes 295-304 infra.
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Whether the courts were seeking to deter negligence or to punish
suspected malice is impossible to determine, but it appears that they
returned to pre-fourteenth-century practice and refused to acquit
defendants, whether or not the jury stated that the deceased had
"slain himself."
D. Jury Behavior and the JudicialResponse
This study of the late medieval law of nonfelonious homicide has
centered on the effects of jury behavior on the development of the
substantive law. I have suggested that jury behavior in cases of
simple homicide to some extent stifled legal development. Specifically, I have suggested that, had there been a free flow of fact situations, judicial discussion of "close cases" might have resulted in elaboration of the rules of self-defense and felony, singling out true
self-defenders for better treatment (acquittal without forfeiture) and
producing a class of felonious but noncapital homicide. But, in the
absence of direct evidence, it is difficult to prove that judges were in
fact influenced by jury behavior. It is always possible, for instance,
that judges were mechanically applying the rules of self-defense and
that they would have continued to do so even if juries had acted in
accordance with the formal rules of liability for homicide.
While there can be no empirical evidence about how courts would
have structured those aspects of the law discussed had juries behaved
differently, there are developments in the law of nonfelonious homicide that suggest some legal fluidity and a capacity on the part of the
bench-perhaps after consultation with the Crown-to modify the
traditional common-law rules. The courts singled out slayers of
burglars and thieves as justifiable slayers, thus eliminating for them
the requirements of pardon and forfeiture. 152 And the courts developed the theory by which some accidental slayers were acquitted on
the ground that they were not true slayers but merely instruments by
which the victims, through negligence, caused their own deaths. 15 1
However, in related areas the courts demonstrated considerable
reluctance to modify the substantive rules. The slaying of a would-be
murderer was not included within the class of justifiable homicide;
although acquittals were freely allowed in accidents resulting from
target shooting, courts were cautious in acquitting for accidental
homicides stemming from fights. The pattern of relative nondevelopment in areas where the courts were faced with facts that might
152. See text at notes 101-09 supra.
153. See text at notes 11548 supra.
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suggest the appropriateness of acquittal is as important as the pattern
of fluidity and growth. On the one hand, the law remained static just
where one might expect it to: where the defendant had been involved
in a fight for which he might have been at least in part responsible.
On the other hand, the defendant in some of these cases was under
unprovoked and deadly attack. He was resisting behavior that the
law sought specifically to deter in much the same way as were those
who slew robbers and burglars. Yet only the latter were deemed

worthy of acquittal. One is driven to ask why merely personal selfdefense, especially in cases of defense against murderous assault,

resulted in the application of the full rigor of the law of excusable
homicide.

It does not seem reasonable to suggest, at least for the

fourteenth century, that the answer lies solely in the mechanical
nature of judicial application of the law. By then, some self-defenders and some perpetrators of accidental homicide were being acquit-

ted; others were not.
A second possible explanation for the courts' behavior in this

regard might have been the Crown's need for additional revenue. As
long as true self-defenders required pardons, they suffered forfeiture
as well. But, considering their likely numbers, acquittal even of all

true self-defenders would have cost the Crown a relatively small sum,
and acquittal only of those true self-defenders who had slain would-

be murderers would have involved a still smaller cost. 154 If the
Crown could afford to acquit many of those who had slain accidentally
and most of those who had slain robbers and burglars, it could

have afforded to acquit those who had slain murderers.
The most plausible explanation for the retention of the strict rules
of self-defense, I submit, was the difficulty, given the pattern of jury
verdicts, of identifying true self-defenders.

But, if jury findings that

the defendant had slain an attempted murderer were suspect, why
154. It is impossible to determine either the number of true self-defenders or the
percentage of them who slew would-be murderers. Of the ten to forty per cent of
defendants who received verdicts of self-defense, many, perhaps most, had failed to
comply with the strict letter of the law. Of those who had complied, many had retreated from an attack launched by a friend or neighbor after a heated argument and
probably only a few from a truly murderous assault. In any case, many defendants
had no goods; others had goods but disposed of them before trial. Moreover, the
Crown could not depend on juries to assess the full value of the defendant's goods
in cases of true.self-defense.
The Crown did stand to gain from forfeiture as it applied to all cases in which
juries rendered verdicts of self-defense. See T. Green, supra note 50, at 189-90.
Moreover, since most of those cases were in fact instances of felonious homicide, the
rule of forfeiture served important deterrent and punitive purposes. See text at note
158 infra. The true self-defenders were, of course, victimized by this interaction of
jury behavior and judicial response (unless juries refused to state that the true selfdefenders had goods).
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were findings that he had slain a burglar or robber not equally open
to doubt? Why did the courts treat with caution verdicts to the effect
that the defendant had slain accidentally in the course of a fight (i.e.,
where the defendant had stood motionless and his assailant had
hurled himself upon the defendant's knife), while apparently giving
credence to verdicts of mischance at target shootings?
The suggestion here is that juries did not-or that judges supposed juries did not-engage in total fabrication of the facts. Rather,
juries built upon or modified some core of reality.'5" To emphasize the defendant's absence of malice, juries were not beyond
construing common fights as one-sided attacks. They assigned to the
deceased responsibility for commencing the struggle, often alleging
-thatthe deceased had harbored a grudge against the defendant or had
taken him by surprise. Such descriptions may have been ritualistic
assertions extended by the jury in its desire to promote the defendant's -case. Similarly, the assertion that the defendant held his knife
steady and motionless against his attacker's reckless charge stretches
the truth but a little further than the clearly acceptable assertion that
the defendant actively fought back by striking one blow as he stood,
gravely wounded, with his back to the wall.
But it would have been quite another thing for the jury to invent a
shooting match or to place the parties in a field where they labored
side by side with sharp-edged tools that might go astray. Converting
slaying during a fight into slaying to prevent a burglary may have
demanded more distortion than the jury was prepared to countenance. After all, in many cases the true facts would have been
known to many individuals not sitting on the jury. Reducing complicated facts to particular forms that did "justice" might not have engendered popular disapproval; complete transformation of the facts
appears more likely to produce such a result. Moreover, although we
cannot be certain about the nature of medieval trials, it is possible
that in many cases the defendant told his story first and that the jury
repeated, or built upon, his statement.15 6 While the defendant
doubtless sought to put the best possible face upon the basic fact that
he had slain in the course of a fight, he may out of prudence have
stopped short of attempting to achieve an acquittal through a total
invention.
The fact that the bench countenanced some legal change within
the area of nonfelonious homicide, and the fact that rational explana155. The following argument is tentative, but it is supported by those cases I have
found where the description of a homicide on the coroner's roll can be compared with
the trial jury's verdict. See text at notes 66-67 &note 67 supra.

156. See text at notes 76-77 &note 77 supra.
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tions are available for areas in which the court was reluctant to
mandate change, do not, however, prove the proposition that, other
things being equal, the bench would have been willing either to
modify the outer limits of nonfelonious self-defense or to create an
intermediate category of noncapital felonious homicide. Either of
those changes would have meant shifting the line between life and
death rather than between acquittal and pardon. It is at least possible that, even had juries behaved differently, the legal definition of
capital homicide would have remained unchanged-that, if all perpetrators of felonious homicide had been convicted of that crime, they
would all have been hanged.
Moreover, even if it is assumed arguendo that judicial confrontation of close cases might have resulted in elaboration of the law of
felonious homicide and self-defense, it must be conceded that such a
development could have occurred without a flow of close cases.
Judges must have been aware that many homicides resulted from
brawls that defendants had freely joined and that juries systematically
concealed this aspect of the defendants' behavior. The judges could
have redefined felonious homicide to secure justice, to induce different jury behavior, or both. Yet they did not do so. Systematic
nullification of the formal rules of felonious homicide continued for
perhaps two centuries or more. 157 Why did the Crown not seek to
end such nullification by changing the formal rules? Why, for
instance, did the Crown not provide a formal fine for those who slew
feloniously, but not murderously, rather than formally threaten such
persons with hanging only to have to grant them pardons de cursu?
In one sense, of course, perpetrators of simple homicides who
were alleged to be self-defenders were fined. At least after 1343, all
of them were supposed to suffer forfeiture even though they received
pardons. Indeed, the rule of automatic forfeiture, which penalized the
true self-defender as well, may have been a belated response to the
juries' handling of simple homicide.' 58 In another sense, some feloni157. There is strong evidence of jury manipulation of facts for the period 1250
to 1430. The rolls for the period 1430 to 1550 are too sparse for analysis; thereafter,
it appears that juries infrequently returned verdicts of self-defense. See text at note
288 infra. While there is some reason to believe the new pattern of jury verdicts
began before 1550, the exact date of the change cannot be determined.
158. Maitland ascribes the new rule to royal desire for revenue generally:
So far as we can see, the homicide who obtained a pardon on the score of misadventure or self-defence (unless he had fled on account of his deed), did not
in Henry III's time incur that forfeiture of his chattels which was inflicted upon
him in after days. But very often he had fled, and this, so it seems to us, may
have enabled our ever needy kings to establish forfeiture as a general accompaniment of the "pardon of course."
2 F. PoLrocK & F. MArrL -D, supra note 5, at 481. I suspect, but cannot prove,
that the bench was influenced by the frequent recourse of juries to a verdict of self-
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ous slayers could avoid prosecution by paying a "fine"-the cost of a

pardon de gratia, money in normal times, forty-days' service in time
of war. Between these two provisions, many felonious slayers
suffered a penalty even if they were not prosecuted or were prosecuted

but avoided conviction through securing a verdict of self-defense.
In any case, everyday brawling and the inevitable ensuing deaths

could not be ended altogether by formal legal rules.

From the

perspective of the Crown and bench, a moderation of the law might

only have made matters worse. The adoption of a lesser sanction for
simple homicide might have seemed a condonation of jury attitudes
and thereby resulted in their amplification. Or it might have produced more convictions only at the expense of encouraging the already widespread recourse to physicial violence. In short, by adhering

at least in theory to the strictest rules of criminal liability-by posing
what might have been thought to be the greatest threat to the greatest
number-the Crown might well have believed that its approach to
homicide represented at least a modest deterrent that also produced
an important source of money and military service. 1 9
defense. The new rule of forfeiture also affected misadventure, but, as we have seen,
judges began to acquit accidental slayers, except where they suspected misadventure
verdicts concealed simple homicides.
There is, however, another explanation, which the bench itself gave as early as
1347. A Year Book entry of that year noted that the Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw.
1, c. 9 (1278), authorized a pardon for cases of accident and self-defense but said
nothing about saving the defendant his goods. Y.B. Hil. 21 Edw. 3, f. 17, pl. 23
(1347). In fact, the Statute of Gloucester dealt with procedures for the granting of
writs of inquest into cases of homicide. See N. HuRNARD, supra note 4, at 281; 2
F. POLLOCK & F. MArTLAND, supra, at 481. It therefore provided no occasion for
dealing with the matter of forfeiture.
The same Year Book entry reveals an important misconception of the Statute of
Marlborough, 52 Hen. 3, c. 26 (1267). That statute decreed that the murdrum fine
(the fine imposed upon a hundred for an unexplained homicide, see note 19 supra)
was not to be levied in cases of misadventure. The murdrum fine was abolished altogether in 1340, perhaps some decades after it had fallen into disuse. The bench in
1347 read the Statute of Marlborough to say that misadventure was no longer to be
treated as "murder," in the substantive sense of felonious homicide. Due to this misreading, the judges concluded that pardons de cursu in accident and presumably selfdefense cases were of relatively recent vintage (1257) and that the procedure in such
cases had been developed soon after by the Statute of Gloucester (1278). Since neither statute dispensed with the rule of forfeiture, which applied in all cases of felonious homicide, the judges' conclusion that forfeiture applied to all of the "new"
excusable homicides is understandable. For a discussion of these erroneous statutory
constructions and subsequent commentary upon them, see 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra, at 481-82.
While the judicial misreadings of earlier statutes are understandable, there remains the question of what occasioned judicial inquiry into the problem of forfeiture
in excusable homicide. Maitland's suggestion regarding the need for revenue and my
own related suggestion regarding jury behavior in cases that otherwise would clearly
have led to forfeiture must remain tentative. In any case, my analysis of the effect
of the rule once it had been propounded does not depend upon my suggestion regarding the motivation of the bench in 1347.
159. Douglas Hay's analysis, D. HAY, ALnBION'S FATAL TREE 40-49 (1975), of the
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THE STATUTE OF 1390: AN ANALYSIS OF THE

INITIATIVE FOR CHANGE IN THE LAW

OF FELONIOUS HOMICIDE

The ancient distinction between murder and less serious felonious
homicides re-emerged in the fourteenth century in the course of a
parliamentary attempt to restrain the king's power to grant pardons of
grace (de gratia) to the most serious offenders. This distinction,
however, which was devised solely to determine eligibility for a
pardon of grace, apparently had no permanent effect on the substantive law of homicide. Throughout the entire period, all homicides
committed with "malice" (i.e., those that were deliberate but neither
justifiable nor excusable) remained capital offenses. Nevertheless, it
is necessary to undertake a brief review of the early fourteenthcentury legislation and a detailed examination of the statute of
1390,160 the most important of the fourteenth-century pardon statutes. I shall establish that the pardon statutes created a distinction
between serious and simple felonious homicide and suggest some of
the reasons for the failure of these statutes to leave a lasting imprint
on the substantive law.
A.

The PardonStatutes

The 1390 statute was the last of many attempts over nearly a
century to stem the tide of royal pardons de gratia that flowed,
usually for a price, to nondeserving offenders.1 61 The earliest statutes declared that the king might pardon only those who slew se
defendendo or by accident, the traditional grounds for pardons de
cursu. These statutes, therefore, appear to have endeavored
to prohibit all pardons of grace, declaring that all felonious homi1 62
cides lay beyond the scope of the royal power to extend mercy.
This, in itself, nearly defies explanation: Surely justice required
greater latitude than the statutes allowed, and literal applicaplays havoc with the underlying
tion of the wording of these statutes 63
theory of the king as fount of justice.'
retention in the eighteenth century of statutes making minor property crimes capital
offenses might have some bearing here. Hay observes that these statutes were infrequently enforced to their fullest. Many offenders were not prosecuted by the propertied persons they had victimized; others were treated leniently by jury or judge; some
received pardons. The opportunity to extend mercy, Hay argues, enhanced the position of the ruling elites while it allowed for selective enforcement for deterrent purposes.
The retention of the strict rules of felonious homicide in the medieval period may

have played a similar role. It gave the Crown a greater degree of power over life
and death and an opportunity to extend mercy through pardons of grace and (undeserved) pardons de cursu.
160. 13 Rich. 2, stat. 2, c. 1 (1390).
161. See I. BELLAMY, supra note 37, at 195; N. HuRNARD, supra note 4, at 32526; Kaye, supranote 5, at 377-91.
162. As early as 1309, Parliament petitioned the king about the frequent pardon-
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It would be a mistake, I believe, to read the early pardon statutes
too literally. They may in fact have been speaking to extreme cases

rather than to the large intermediate body of simple homicides, and
they may have been assuming a distinction close to the one that the
statute of 1390 made explicit. It is worth considering how this may
have come about.
As we have seen, the law of self-defense required the defendant to
prove that he had acted in extremis. 6 4 Indeed, by the middle of the

thirteenth century, it was considered felonious for a person able to
flee deliberately to strike and cause death even if he had been

provoked and was in substantial danger.'0 5 Yet the early treatise
writers, when they considered felonious homicide, dealt mainly with
its core element, malice, in the sense of a deliberate, unprovoked
attack. 166 They rarely considered the case where the deceased had
been the assailant, and the defendant, acting without true malice but
in unnecessary haste, had chosen retaliation rather than flight. It is
even unclear that these writers discussed homicides committed in the
course of a brawl freely joined, where one of the blows dealt produced an unforeseen fatal result. Had they been pressed to
define the outer limits of excusable homicide, they almost certainly
ing of thieves ("larons") who had been indicted for "larcines, roberies, homicides,"
and other felonies. Those responsible for the indictments, so the petition alleged,
feared to remain in their communities; many refused to indict out of similar fear.
The petition did not suggest any specific remedy, but the king replied that in the
future he would grant pardons only to those found to have slain through misadventure, self-defense, or insanity. 1 RoTurJL PARLIAMENTORUM 444b (1309). The Ordinances of 1311 carried out the royal response in more general language: "That
no felon nor fugitive be from henceforth protected or defended from any manner of
felony, by the King's charter of peace . . . unless in a case where the King can give
grace according to his oath, and that by process of law and the custom of the realm.
." Quoted in N. HuRNARD, supra note 4, at 323-24. The Statute of Northampton attempted to limit pardons to self-defense and misadventure, 2 Edw. 3, c. 2,
(1328), and in 1336 a new statute ordered that the Statute of Northampton be observed, 10 Edw. 3, c. 2.
163. See note 52 supra. The king sometimes pardoned culpable slayers whose
acts either bordered on self-defense or for other reasons were not considered especially heinous. See N. HUNARD, supranote 4, at 244.
164. See text at notes 56-57 supra.
165. See text at note 57 supra.
166. Bracton seems to consider an unlawful homicide as one committed "in premeditated assault and felony." 2 H. BRAcTON, supra note 43, at 438 (f.155). He
describes felonious homicide "as where one in anger or hatred or for the sake of gain,
deliberately and in premeditated assault, has killed another wickedly and feloniously
and in breach of the king's peace." Id. at 341 (f121). Bracton does not here
consider the provoked slayer who responds merely to save himself without being in
extremis. Fleta, written a generation after Bracton, refers to wilful homicide as one
in which "a man, with corrupt intention, wickedly and feloniously slays anyone by
a deliberate attack, in anger or hatred or for the sake of gain." 2 FLETA, supra note
52, at 60.
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would have excluded such acts,'1 7 but their writings do not articulate

a reason for treating them as capital felonies.168 Thus the trend of
focusing only on extreme cases had begun.
As concern about professional and secret homicide grew, the

chasm between those acts singled out for special condemnation and
those meriting pardons de cursu grew wider. The attention of both
judges and legislators, like that of the treatise writers, may have been
diverted from the intermediate category of simple homicide. Indeed,
this might have been a result of the prevailing pattern of jury behav-

ior, which narrowed the courts' focus on homicide to the more
extreme cases.

Yet another factor sheds light on the likely intent of the early
fourteenth-century pardon statutes: a parliamentary misconception
regarding the granting of pardons de cursu. In the thirteenth cen-

tury, kings personally oversaw the pardoning process.

Under this

procedure, a few technically undeserving slayers, in the interests of

justice, -had received pardons for self-defense after trial.' 6 9 In the
early fourteenth century, the pardoning procedure changed: routine

royal intercession ceased and the chancellor was empowered to issue
pardons de cursu in the king's name.'1 0 By virtue of this new
procedure, pardons de cursu were issued only in those cases in which

there had been a judicial determination that the defendant had met
the legal standard for self-defense.

Thus, although the king retained

the power to grant pardons for self-defense to slayers who had not
167. Bracton describes self-defense as follows: "[I]f avoidable and he could escape without slaying, he will then be guilty of homicide." 2 H. BRACTON, supra note
43, at 340 (f.120b). Here, Bracton states the strict rule of self-defense, but does
not specifically refer to provoked slayings where the slayer might not have acted out
of malice. Nor does he refer to such acts in his discussion of intentional homicide.
See note 166 supra. In his discussion of self-defense, where the slaying was "unavoidable," Bracton states that the slayer acts "with sorrow of heart," 2 H. BRACrON,
supra, at 341 (f.121), and "without premeditated hatred," id. at 340 (f.120b). But
what of the slayer who acts when it was avoidable, "without premeditated hatred"
and "with sorrow of heart"? Compare 2 FLETA, supra note 52, at 60: "[lf the
necessity were avoidable, without slaying, a man is guilty of homicide, whereas,
should the necessity be unavoidable, he will not be liable to the penalty of homicide,
because he has not slain feloniously, but from fear and instinctively, to save himself
when he could not otherwise avoid his own death."
168. Bracton comes closest to explaining the rationale for the harsh rules of the
law, but his discussion presumes the possibility of rational decision-making. In discussing the capital liability of one who "thinking to strike a light blow, . .. has
struck a heavy one and killed. . .," Bracton states, "For everyone ought to observe
mean and measure in what he does." 2 H. BRACTON, supra note 43, at 438 (f.155b).
169. These included those whose acts bordered on, but did not fall within the
legal category of self-defense, N. HuRNARD, supra note 4, at 239-43, and on occasion
even brawlers, id. at 244.
170. See note 52 supraand accompanying text.
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met the formal rules of the law,' 71 this power was seldom if ever
exercised; it was the rare case in which a defendant could convince
the judges to carry forward his case for personal royal consideration.
The drafters of the early pardon statutes, however, may not have fully
understood this:'1 2 the statutes may have been drafted under the
incorrect assumption that such cases might still go forward after trial
for royal consideration.
In sum, it would appear that Parliament did not intend totally to
deprive the Crown of its traditional power in cases long thought
appropriate for royal mercy. By allowing pardons only in cases of
accident and self-defense, Parliament probably thought it was leaving
intact the royal power not only to pardon de cursu according to the
strict rules of the law, but also to pardon de gratia those simple
homicides that the king, out of true mercy and by appropriate extension of the legal rules, desired to treat as if meeting the formal
requirements.
By the middle of the fourteenth century, in any event, statutory
preambles and legislative histories provide a clearer insight into the
nature of the protest that Parliament had leveled against the Crown.
While the statutes continued to distinguish between pardons de cursu
and pardons de gratia,it appears that Parliament, seeking to combat
what was perceived as a dangerous rise in professional crime,' 73 was
171. It is, of course, possible that the summary procedure for pardons de cursu
reflected a new royal policy according to which the king conceded his power to pardon except in cases of accident or in those cases meeting the strict rules of self-defense. Having so reduced his options, he would have little reason to oversee the issuing of pardons de cursu. But it seems more reasonable to conclude that the king,
in forfeiting the opportunity to pardon some offenders after trial, did so only as a
by-product of his streamlining of the royal administration of pardons de cursu. He
probably had at the time imagined that more suspects would then come to him before
trial for a pardon de gratiain return for money or military service.
172. Year Book recognition of the chancellor's summary powers with regard to
pardons de cursu dates from the early fourteenth century, the period of the early pardon statutes, see note 52 supra and accompanying text, but Parliament may have
overlooked this innovation.
173. There is no systematic study of the growth of professional crime over the
course of the fourteenth century. My argument does not depend on the fact of increasing crime; it does depend on the contemporary belief in an increase in "professional" crime. We owe much of our evidence to parliamentary attention to the problem, see note 174 infra, which may reflect the perception of the higher classes rather
than actual conditions. The trial rolls from the later decades of the fourteenth century indicate frequent indictments of groups of offenders, especially in cases of theft,
and indictments before justices of the peace also reflect a substantial amount of what
seems to have been professional crime. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS, supra note 35, at 21239. Gangs seem to have operated openly and ubiquitously. See H. Hnwirr, supra
note 54, at 173-75; Bellamy, The Coterel Gang: An Anatomy of a Band of Fourteenth-century Criminals,79 ENo. IsT. REv. 698 (1964). For discussions of thirteenth-century crime, see P. HILTON, A MEDIEvAL SocmTY 248-61 (1966); Pugh, supra note 39, at 18-19. Professor Barbara Hannawalt of Indiana University is at pres-
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concerned mainly with those pardons de gratia obtained by the worst
offenders.

Notorious malefactors who committed homicide in the

course of theft were frequently cited as the targets of the legislation.1 4 Persons who had acted on a sudden impulse or in the course
of a common brawl were almost never mentioned, though they were

probably responsible for most homicides. Parliament dealt, in short,
with those acts that incurred public outrage and seemed beyond the

most generous limits of legitimate mercy.
During the later decades of the fourteenth century, parliamentary
concern with the problem of professional homicide steadily increased.

Possibly as a result of this concern, the terminology of royal commissions to justices of the peace came more fully to define serious

homicide, or "murder," as it once again had come to be called in
official documents, 175 and thus to lend special importance to prosecution in such cases. The commission of 1380, for instance, which

empowered justices of the peace to take indictments in cases of
"murder," associated that term with ambushing and malice afore-

thought, or true planning. 176 Legislative demands for limitations on
ent undertaking an extensive study of crime in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
174. The petition of 1309 had referred to the "too free pardoning of thieves
[larons] who had been indicted" for the crimes Parliament sought to prevent. 1
RoTtu PARrYAMENTORUM 444b (1309). The statute of 1336 recited: "Whereas murderers, robbers, and other felons, be greatly encouraged to offend, by reason that
Charters of pardon of manslaughters ["homicides"], robbery, felonies, and other trespasses against the peace, have been so lightly granted. . . ." 10 Edw. 3, c. 2. The
statute of 1340, 14 Edw. 3, c. 15, repeated earlier restrictions on pardons: "Charters have been granted without number to felons and manslayers ["larons et homicides', to the evil example and fear of good people and lawful, whereby thieves,
felons and offenders ["larons et meffesours"] be comforted to do their robberies and
manslaughters ["roberies et homicides"] and the same do from day to day . ..."
In a petition of 1347, Parliament referred to malefactors without number who received pardons "to the great destruction of the people." 2 RoTuLI PARLIAMENTORUM
171a. See 2 ROTuLI PARLIAMENTORUM 172a (1347). A similar petition of 1353
stated that the king, in response to "suggestions" which were less than truthful, had
granted pardons to many notorious felons ("larons") and to common murderers, who
were to fight overseas and who returned and plundered the countryside. 2 RoTULI
PARLIAMENTORUM 253b. Kaye correctly notes that Parliament did not distinguish
types of felonious homicide in these statutes and petitions. Kaye, supra note 5, at
378. It is possible that Parliament had in mind all felonious homicides; but it is
unlikely that in its attempt to prevent the pardoning of really serious malefactors,
Parliament proscribed pardons even to those of generally good reputation who, in a
sudden quarrel, struck and slew another person.
175. See note 19 supra. For an excellent discussion of the use of "murder" as
a term of art in justice of the peace indictments in the 1380's, see Kaye, supra note
5, at 383-89.
176. "We have assigned you to inquire . .. into all thefts, notorious or open, and
mayhems and slayings of men through ambush or malice aforethought, and murders,
and other felonies . . . ." 3 RoTuui PARLIAMENTORuM 84b. "Felonies," I believe,
incorporated simple homicides. See note 201 infra.
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royal pardoning power may have prompted the frequent insertion in
pardons for "all felonies," from about that date, of clauses excepting
"treason, murder, and rape."' 177 In this context, "murder" was not
employed as a catch-all for felonious homicide, but was a term of
art.

1 78

The statute of 1390 gave these legislative demands their fullest
embodiment: Limits were imposed on the king's power to pardon
homicides committed through murder, ambush, assault, or malice
aforethought.1 79 Pardons for these offenses were made quite expensive. They could be obtained only through a request making clear
the nature of the killing, and to be effective had expressly to cover
these offenses. A trial was to be held to determine the nature of the
slaying when a general pardon for homicide was presented to the
court.

80

The meaning of both the commission of 1380 and the statute of
1390 depend largely on the meaning assigned to the term "malice
aforethought"-the "malitia precogitata" of the commission and the
"malice prepense" of the statute. If the term was meant to coincide
with the general "malitia precogitatd' that was then employed in
indictments as the threshold degree of mens rea for felony, the term
would have swallowed up the statutory "murder, ambush, [and]
assault," and the pardoning power would have been restricted in all
cases of felonious homicide. If, on the other hand, "malice aforethought" was a new term of art encompassing homicides committed
through true planning or premeditation, the statutory restraint on the
royal pardoning power would have applied only to the most serious
forms of felonious homicide. The former position has recently been
taken by J. M. Kaye, who, in the first systematic analysis of the statute of 1390, argues that "malice aforethought" was meant to be
equivalent to the general "malitia precogitata."''8 I take the oppo177. See, e.g., CALENDAR OF THE PATENT RoLLs, 4 Rich. 2, pt. 2, at 610 (March
20, 1381), 624 (May 7, 1381); 9 Rich. 2, pt. 1, at 71 (Dec. 12, 1385), 79 (Jan.
8,1386), 94 (Jan. 16, 1386), 128 (Feb.27, 1386).
178. See, e.g., JusT 3/177, m.7/3 (1393), discussed in note 197 infra.
179. 13 Rich. 2, stat. 2, c. 1 (1390): "Mhat no charter of pardon from henceforth shall be allowed before any justice for murder, or for the death of a man slain
by await, assault, or malice prepensed, treason, or rape of a woman . . ." ("[Q]e
null chartre de pardon desore soit alowe devant qiconqes Justices pur murdre mort

de homme occys par agait assaut ou malice prepense treson ou rape de femme . . .").
180. 13 Rich. 2, stat. 2, c. 1 (1390). The section of the statute imposing heavy
fines for pardons for the named offenses was repealed in 1392. See note 205 infra.
181. See Kaye, supra note 5, at 391-95. He argues forcefully against the uncritical assumptions of earlier scholars that the statute associated malice aforethought
with murder. See, e.g., 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 53, at 44-46; Maitland, The Early
History of Malice Aforethought (1883), in 1 COLLEcTED WoRKs 304 (1911); Plucknett, Commentary on the Indictments, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 35, at cxlviii.
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site view in the following discussion.' 82
Kaye's view that malice prepense (the malitia precogitata of the
commission of 1380) referred to all culpable homicides rests ultimately on the following argument: Both before and after the statute
of 1390, pardons for excusable homicide stated that the defendant

had slain "neither through felony nor through 'malitiam precogitatam."' If "malitiam precogitatam" meant true malice aforethought,
Kaye argues, its use in this context would be odd, for such a denial

would not have sufficed; mere deliberateness was enough to preclude
a pardon de cursu, and that was what the defendant had to deny. 83

While Kaye's argument is forceful, the weight of the evidence, as I
shall demonstrate, suggests that by 1390 malitia precogitatahad come

at least temporarily and in one significant context to have a second
meaning-true malice aforethought.

84

That the statutory term "malice aforethought" modified "murder," i.e., especially serious homicide, or at least that justices and
other royal officials thought it did, can be shown in several ways.
First, one must consider the parliamentary petition to which the
statute was a response.

This petition sheds important light on the

meaning of the terminology used in the statute to which King, Lords,
and Commons finally agreed."8 5 It clearly requested that pardons for

"murder," treason, or rape be altogether proscribed'

8

and that the

court be required both to check the indictment in every case in which
the defendant produced a pardon and to hold void the charter of

pardon if the indictment was for one of these felonies.

87

Moreover,

182. In short, unlike Kaye, I believe that the late fourteenth-century chronicler,
Walsingham, quoted in Kaye, supra note 5, at 391, correctly characterized the purpose of the statute when he stated that it made it impossible (or nearly so) for "secret slayers whom the English call murderers" ("occultus jugulator, quales morderers
appellant Anglici") to obtain a pardon. I believe that the statute was aimed not only
at "secret slayers" in the narrow sense, but also more generally at those who perpetrated planned homicides. Kaye correctly establishes the importance of the term
"murder" in, the fourteenth century. Our disagreement concerns the term "malitia
precogitata"and the breadth of the 1390 statute.
183. See Kaye, supra note 5, at 392-93.
184. Kaye perhaps presupposes greater consistency in the use of malitia precogitata than one ought to expect. The term might have served both its original function
of denoting the threshold degree of mens rea and the more technical purpose of describing one specific and aggravated form of mens rea. There could have been little
confusion when the phrase "malitia precogitata" was used alongside other phrases
that were clearly associated with serious homicide.
185. See 3 ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM 268 (1389).
186. "Mhe commons pray that henceforth no charter of pardon for treason, murder or rape of woman be granted to any one, at the instance or request of any person." 3 RoTULI PARLtAMENTORUM 268 (1389).
187. "And [the commons pray] that each justice throughout the whole realm, before whom any charter of pardon is alleged, shall search the indictment rolls; and
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the petition urged that if anyone requested a pardon for homicide
("mort de home") and thereafter the homicide was proved to be a
murder ("murdre"), the supplicant (or his patron) should pay a
substantial fine.188
If "murder," as employed in the petition, included all felonious
homicides, then, a fortiori, "mort de home" in the petition referred

only to nonfelonious homicide---excusable or justifiable killing. But
such a reading is inconsistent with contemporary terminology. Kaye,
although the strongest proponent of the theory that the statute that
resulted from the petition dealt with all felonious homicides, has
demonstrated that "murder" was a term of art for the most serious

Moreover, by 1390 pardons de gratia
form of felonious homicide.'
granted for felonious homicide ("for the death [of a person] slain
feloniously, as it is alleged"'190 ) often expressly excepted "murder,
The courts treated such pardons as valid in
treason, and rape."''
cases where juries returned verdicts of simple homicide. 1 2 The peti-

tion's request that pardons in cases of "murder, treason or rape" be
held void is entirely consistent with the contemporary practice of
granting this limited form of pardon.
if it is found in the said indictment that it is murder, treason or rape of woman,
let the charter be held null." 3 RoTuLs PARLIAmENTORUM 268 (1389).
188. The penalties ranged from two hundred marks to one thousand pounds, depending upon the status of the person making the request. 3 ROTULI PARLIAMENThe penalized supplicant would normally be a lord who had
TORUm 268 (1389).
requested a pardon for one of his retinue; the defendant, who had already suffered
conviction, hanging, and forfeiture, could hardly be further penalized.
189. See Kaye, supra note 5, at 383-88. Kaye also argues, correctly I believe,
-that the third term of the statute, assaut (assault), was a term of art referring to
a serious form of homicide, much like ambush, which was associated with murder.
Id. at 392.
190. "Promorte. . . feloniter ut dicitur interfecit."
191. See text at note 177 supra. Comparison of an "act" of Richard H's Privy
Council, of unascertained date but very likely from the years just preceding the statute of 1390, with the statute itself reveals a clear distinction between mort de homme
and murder. The Privy Council act requested that the king not "grant lightly charters of pardon for death of a person [mort de homme], murder, rape of women,
robberies and other felonies [dautres felonies] without good information and testi-

mony of sufficient persons."

1 PROCEEDINGS

AND ORDINANCES OF THE PRIVY COUN-

CIL oF ENGLAND 86 (H. Nicholas ed. 1834). This resolution sought to ensure that
those who received pardons of grace would be generally reputable persons who could
produce sufficient sureties as guarantors of their future good behavior. For a discus.
sion of the surety requirement in cases of pardons for felonious homicide, see R.
HUNNISETr, supra note 22, at 79-80. The act did not go so far as to request proscrip.
tion of pardons in even the most serious cases, much less in all cases. The petition
to which the statute of 1390 was a response, on the other hand, singled out from
this list murder, rape, and treason, and requested proscription in those cases. It did
not include "mort de homme"; rather it specified that pardons be disallowed solely
in cases of alleged "mort de homme" that turned out, upon judicial inquiry, to be
cases of murder.
192. See, e.g., JUST 3/177, m.7/3 (1393), discussed in note 197 infra.
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The petition thus requested total restraint on the pardoning of
perpetrators of serious homicide ("murder"), but it made no request
for a limitation on pardons in cases of felonious but not serious homicide. This fact alone is nearly determinative of the statute's meaning,
for it is nearly unthinkable that the King, always jealous of his prerogatives, would respond to the petition by granting more than was
asked and assent to a near-total restraint on his power to pardon perpetrators of both serious and simple homicides. If the petition sought
to preclude pardons solely in cases of murder, the statutory restraint
was almost certainly limited to cases of murder.
A close reading of the statute itself supports this view. The
preamble to the statute recited that the Commons had complained
about "outrageous mischiefs and damage done to the realm because
treasons, murders and rapes of women are too commonly committed.
."

In the body of the statute, however, "murder" was accom-

panied by the troublesome "ambush, assault, [or] malice aforethought." Kaye admits that the term "murder" was used in the body of
the statute as a term of art for stealthy homicide or planning, but
insists that the term "malice aforethought" referred to homicides
committed with the threshold degree of mens rea needed for all
felonious homicide. 193 If Kaye is correct, the statute employed the
term "murder" in two rather different ways: first, in the preamble, in
the general sense of all felonious homicides, and then, in the body of
the statute, in its more technical meaning of slaying through secrecy
and stealth. It seems likely, however, that the term was used consistently in the statute, and, since there is no doubt about its meaning in
the body of the statute, it is probable that the technical meaning was
intended in both cases. 94
Another important source of evidence regarding the meaning of
the statute is its application by the royal courts. Unfortunately, the
surviving records tell us little about whether the courts enforced it.
And, of the handful of existing enrollments that do apply the statute,
only a few provide insight into its meaning. The small number of
relevant enrollments probably ought not to be accorded great impor193. Kaye, supranote 5, at 383-88.
194. One clause of the statute has engendered some confusion. The statute provided that "no charter of pardon, of treason, nor of other felony, [should] pass the
chancery without warrant of the privy-seal, but in case where the chancellor may
grant it of his office, without speaking thereof to the king." 13 Rich. 2, stat. 2, c.
1 (1390). This provision merely required that the proper royal seals be placed on
all pardons for felony and did not subject pardons for all felonies to the special restrictions placed on pardons for serious homicides. Stephen misinterpreted this provision. See 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 53, at 43.
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tance in interpreting the statute; rather, they ought to be taken as one
element of evidence among the others presented."9 5
Of the enrolled applications of the statute, a few are not inconsis-

tent with, but do not prove, the proposition that the statutory "malice
aforethought" referred not just to those homicides considered "mur-

der" but to all felonious homicides. In three such cases, defendants
presenting pardons for felony not mentioning "murder" were subjected to an inquisition to determine whether they had in fact committed homicide "per murdram, insidiam . . . malitiam precogitatam." The jurors in each case responded that the defendant had
not done so, but had slain "se defendendo."'' 9 The fate of the defendant said to have slain per feloniam, but not per murdram, remained untested.
On the other hand, several enrollments support the proposition
that the statute restricted only the power to pardon for murder. In
two cases, the judicial treatment of the statute leaves no doubt that the
court equated malitia precogitatawith murder. In response to ques-

tions put by the bench, the jury in these cases both confirmed the
truth of indictments employing the term per feloniam ("they say that
the defendant slew in the way for which he was indicted") and

stated, in specific terms, that the defendant had not acted "per murdram . . . malitiam precogitatam."'97 A third case, tried before
195. I have examined nearly every gaol delivery and relevant King's Bench roll
from 1390 to 1430. Pardons were tested against the statute in only a handful of
cases, discussed in notes 196-97 infra. The cases come mainly from three different
gaol delivery rolls: three from Jusr 3/180; three from Jusr 3/176; two from Jvs'r
3/177. The clustering of cases might indicate that certain justices, at certain times,
remembered to apply the statute or that certain clerks, at certain times, bothered to
enroll applications of the statute.
196. JusT 3/180, m.31/6 (1390); JusT 3/180, m.31/5 (1390). In these cases,
the court had asked the jury whether the defendants had acted "feloniously or out
of malice [aforethought?] or not" ("felonice aut ex malitia precogitata necne"). In
a later case, JusT 3/180, m.35/7 (1393), the court seems to have distinguished mere
felony and felony with malice aforethought. The court asked a jury "whether the
aforesaid felony was done out of malice [aforethought?] or not" ("si felonia facta
fuit ex malitia precogitata necne"). The response, however, is not helpful: "[The
defendant] did not slay .. . out of malice [aforethought?], but in defending himself" ("non interfecit . .. ex malitia precogitata set se ipsum defendendo").
197. In JusT 3/177, m.32d/1 (1393), the defendant, Richard Baker, came before
the justices of gaol delivery at Leicester on an indictment of simple homicide ("felonice interfecit") and produced a pardon "for the death of" ("pro morte") Adam
Sutton. The justices saw fit to hold an inquest by the jury of the neighborhood, "nocording to the Statute, . ..because the charter [of pardon] does not state whether
Richard slew Adam through murder, ambush, assault or malice aforethought. . . or
not. . . .The jurors say that Richard did not slay Adam through murder, ambush,
assault or malice aforethought, but rather in the way in which he was indicted." The
coroner's roll, which the clerk copied onto the trial roll as the indictment, recorded
that Baker met Sutton one night coming from a tavern and that they fell into an
argument ("variis litibus inter ipsos motis") during which Richard struck Sutton a
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King's Bench in Westminister, also suggests this equation of murder
and malitia precogitata. Two defendants had been indicted for mur-

der. When they presented pardons for felonious homicide, the court
stated that in accordance with the statute of 1390 it was necessary to
empanel a jury to determine whether the slaying had in fact been

murder. The trial was put over until the next term so that a jury
could be brought to Westminister. In the meantime, however, the

defendants obtained new charters stating that the King pardoned
them for murder committed through ("per") malice aforethought,
and they were immediately released. 198 Two other enrollments are

ambiguous on the point, but appear to support this reading of the
statute.' 9 9
Additional evidence that the statutory term "malice prepense"
was associated with the term "murdre" rather than with all felonious
homicides is found in a 1403 charge to grand jurors that was worded
in a way that separated simple homicides from murders, identifying
the former as acts of "chance medley" ("chaude mleld'). 2 00 Tfis
fatal blow. JusT 2/57, m.15/7 (1390). There is no reference to self-defense on
either the coroner's roll or the gaol delivery roll.
In the second case, JusT 3/177, m.7/3 (1393), the defendant, John, son of William Soupere, came before the justices of gaol delivery at Northampton on an indictment of simple homicide ("felonice interfecir'). John put forth a pardon "for all
felonies, . . . murders and rapes excepted." The court, presumably to determine
whether the pardon, as drafted, was applicable, thereupon held an inquest into the
nature of the homicide in question. The jurors were asked whether John had slain
through "murder. . . or malice aforethought. . . or not. . .," and replied that he
had not done so, but had slain in the manner recorded in the indictment: simply,
"feloniously." Here the entire range of terms of the 1390 statute is used as an
equivalent for the charter's term "murder."
198. KB 27/529, Rex iii/1 (1392) (emphasis added). See note 201 infra.
199. See JusT 3/176, m.10 (1391); JusT 3/176, m.1l/2 (1391). Defendants indicted for felonious homicide and bearing pardons "pro morte" were released after
jury verdicts. The juries were asked "whether or not [the defendant] murdered . . .
either through ambush, assault or malice [aforethought?] slew . . . or not ... "
("utrum . . . murdravit . . . aut per insideas, insultum seu malitiam precogitatam interfecit . . . necne . . ."). They responded: the defendant "did not murder . . .
neither through ambush, assault nor malice [aforethought?] slew him" ("non murdravit . . . nec per insideas, insultum seu malitiam precogitatam ipsum interfecit").
The use of "neither. . . nor" suggests that ambush and malice- aforethought modified
"murder." In another case, KB 27/520, Rex xix/1 (1391), the statute was tested
with similarly ambiguous results.
200. Harleian ms. 773, f.50, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 35; at 11: "Also you
will inquire about all sorts of homicides both of those who lie in wait through malice
aforethought [par malice deuant pourpense] in the peace of homes and other places
[and who] murder people and of those who slay men through chance medley
[chaude melle] . . " (translated from the original Law French).
The earliest reference to "chance medley" that I have found dates from 1388:
two parties "met and, through chance medley, fought together" ("encountreront et
par chance melle ensemble combateront"). SC 8/253, no. 12605. The two terms
"chaude melle" (literally "hot medley") and "chance melle" (literally "chance medley") appear to have been interchangeable. In any event, given the narrow definition
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grand jury charge reiterated the association of murder with ambush

"through malice aforethought" ("par malice devant pourpense") and
burglary, acts that had been the primary concern of pardon statutes
and petitions for almost a century. It seems clear that the terms of
this charge track those of the commission of 1380201 and the pardons
that, by 1400, had been given for a generation for all felonies, "murder, treason, and rape excepted."

Finally, a systematic analysis of all the extant coroners' rolls from
1380 until 1430 reveals that many coroners, or assize clerks who
of murder, the "hot medley" of the 1403 grand jury charge cannot reasonably be restricted to cases where the slaying that resulted from the "medley" was excusable;
it appears to refer to all homicides stemming from a chance or sudden encounter.
For a discussion of sixteenth-century treatise writers who carried forward this meaning of chance medley, see text at notes 227-35 infra.
201. Putnam states that the charges to grand jurors were not "formulated from
above by the central government. [They] must on the contrary have been put into
shape by local officials . . . , working with the commission and with general collections of 'old' and 'new' statutes or with special compilations." PROCEEDINGs, supra
note 35, at xxxv. She draws attention to the similarity between the charge of 1403
and the commission of 1380. Id. at 11. It seems likely that the drafter of the charge
worked either from that commission or from a copy of the statute of 1390. See id.
at 20-25; EARLY TREArsEs ON THE PRACtiCE OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE IN THE FIFTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH CENTURIES 102-04 (B. Putnam ed. 1924) [hereinafter
EAUX TREAisES].
The commission of 1380 referred to "slayings of men through ambush or...
malice [aforethought?], and murders . . . " 3 RoTvu PARLIAMENToIuM 84b. The
1403 charge referred to "homicides .. . of those who lie in wait through malice
aforethought .. .and who murder.. . ." See note 200 supra. The "malittam precogitatam" of 1380 was transformed into "through malice aforethought" ("par malice
deuant pourpense") (emphasis added). It was no longer an independent phrase; the
charge of 1403 referred to it as a means of committing ambush. The seeming dependence of the 1403 charge on the earlier one makes it doubtful that the usage in
the latter was a complete innovation. The "malice aforethought" of the 1380 commission ought therefore to be read as modifying "insidiam" ("ambush"). The
addition in 1403 of "devant" ("before," in the temporal sense) gives emphasis to the element of true premeditation and signals the fact that this use of
"malitia precogitata" is different from the older use of the term as the degree of
deliberateness and wickedness necessary for felonious mens rea.
Several cases in the 1390's support this reading of "malitia precogitata." In one
case, KB 27/529, Rex iii/t (1392), the defendants, indicted for murder and about
to face a jury on the question whether their pardons for "felonious" homicide sufficed, secured new pardons that stated: "feloniously slain and murdered through malice aforethought" ("felonice interfecti et murdral per malitfiam precogitatam") (emphasis added). The use of "malitia precogitata" as a means of committing murder
is unambiguous. In KB 27/543, Rex xvii/1 (1395), the defendants secured a pardon
for death and murder: "of malice aforethought feloniously as it is alleged murdered
and slew" ("ex malitia precogitatafelonice ut dicitur murdravit et interfecit"). The
Chancery warrant, C 81/557, no. 10455 (1396), on which this pardon was based,
stated: "for death and murder . . .feloniously slain and murdered through malice
aforethought" ("pur la mort et murdre .. .felonousement occis et murdrez pur malice purpensee"). KB 27/547, Rex xvi/6 (1398), recited an indictment to the effect
that "of malice and murder aforethought he lay in hiding" ("ex malitia et murdra
precogitataiacuit insidiis"). A 1391 Chancery warrant for a pardon, C 81/529, no.
7615, used the phrase: "of his malice aforethought he lay in wait" ("de sa malice
devant pensez gisoit agaitant"). CALENDAR OF THE PATENT ROLLs, 15 Rich. 2, at
496 (Oct. 25, 1391).
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glossed the coroners' rolls at time of trial, employed the term "malitia
precogitata" (or a variant) not only in its meaning as the threshold
for felonious homicide but, when relevant, in its more technical
meaning as integral to murder or as a common incident thereof.2" 2
B.

The Statute of 1390 and the Jury

The distinction among felonious homicides drawn by the statute
of 1390 appears to have been short-lived. By the middle of the
fifteenth century, "murder" was employed in indictments as a catchall term for felonious homicide. Simple homicide was swallowed up
within it20 3 and remained so until the very late fifteenth or early
sixteenth century.20 4 Moreover, it is doubtful whether the statute of
1390 retained any force at all. There is no evidence of judicial
enforcement of the statute after the early years of the fifteenth century. Some degree of royal observance of the statute may have continued for a few decades into the fifteenth century, but it seems unlikely that it lasted much longer:2 05 The demise of "murder" as a
202. See, e.g., Jusr 2/146, m.5/11 (1394) (where the coroner had recorded
"slew feloniously... out of premeditated thought" ("felonice interfecit. .. ex cogitato premeditato"), an assize clerk inscribed the abbreviation "murd" for "murder"
in the margin); Jusr 2/165, m.1/5 (1391) ("felonice et ex precogitatamalitia" was
marked "murd" by a later hand); JuST 2/59, m.18d/4 (1389) (where there appeared
"out of malice [aforethought?] and because of old hatred" ("ex malitia precogitata
et causea antiqui odi'), an assize clerk wrote "murd" in the margin); KB 27/531,
Rex viii/1 (1394) ("through consideration and malice and felony aforethought ...
he slew and murdered" ("per avisamentum et malitiam et feloniam precogitatam ...
occidit et murdravi')).
In JusT 2/235, m.2d/11 (1380), the coroner recorded that the defendant "feloniously slew [the deceased] . . .with a sword, out of malice aforethought, as he lay
at night in his bed" ("feloniter interfecit . .. cum uno gladio ex malitia precogitata
noctanter in lecto suo iacentem"). This was a common form of "murder," see Green,
supra note 3, at 693, and the critical phrase appears at a point that makes it very
unlikely that it was a mere formula for felonious homicide. Cf. id. at 689-91 (discussing a half-dozen pre-1380 cases in which "malitia precogitata" appears contextually to mean true malice aforethought). But see KB 271543, Rex xii d/4 (1397),
where the indictment was for felonious homicide and the defendant had a pardon that
covered "ambush, malice aforethought or long thought out, assault, murder"
("insidiis, malitia precogitata-sive a longe tempore imaginata,insultu, murdra"). The
Chancery warrant on which the pardon was based recited "ambush, present malice or
malice long thought out, assault, murder" ("agait, malice presente on longe temps
imagine, assaut, murdre"). C 81/522, no. 6918. This use of "malice presente" is the
only one I have found on Chancery warrants for pardons. The otherwise invariable
phrase is "malice purpensee". See, e.g., C 81/459, passim (1379); /673, passim
(1423). It is impossible to say whether "present malice" meant mere deliberateness
or true malice aforethought. The use of the word "presente" seems to make a distinction between "malice aforethought" and "malice long thought out." In this one
example, then, "malitia precogitata" appears to have been equated with present
malice.
203. Kaye, supra note 5, at 569.
204. See text at notes 220-64 infra.
205. The system of fees for pardons set up by the statute was abolished in 1392.
Parliament concluded that the statute had encouraged malicious indictments for the
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term of art probably indicated that the statute had become moribund.
Why did the fourteenth-century initiative have such an inconsequential effect on the substantive law of felonious homicide? The
principal reason, I believe, was that Parliament had sought only to
limit the pardoning power, not explicitly to refashion the rules of
criminal liability. Under the formal rules, all felonious homicide
remained capital. The Crown had agreed only to a restraint on its
power to abrogate the judicial process. Moreover, the relation between the statute of 1390 and the nature of criminal procedure made
it unlikely that the statutory distinction between murder and simple
homicide would have a significant impact upon the substantive law.
What was required for such a development was a large number of
trials wherein the critical issue was whether the defendant had committed a murder or a simple homicide; such problem cases remained
rare despite the statute. This is not because cases with the potential
to pose this problem did not arise. Rather, it is because the procedures surrounding the granting of pardons filtered out most problem
cases before the point at which the courts would have been called
upon to distinguish between serious and simple homicide.
Unlike the pardon de cursu,2 °0 the pardon de gratia was granted
before trial and was proffered by the indicted defendant as a bar to
prosecution when he was called forward to plead to charges. The
statute of 1390 virtually proscribed the pardoning of murderers and
required that the court, when a pardon for simple homicide was
presented, empanel a jury to discover whether the slaying had in fact
been a murder.207 But this did not often occur. Most potential
defendants who obtained a pardon of grace did so without first being
arrested, and most of these never appeared in court. Certainly, once
pardoned, they did not appear voluntarily, and there is no evidence
named offenses "to the intent that no man should be so bold to sue the King our
lord for such a charter." 16 Rich. 2, c. 6 (1392). The first part of the statute was
left intact, so that pardons for the named offenses were entirely proscribed.
Although there is no systematic study of royal pardons after 1390, the work that
has been done suggests that the king continued to pardon some "murderers." See
J. BELLAMY, supra note 37, at 195-96; PROCEEDINGS, supra note 35, at 315-16, 319,
338; THE SHROPSHI E PEACE ROLL 1400-1414, at 54, 56, 57, 64 (E. Kimball ed.
1959) [hereinafter SHROPSHIRE PEACE ROLL]. But there is also strong evidence that
most alleged murderers did not obtain pardons while most of those indicted for simple
homicide did. See SHROPSHIRE PEACE ROLL, supra, passim. One historian argues
that, at least for the period 1422 to 1436, few pardons issued, and those that did
were pardons de cursu. See R. STOREY, THE END OF THE HOUSE OF LANCASTER 210
(1966). It cannot be determined whether those indicted for murder did not obtain
pardons specifically because of the statute of 1390 or because of the Crown practice
of excepting murder from general pardons.
206. See text at notes 52-55 supra.
207. 13 Rich. 2, stat. 2, c. 1.
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that they were arrested merely for the purpose of having their pardons
"tested." Other defendants obtained a pardon de gratia after incarceration but before gaol delivery and so were in custody for a court
appearance. But even in these cases the bench rarely bothered to
empanel a jury to test the appropriateness of the pardon. Had the
court tested every proffered pardon de gratianot expressly for "murder," the line between murder and simple homicide might have
received far greater attention. Even then, however, jury control over
the production of evidence might have precluded judicial legal development. If the enrollments are a true reflection of this process, the
court merely concluded from the jury's use of the vernacular equivalents of the terms murdram, insidiam, and malitiam precogitatamthat
the defendant had committed murder." 8 There is no indication that
jurors, who might have employed these terms in accordance with
their own, perhaps looser, concept of murder, 0° set forth the facts
and left to the bench the job of construing the law of homicide.
What effect, if any, the new and short-lived official recognition of
"murder" in the sense of especially heinous homicide had on the
behavior of juries is impossible to trace. While juries systematically
shielded simple homicide suspects from capital punishment in. the
post-1390 period,2 1 there is reason to believe that this represented a
continuation of a long-standing pattern of behavior.2" 1' Thus, while
we may assume that juries agreed with the new attempts at restraints
upon pardons de gratia for serious homicide, their attitudes, though
possibly reinforced by the official policy, were not created by it.
Indeed, it is more likely that the influence worked in the other
direction-that jury behavior in part conditioned the form taken by
the statute of 1390. The statute seems to have taken account of
social attitudes regarding simple homicides, even if it was not actually
framed in response to them. While simple homicides remained
felonious, the courts rarely were called upon to give effect to that
aspect of the law. The king's refusal of pardons of grace to those
who would otherwise have been the beneficiaries of jury leniency not
only would have been unnecessary, but would have cost the Crown a
substantial sum of money and military aid.21 2 The legislators' focus
on serious homicide, on the other hand, complemented jury behavior.
The courts' success in prosecuting murderers had been hampered not
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See, e.g., JusT 3/177, m.27/2 (1390); JUST 3/186, m.3d/1 (1400).
See Green, supranote 3, at 692-93.
See id. at 671-74.
See id. at 674-83.
See text at note 54supra.
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by jury attitudes, but by the king's misuse of the pardoning power. It
could be expected that juries would, after the statute's passage, continue to convict many murderers and that the loss of revenue caused
by severely limiting royal pardons for murderers would, therefore, be
to some extent compensated by an increase in the number of convictions and the accompanying forfeiture of goods and chattels.
Thus it was, in 1390 as earlier, that Parliament sought to prevent
the wholesale pardoning of murderers and not to moderate punishment of those who had committed simple -homicide. As a result,
while the borderline between murder and simple homicide received
some fleeting attention, the statute required no judicial attention to
the distinction between felonious and nonfelonious homicide.
As we have seen, the principal substantive development in the law
of intentional homicide in the fourteenth century occurred within the
category of nonfelonious homicide. The courts adjusted the line
between excusable and justifiable homicide, acquitting some defendants who formerly would have required a pardon. Juries continued
to describe such defendants as self-defenders, but the inclusion of
details concerning burglary, robbery, or arson enabled the courts to
invoke the alternative theory of justifiable homicide. In this limited
and roundabout way, the policy underlying the statute of 1390 and its
precursor legislation-that of deterring serious crime--stimulated
ohange in the substantive criminal law. It was, however, a minor
adjustment, one that did not speak to the problem of simple homicide. That problem was left to the conscience of the jury. The result
was not entirely satisfactory, for jury findings that continued to place
some slayers by simple homicide in the class of self-defenders inevitably tainted the pardon de cursu. Slayers of those who had launched
murderous attacks but had neither committed burglary nor attempted
highway robbery were not easily distinguished from slayers who acted
in the course of a brawl freely joined. The pardon for self-defense
served both; in the hands of the self-informing jury, the law spoke
precisely to neither.
IV.

TiE TuDOR TRANSFORMATION IN Tm LAW
OF HOMICIDE

The modern law of homicide originated in early Tudor statutes
aimed at deterring professional and planned slayings. The Tudor
statutory distinction between murder and manslaughter corresponded
to the distinction between serious and simple homicide found in the
statute of 1390 and the late fourteenth-century commissions to jus-
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tices of the peace, and perhaps reflected their influence. But there
were important differences between the respective statutory schemes.
First, as we shall see, the expansion of benefit of clergy in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries allowed juries to convict without
condemning to death defendants who had committed simple homicide. The Tudor statutes excluded recourse to benefit of clergy only
in cases of murder and did not affect the post-trial availability of the
benefit to slayers by simple homicide. Second, even had juries still
been inclined to shelter manslaughterers within the category of excusable self-defense, their tendency to do so may have been considerably
lessened by the changing nature of the trial procedure. Juries no
longer controlled the flow of evidence; the facts were declared by
witnesses whom the justices of the peace, acting as prosecutors, had
bound over for appearance at trial. Juries then assessed the credibility
of the witnesses, weighed the evidence presented, and rendered a
verdict. In practice, of course, the verdict could still fly in the face of
the evidence produced at trial. But now the disparity between the
facts and the jury's verdict in any given case was more obvious and
had the potential for engendering conflict between the jury and the
court.
In taking testimony from witnesses, the bench was unavoidably
confronted with cases bordering on the line between murder and
manslaughter. Because the bench could now instruct and control
juries on the law in close and difficult cases, the nature of the new
trial procedure resulted in the gradual articulation of the modem law
of homicide.
A.

The Murder-ManslaughterDistinction

As we have seen, the statute of 1390 enjoyed only temporary and
limited success.2 13 There is little evidence of systematic royal enforcement of the statute in the decades immediately following its
passage, and it is doubtful that it was observed at all after 1430. As
a result, distinctions among felonious homicides became unnecessary.
By the later decades of the fifteenth century, all homicide indictments
carried the form ex malitia precogitata insultum fecit percussit et
felonice interfecit et murdravit (of malice (aforethought?) [the
suspect] made an assault, struck and feloniously slew and murdered
the deceased). 214 Surely not every indictment was based on a
213. See text at notes 203-05 supra.
214. Kaye, supra note 5, at 569-70.
237-69.

See, e.g.,

PROCEEDINGS,

supra note 35, at
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grand jury assertion that the suspect had committed "murder" as
opposed to simple felonious homicide. The justices of the peace
appear to have adopted this standard form in order to cover all the
terms in commissions empowering them to indict for felonious homicide. Thus it appears that "murder," as employed in official documents, was no longer a term of art.215 Similarly, whatever malitia
precogitata now meant, it did not stand in indictments for any
greater degree of intention than was required for felonious homicide.
The demise of the statute of 1390 and the blurring of terms of art in
indictments reinforced one another: The former made the terms of art
unnecessary; the latter made further enforcement of the statute impossible unless the king were willing to forgo all pardons de gratiafor
homicide.
While pardons of grace continued to flow steadily out of Chancery,216 they no longer represented the only substantial barrier to
successful prosecution and execution for capital felony. During the
fifteenth century, it appears, the number of defendants who took
advantage of benefit of clergy dramatically increased. The institution
of benefit of clergy took its basic form during the late twelfth-century
struggle between church and state, more specifically, as a result of
the clash between Henry II and Thomas Becket. 217 The Crown conceded to the Church ultimate power to try and punish ordained
clergy, but it ordered that such clergy first be tried in a royal court
and, if convicted, that they then be delivered over to the bishop as
guilty in the eyes of the secular law. 218 The Church insisted, nevertheless, upon retrial of the convicted clerk in accordance with canonlaw rules; upon a finding of guilt, the clerk suffered punishment by
the Church, usually degradation from orders, temporary imprison215. An alternative hypothesis would be that "ex malitia precogilata" and "murdravit" remained terms of art, and that the justices of the peace inserted them into
indictments in order to make out the strongest possible case. Kaye, however, concludes that "the word Murder had reverted to the broad general descriptive name for
culpable homicide of any kind. . . " Kaye, supra note 5, at 569, and points out that
several contemporary legal writers used murder to refer to any felonious homicide,
id. at 571. See, e.g., Keble, in R. KELwAY, RELATIONES, f. 136a (1602) (case 120);
Marowe, De Pace Terre et Ecclesie et Conseruacione eiusdem (1503), in EARLY
TREATISES, supranote 201, at 286, 378.
216. See, e.g., CALENDAR OF THE PATENT ROLLS, 37 Hen. 6, at 470 (Dec. 3,
1458), 474 (Feb. 10, 1459); 5'Edw. 4, at471 (Nov. 13, 1465), 477 (Nov. 16, 1465).
217. See generally G. DALZELL, BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN AMERICA 9-42 (1955);
L. GABEL, BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGEs (1929); 1
F. POLLOCK & F. MArTLAND, supra note 5, at 441-57.
218. See, e.g., JUST 3/127D, m.lld (1337) ("And in order that it might be ascertained in what capacity [the prisoner] should be delivered, let the truth of the matter
be inquired into by a jury").
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ment, and penance.2 19 Access to benefit of clergy originally required

that letters of ordination be formally presented to the trial court. By
the late fifteenth century, however, mere literacy, and even feigned
literacy, had come to suffice. By that time, the protection against
hanging was extended so that even some of the worst lay offenders
could avail themselves of the benefit.2 20

A thorough review of the Tudor legislation regarding eligibility to
claim benefit of clergy reveals the re-emergence of a distinction
between types of felonious homicide. This distinction, which came to
be one between "murder" and "manslaughter," was conceptually
similar to that drawn by the statute of 1390 and, ultimately, that

which the community had long drawn between capital and noncapital
homicide.2 '

In 1488, the Crown sought to reduce the impact of benefit of
clergy by prohibiting a layman from twice having recourse to it for
certain offenses: "murder [at this time used as a catch-all term
embracing all felonious homicides], rape, robbery, theft and all other
mischievous deeds. 222 While the 1488 statute drew no explicit

distinction between different types of felonious homicide, its distinction between first and second offenders signals an important first step

in the gradation of punishment for felony.
The first statute reviving the 1390 distinction between types of
homicide was that of 1512,223 which altogether excluded laymen who

were convicted of certain felonies from the benefit of clergy:
[A]ll person or persons hereafter committing murder or felony, in any
church, chapel or hallowed place, or of and upon malice prepensed
rob or murder any person or persons in the King's high-way, or else
219. See 1 F. POLLOcK &F. MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 443-45.

220. See T.

PLUCKNETr, supra note 19, at 440;
HISTORICAL PERSPECTvE 57-62 (1974); 1 J. STEPHEN,

J. SAMAHA, LAw Am ORDER
supra note 53, at 463-64.

iN

221. The following discussion counters Kaye's analysis. See Kaye, supra note 5,
at 573-87. Kaye doubts that the early Tudor clergy legislation distinguished between
types of felonious homicide. Earlier studies had assumed, but not proved, such a distinction. See, e.g., 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 53, at 44-46. Kaye's criticisms of
earlier work are often warranted, but, as I shall demonstrate, his own conclusions
are open to question.
222. 4 Hen. 7, c. 13 (1488). In order that the court might know who had already been once benefited, the offender was to be branded after the first conviction.
For "murder," the brand letter was "M"; for other felonies, 'T."
223. 4 Hen. 8, c. 2. But see the statute of 1496, by which Henry VII withdrew
benefit of clergy from petty treason using "murder" in a way reminiscent of the fourteenth-century usage. 12 Hen. 7, c. 7. The statute referred to "abominable and wilful prepensed murders," and it referred to a specific case: James Grame of London,
a yeoman, "wilfully assented and prepensed the murder" of Richard Tracy, a gentleman and Grame's master, who was "murdered and-slain." The need for "murdered"
as well as "slain" suggests, but does not prove, that the former had some special
meaning. The emphasis on willfulness and assent may well be relevant to that special meaning.
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rob or murder any person in his house, the owner or dweller of the
house . . . then being therein and put in fear or dread by the same
.. . be not from henceforth admitted to his or their clergy, (such
as been within holy orders only except).224

This legislation appears to have been aimed primarily at predatory
and truly premeditated attacks upon the person or property of others.
It came at a time when such offenses were thought to have reached

crisis levels.225 The homicides that often flowed from these attacks,
chiefly along the highways and in burglarized homes, -had apparently
come once again to be known as "murders. 22 5
The re-emergence of a distinction between murder and simple
homicide, or "manslaughter" as it was now coming to be known, is
reflected in early sixteenth-century legal writings. The definitions of
various forms of homicide in these writings not only support the view

that the Tudor statutes intended such a distinction, but also strongly
suggest a link between that distinction and the one created by the late
fourteenth-century legislation.
In his Reading on the Peace (De Pace Terre et Ecclesie) (1503),

Marowe at one point characterizes "murder" as -homicide where the
slayer lies in wait.12r Marowe then employs the term "chaunce
medle" without defining it.228 Given his narrow use of "murder," it
224. 4 Hen. 8, c. 2, § 1.
225. The statute began: "Whereas robberies, murders and felonies daily increase
more and more, and been committed and done in more heinous, open, and detestable
wise, than hath been oft seen in time past.. . ." 4 Hen. 8, c. 2, § 1.
226. Kaye argues that "murder" as employed in this statute referred to all felonious homicides. Kaye, supra note 5, at 572. He reads the statute this broadly
because of its inclusion of the phrase "of and upon malice prepensed." He takes
this to stand for the threshold degree of mens rea. Kaye believes that the term had
never lost this meaning since its emergence in the late twelfth or early thirteenth
century. See text at note 181 supra. He notes that it would be "unthinkable" to
construe "malice prepensed" "as implying premeditation" in the context of robbery.
Kaye, supra note 5, at 572. Thus, in his opinion, the phrase meant no more than
"deliberately" or "wickedly." Nevertheless, the homicides removed from clergy were
described circumstantially. See 4 Hen. 8, c. 2, § 1 (1512), quoted in text at note 224
supra. The context of the homicide made the act "murderous"; whether true premeditation was a necessary element is unclear. The use of the term in 1512 was
similar enough to its use in 1390 to suggest that "malice prepensed" did imply true
premeditation.
227. See Marowe, supra note 215, at 378: "But of manslaughter [the justices
of the peace] may inquire and this will mean where a man kills another through
chance medley he is subject to inquiry before them. The fourth [type of homicide]
is murder, and this is where a man through malice aforethought lies in wait and kills
any man, this also is subject to inquiry before the justices, etc." See Plucknett, supra
note 181, at cxlix. Kaye terms Marowe's definition "too narrow" because it was confined to ambushings. Kaye, supra note 5, at 573. The objection stems from Kaye's
view that in 1503 murder meant felonious homicide. Marowe's usage might not have
been the only one appropriate to the term "murder," but it was a commonplace definition of the centuries-old term of art "murder." Marowe's terminology seems to
have been drawn from the 1403 grand jury charge. See note 200 supra.
228. See Marowe, supranote 215, at 378.
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seems likely that he meant by "chaunce medle" something broader
than accidental homicide and self-defense. At another point in his

Reading, however, Marowe uses "murder" in the broad sense of
felonious homicide.

29

Thus, in the decade before the statute of 1512,

it appears that, even in a technical dissertation on the law, the term
"murder" could be employed both as a term of art for the most
serious form of culpable slaying and as a general term signifying all

felonious homicide.
The 1510 edition of the well-known anonymous work The Boke

of Justyces of Peas, elaborating upon the distinction between murder
and manslaughter, further clarifies contemporary usage:
Murder is properly where a man by malice prepensed lies in wait to
slay a man and according to that malicious intent and purpose he
slays him so that he who is slain makes no defense against him, for if
he does it is manslaughter and not murder ....
And manslaughter
is where two men or more meet and by chance medley they fall at
affray so that one of them slays the other; [this] is but felony .... 230

Obviously, the Boke does not equate "murder" with all felonious
slaying, for its definition of "murder" explicitly excludes all sudden

encounters and even excludes malicious attacks against which the
victim had been able to make some defense. "Manslaughter," on the
other hand, applies, according to the Boke, to homicides where the

victim had been able to make some sort of defense despite the slayer's
stealth and to homicides where slayer and victim had fought together
on a sudden encounter ("chaunce medley'). 231- The Boke's defini-

tion of "murder" is perhaps narrower than contemporary usage would
have warranted, as none of the other texts or statutes include its no229. See id. Marowe here describes one type of "murder": "[For if a man intends to beat any person and in the course of this battery he kills another person,
this is felony notwithstanding that his intent was not to kill him."
230. THE BoxE OF Jus-rYcEs OF PEAs f. 4a/b (2d ed. 1510).
231. Kaye states that, in the Boke, "Murder is inaccurately confined to ambushing cases ... ." Kaye, supra note 5, at 574. He argues that the author intended
to use "murder" for all felonious homicide. Hence Kaye's skewed analysis of the
meaning of the Boke's discussion of "manslaughter by chance medley":
Here the Boke is more informative than Marowe at least in that a chance medley
is now identified as a sudden encounter, presumably any fight which has broken
out without any prior ambushing of one party by another. But there is still
an important ambiguity: are we to assume that any killing in the course of such
a fight, even though deliberate, would be reckoned Manslaughter, or must we
suppose that the mitigation from Murder was limited in some way-for instance
to cases in which the killing had been unintended or accidental, or where though
deliberate there had been some element of provocation or of self-defense.
Id. at 574-75.
If one takes the Boke's definition of "murder" at face value, the entire range of
homicides on a sudden encounter are manslaughters, save for excusable homicides
committed through accident or true self-defense. This latter class is not mentioned
at this point in the Boke; the purpose of this passage is to distinguish ambush from
open fighting.
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defense rule.232 But it is nevertheless useful as a confirmation of the
characteristics of this special category of homicide that most impressed contemporaries of the statute of 1512.
Sir Richard Eliott, a king's serjeant who rose to Justice of Common Pleas in 1513, writing about 1512 and conceivably commenting
upon the statute,233 put the distinction in the following form: "Note
that murder is where a man lies in wait to murder any person, or with
malice aforethought ["malice devant pretence'] to murder someone,
but if a man by chance medley without malice aforethought kills
someone, it is not murder but manslaughter."2 4 Like Marowe's
Reading and the Boke, Eliott's commentary identifies "murder" with
malice prepensed and singles out ambush by way of example; like the
Boke, it equates chance medley and manslaughter.235
All of these early sixteenth-century writers seem to have written
about felonious homicide in terms reminiscent of those of the statute
of 1390, the commission to justices of the peace of 1380, and the
grand jury charge of 1403, the last of which used the phrase "malice
devant pretence" in apposition to "murder." It is, of course, possible
that they were reflecting the earlier experience without shedding light
on the meaning of "murder" as the term was used in the early Tudor
statutes, though that would seem unlikely. In any event, the statutes
232. While this rule did not have treatise or statutory authority, it may, nevertheless, have been close to the heart of the ancient theory of murder. Homicide by
poison, for example, was especially heinous because the victim was taken off-guard
to the extent that he could not defend himself. Ambush might allow for some defense, but it minimized the possibility of a successful one. On the other hand, fighting openly, on equal footing, might not have met with significant social disapprobation, and neighborhood brawling may even have been an informal example of what
higher classes termed a "duel." See Green, supra note 3, at 686-93.
233. Kaye suggests Eliott "may.

.

.have given the.

. .

opinion after and as an

interpretation of the Statute of 1512 .......
Kaye, supra note 5, at 575.
234. British Library, Lansdowne ms. 1072, f.43a (attributed to Richard Eliott).
235. Kaye asserts:
Eliott's definition of Murder is clearly preferable to that either of Marowe or
the Boke, in that he does not restrict the crime to ambushing but includes generally killing upon malice devant pretence, presumably a variant of malice prepense: i.e., he includes all deliberate killings. . . . The category [of manslaughter], however, is as vague as in [Marowe and the Boke], it not being
clear whether the fact alone that a killing took place in the course of a
chaunce melle would suffice to remove it from the ambit of Murder.
Kaye,. supra note 5, at 575. Kaye perhaps did not recognize the similarity between
Eliott's formulation and the language of the grand jury charge of 1403, which refers
to "those who lie in wait through malice aforethought." See note 200 supra (emphasis added). Eliott might have taken the 1403 charge and made its elements more
explicit. He separated ambush and "malice devant pretence" and associated the latter
phrase with "murder." If, for Eliott, "malice devant pretence" was indeed "a variant
of malice prepense," both referred to some degree of true premeditation, not to mere
voluntas. The use of "devant" (before) makes Kaye's interpretation highly doubtful.
See note 201 supra.

HeinOnline -- 74 Mich. L. Rev. 478 1975-1976

January 19761

The Jury and the English Law of Homicide

of the next three decades built clearly upon a distinction very close to
the one that these writers had framed.
Parliament's attempt to distinguish professional and stealthy homicides from less serious and more open ones reached its peak around
1530. By then, Parliament had excluded murderers from benefit
of clergy, but the records do not allow us to determine exactly what
test of murder was applied. While it seems likely that the true
murderer was still the slayer who ambushed -hisvictim on the highway
or assaulted his victim in the victim's home, it is possible that any
degree of true premeditation, rather than sudden deliberation, turned
a manslaughter into a murder.2 3
A 1530 statute denying persons who had once been protected by
sanctuary and abjuration23 7 the right to take advantage of this shelter
for a subsequent "petit treason, murder or felony"2 8 renders the
distinction between murder and manslaughter somewhat clearer than
did earlier statutory formulations. The statute provided that sanctuary
remained available to such persons, first, if they had obtained a royal
pardon for the original felony, and, second, if the subsequent act was
"petit treason, felony or manslaughter by chance medley, and not
murder of malice prepensed . . "..
139 A general pardon for all
felonies, "murder and treason excepted," 240 was apparently available
to those who slew feloniously but not of malice prepensed, that is,
through "manslaughter by chance medley." If "manslaughter by
chance medley," as employed in the statute of 1530, meant no more
than legitimate self-defense or accident, the exception in that statute
would have made little sense: In cases of self-defense or accident,
236. See text at notes 259-61 infra.
237. A felon who had escaped to a church or other designated holy place could
remain there inviolate for 40 days. If he confessed his felonies to a coroner within
that time, he was allowed to abjure (swear he would leave) the realm. The coroner
then assigned the abjuror a port and gave him a cross to carry as a sign of his abjuration. So long as the felon headed straight for the port, no one was permitted
to harm him. See R. HuNNiSETr, supra note 22, at 37-54. See generally N. TRENHOLME, THE RIGHT OF SANCTUARY IN ENGLAND (1903).
For the Anglo-Saxon background of medieval sanctuary, see C. RIGGs, supra note 87.
Although sanctuary was not abolished until 1624, 21 James 1, c. 28, §§ 6, 7, the
Tudors set strict limits upon the institution. Abjurors were branded -to ensure their
identification, 21 Hen. 8, c. 2 (1529), and the statute of 1530-1531 did away with
abjuration of the realm, 22 Hen. 8, c. 14, § 1. Now the felon in sanctuary was to
choose, or be assigned to, one of a number of appointed sanctuaries in England.
Thereafter, he could not leave that appointed sanctuary without pardon or special
license. See Hunnisett, The Last Sussex Abjurations, in 102 SussEx ARcmoLoOGCAL
COLLECTIONS 39 (1964); Thornley, The Destruction of Sanctuary, in ToDOl STUDIES
PREsENTED TO A.F. POLLARD 198-207 (1924).
238. 22 Hen. 8, c. 14, § 2.
239. 22 Hen. 8, c. 14, § 4.
240. 21 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1529).
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pardons were available de cursu, and sanctuary and abjuration were
unnecessary shelters from the law.24 '

The distinction we are tracing is also evident in an important
statute of 1532, which sought to clarify the liability of one who slew a
person who had attempted to "rob or murder" 242 him on the highway
or in his dwelling. The preamble to the act stated that there had
been "question and ambiguity" as to whether the slayer "should for
the death of the said evil disposed person forfeit or lose his goods and

chattels for the same, as any other person should do that by chance
medley should happen to kill or slay any other person in his or their
defense ....

-"43 The act mandated that such a slayer ought not

suffer forfeiture, "but shall be thereof, and for the same fully acquitted and discharged, in like manner as the same person or persons
should be if he or they were lawfully acquitted of the death of the said
evil disposed person or persons. 24 4 The statute did not expressly

define "murder," which was merely one of several acts that, if attempted by the deceased, permitted his slayer to go free. It is clear,

however, that "murder" as employed in the statute did not refer to
all felonious slayings. Surely not every act of self-defense, including
acts undertaken by one not in extremis, was to lead to acquittal. The

statute referred to homicides committed in ways long considered
particularly serious: homicides committed by a person who came to
rob or slay on the highway, in passageways, or in the victim's home or
on his grounds. Rather than single out the element of stealth, the
statute appears to have dealt generally with professional or clearly

planned acts of homicide. Indeed, some contemporaries thought it
applied only to homicidal attacks perpetrated by thieves. 2 "

While

241. Similarly, section three of the statute excluded from benefit of clergy those
persons
found guilty after the laws of this land, for any manner of petit treason, or for
any wilful murder of malice prepensed, or for robbing of any churches, chapels, or other holy places, or for robbing of any person or persons in their dwellig houses, or dwelling place, the owner or dwelling in the same house, his wife,
his children or servants than being within, and put in fear and dread by the same,
or for robbing of any person or persons in or near about the highways ....
23 Hen. 8, c. 1, § 3 (1530-1531). Here "murder" was associated with "malice prepensed." While there is nothing internal to the act that conclusively disproves the
thesis that "murder" referred to all felonious homicides, the other crimes excluded
from clergy suggest that Parliament was concerned with the kinds of acts that earlier
had been singled out as most serious. See text at notes 173-79, 199-201 supra.,
242. 24 Hen. 8, c. 5.
243. 24 Hen. 8, c. 5.
244. 24 Hen. 8, c. 5.
245. This misinterpretation of the statute may have begun with William Staundford. Writing in 1557, Staundford noted that there had been doubt whether someone
who slew a would-be thief ought to suffer forfeiture. He asserted that the statute
of 1532 was passed to settle this issue. W. STAVNDFORD, supra note 145, at 14v. He

HeinOnline -- 74 Mich. L. Rev. 480 1975-1976

January 1976]

The Jury and the English Law of Homicide

the precise meaning of the statutory terminology is unclear, it appears
that some circumstantial distinction among culpable attacks-pre-

sumably that of the statutes of the years immediately preceding-was
being carried forward.

Like the earlier sixteenth-century statutes on murder, the statute
of 1532 did not define types of homicide but dealt with eligibility for

protection from liability in specific cases. By earlier mandates, the
murderer had lost his right to sanctuary and benefit of clergy; now
the slayer of a would-be murderer merited acquittal and was immune
from forfeiture of chattels. Both the act of 1532 and the earlier
Tudor statutes reflect concern with a particular type of -homicide.

Moreover, the 1532 act effected a logical extension of the rules of
liability for justifiable homicide that had begun to expand in the
246
fourteenth century.

distinguished killing a thief from pure self-defense, where a pardon and forfeiture remained appropriate. In the one case, the defendant dealt with a thief, in the other
the defendant dealt with a lawful man ("loial home"). Id. Staundford might have
considered even a would-be murderer a "loial home," but it is more likely he had
in mind the assailant who acted suddenly in the course of a chance medley. Since
most perpetrators of murder probably were motivated by financial gain, Staundford
might not have focused his attention on the person who attempted solely to commit
the most heinous form of homicide.
Coke, writing in the seventeenth century, also implied that the statute referred
mainly to cases involving thieves:
Some [homicides are justifiable] without any giving back to a wall, etc. or other
inevitable cause. As if a thief offers to rob or murder B either abroad or in
his house, and thereupon assaults him, and B defends himself without any giving
back, and in his defence kills the thief, this is no felony; for a man shall never
give way to a thief, etc., neither shall he forfeit anything. And so it is declared
by the statute of 24 H.8.
E. CoKE, Tim INsTrrTus pt. 3, at 56 (5th ed. 1671). The statute, however, had
not referred to "a thief," but rather to "a person" who attempted to rob or murder.
Coke's use of "As if a thief" suggests, perhaps, that even for him it was only the
most common, not the sole, context in which the statute was applied.
1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF Tim CRowN 258 (1736), and 1 W. HAwKrNs, PLEAS OF
CRowN 71-72 (1716), perhaps taking Coke too literally, stated that the statute
Ta
of 1532 affected forfeiture only where the slayer had killed a would-be thief. See
Beale, Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HAnv. L. REv. 567, 573-76 (1903).
Other contemporary commentators gave the statute a broader interpretation. See,
e.g., Dalton's report of Copstone's Case (1573), in M. DALTON, THE CouNTREY JusTcE 251 (1630):
There was malice between Copstone and one S. and they had fought divers
times, and after met suddenly in London Street, and C. told S. that he would
fight with him, & S. answered that he had nothing to say unto him, and S. went
to the wall, and after C. assaulted S. and then S. struck and killed C. and it was
found that C. began the affray, and S. was thereupon discharged without forfeiting anything: But that was by force of the statute 24 Hen. 8 ca. 5.
In an unpublished contemporary report of a 1627 case, Harvard Law School ms. 106,
f.294v, the statute was said to take effect in cases where the deceased had attempted
to "murder, rob, or burglarily to break mansion houses.... .The placement of
"murder" suggests that it did not refer solely to a homicide perpetrated in the course
of a robbery.
246. See text at notes 83-114 supra.
Not all slayers of murderers and burglars, we may be certain, acted in pure self-
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The statute of 1532 did not cover those who "by chance medley"
slew other than murderers or robbers in self-defense. Presumably,
these other slayers continued to require pardons and suffer forfeiture.
The act's use of "chance medley" in connection with self-defense is,
at first, bewildering. There is little reason to believe that the term

always meant homicide in self-defense and nothing more. Its use in
statutes and in other texts both before and after 1532 is inconsistent

with so narrow a definition.24 7 More likely, it usually referred to any
one of many homicides that were not truly premeditated, all of which
stemmed from a sudden or chance falling out, some of which were
felonious but clergiable, and others of which were excusable as true
self-defense.

In sum, whatever the precise meaning of "chance

medley" in the 1532 statute, that enactment contemplated two different classes of culpable attackers: first, murderers or robbers, whose
slayers merited acquittal; and, second, other less culpable assailants,
whose slayers either were clergiable or, if they had acted in true selfdefense, merited a pardon.2 4
defense. Some defended their persons, but might in fact have escaped death without
retaliating physically; others defended their homes and property. The statute of 1532
appears to have applied to all these slayers. Such slayers, like those who had slain
burglars two centuries before, see text at notes 98-100 supra, in presenting to the
court their legal defenses, would be likely to offer evidence showing self-defense
along with evidence showing defense against robbery, burglary, or ambush, even
though the former evidence was not statutorily required. This is largely conjecture.
however, as there are few Tudor criminal assize records before the 1550's, and those
that do exist do not reveal the defendant's allegations.
247. See text at notes 227-35, 240-41 supra. Fitzherbert at one point equates
"chance medley" and felony:
[J]ustices of peace have no authority to inquire of murder as it is in its proper
nature, but of manslaughter as a thing feloniously done by chance medley, they
may inquire, for murder is not expressed in the commission. But forasmuch as
every murder contains felony in itself, therefore if a man be indicted before a
justice of the peace for the murder of another, whom he of malice prepensed lying in wait did kill . . . and so appears the diversity between murder and manslaughter of which the one comes by malice prepensed and the other
but by chance.
A. FrrZHERBERT, NEW BoKE OF JusTIcEs OF THE PEACE cxxiiia (1537).
Kaye doubts that Fitzherbert was distinguishing among felonious homicides. He
states that Fitzherbert molded "his definition, or example, of Murder on an actual
indictment for one type only." Kaye, supra note 5, at 576. Even if that is true,
Fitzherbert's "example" makes clear the essential nature of murder. His use of "malice prepensed" suggests that the term meant true premeditation or planning. Kaye,
believing that "murder" stood for all felonious homicides, has difficulty disposing of
Fitzherbert's identification of "chance medley" with manslaughter and felony. Kaye
asserts: 'To say that 'manslaughter cometh but by chaunce' is not very helpful." Id.
248. References to murder and chance medley on the King's Bench rolls after the
statute support this analysis. In R. v. Fowler, KB 27/1102, Rex m.7 (1537) (indictment at KB 9/529, m.148), the defendant and the deceased "met on a sudden occasion, called chance medley" and fought, and so "the defendant feloniously slew the
deceased-not of malice aforethought but on a sudden occasion" ("ex casu sublto vocato chauncemelle obviaverunt . . . ex nulla malitia precogitata sed ex casu subito
felonice interfecit"). In R. v. Pulter, KB 27/1079, Rex m.4 (1531), the defendant,
indicted for murder, alleged the act had been committed "on a sudden occasion"
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During the two ensuing decades, statutory pronouncements with

respect to homicide continued this dual classification, though the
terminology changed somewhat.

Felonious slayings were either

249

For example, the Bill for the
"murders" or "manslaughters.
Household, enacted in 1541, proclaimed:
Where treasons, misprisions of treasons, murders, manslaughters and
other malicious strikings, by reason whereof blood is or shall be
shed, against the King's peace . . . within the limits of the King's
palace . . [t]hat all [the said acts] shall be . . . enquired of,
tried, heard and determined ....
• .. And if any such person, or persons, so indicted and arraigned, be found guilty of any [of the said acts] that then all and every
such person and persons so found guilty, shall have judgment of life

and member, and suffer such pains of death ....250

Manslaughters were not excusable homicides; they were "malicious

strikings."

Nor were they murders, though, under this enactment,

manslaughters in the royal household were to be treated in the same

manner as murders.
"Manslaughterers" referred to slayers less culpable than murderers and thus eligible for the administrative shelters from punishment:

benefit of clergy, sanctuary, and royal pardon.

Manslaughterers

were nevertheless sentenced to hang, and the sentence was executed,

when, for example, due to illiteracy, administrative protection was
unobtainable.

Manslaughter had not yet become a lesser gradation

of homicide, automatically meriting a lesser punishment.251
("subito casu") and not "ex malitia precogitata." He pleaded the general (statutory)
pardon of 1530, which would not have been necessary if his allegation amounted to
an assertion of excusable homicide. Finally, in R. v. Hudson, KB 27/1114, Rex m.4
(1540), a statutory pardon was allowed for "chaunsmelle", because "it is not prepensed or voluntary murder" ("non est pretensum neque voluntarium murdrum"). (I
am extremely grateful to Dr. John Baker, Fellow of St. Catherine's College, Cambridge University, for these references. They are drawn from a typescript draft of
Dr. Baker's introduction to his edition of the Reports of Sir John Spelman, to be published by the Selden Society in 1977.)
249. For statutes using "murder" and "manslaughter" as terms of art, see, e.g., 27
Hen. 8, c. 4, § 1 (1535) (murder); 28 Hen. 8, c. 1, § 1 (1536) (murder, manslaughter); 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, § 1 (1536) (murder); 33 Hen. 8, c. 12, § 1 (1541)
(murder, manslaughter). 1 Edw. 6, c. 12 (1547) (murder). This last, important statute did not use the term manslaughter since it dealt solely with acts for which clergy
might not be granted: i.e., "wilful murder of malice prepensed."
250. 33 Hen. 8, c. 12, §§ 1, 6.
251. It is important to recognize, I believe, that culpability did not turn on "malice prepense"; the distinction between murder and manslaughter was determinative
only of the availability of benefit of clergy. Moreover, the clergy statutes were inconsistent. From 1536 to 1547, it would appear, neither murder nor manslaughter
was clergiable. A 1547 statute again excluded murder from the benefit, 1 Edw. 6,
c. 12, § 9, and so revived the importance of "malice prepense." The reading test
for clergiability soon became a near fiction; it was abolished in 1706. 5 Anne, c.
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Salisbury's Case,252 the earliest reported verdict of manslaughter,
reveals both the judicial application of the statutory murder-manslaughter distinction and the fact that the distinction was superfluous
in cases where the defendant, for whatever reason, was unable to
plead clergy. In 1553, John Vane Salisbury was tried with his master
and two others on an indictment for murder. Salisbury had joined in
a fray already under way and the question arose as to whether he was
privy to a conspiracy to commit homicide. The court ruled that if the
jury found Salisbury "did not have malice aforethought ["malice
prepense"], but suddenly ["sodeynement"] took part with those who
had malice aforethought, this would be manslaughter in him and not
murder, because he did not have malice aforethought. 253 The jury
convicted the three others of murder, but found that Salisbury had
"killed the man, but not of malice aforethought, and thus they
254
acquitted him of murder, and found him guilty of manslaughter.
The entire court was of the opinion that they might still pass
judgment of death on Salisbury for manslaughter:
And because the malice aforethought made the act more odious, and
because of this the defendant lost divers advantages, which he otherwise had, such as sanctuary and clergy, and the like, still it is not
other than the manner of the deed, and not the substance of the
deed, for the substance of the deed is the killing of the man . . . and
if the jurors -found the substance, and not the manner, still judgment
will be given for the substance. 255
But, in the end, Salisbury was reprieved because of the court's doubt
as to the effect of a variance between the verdict and the indictment.2 56 I believe we may fairly infer that, had Salisbury been
literate, the point would have been moot. At the worst, the verdict of
manslaughter would have forced him to plead his clergy and be
branded before going free.
6, § 6 (in Statutes of the Realm, 6 Anne, c. 9, § 4). Thereafter, manslaughter was,
in effect, automatically punishable only by imprisonment, branding, or some other
means short of death. Benefit of clergy itself was abolished in 1827. 7 & 8 Geo.
4, c. 28.
252. E. PLowDEN, LFs Co wrrm uurs f.100 (1578).
253. Id. at f.l100b.
254. Id. at f.101.
255. Id.
256. Id. Later cases resolved this issue against the defendant See M. HALE,
supra note 245, at 438 ("Upon an indictment of murder, though the party upon his
trial be acquitted of murder, and convicted of manslaughter, he shall receive judgment, as if the indictment had been of manslaughter, for the offense in substance
is the same"). Brooke seems to suggest that this very point had been raised in a
case during the reign of Henry VIII, some years before Salisbury's Case, and had
also resulted in conviction of the defendant R. BRoox, supra note 104, Corone,
pL 222.
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The distinction between murder and manslaughter drawn in Salis-

bury's Case, which for centuries thereafter formed the heart of the
law of felonious homicide, 257 sheds important light on the distinction
between murder and manslaughter at the midpoint of the sixteenth

century. The decision helps us to understand the gist, if not the
precise meaning, of the Tudor legislation dealing with benefit of

clergy. It also suggests that by 1550 the formal rules of the law of
felonious homicide were being reconciled with the persistent popular
feeling about the scope of liability for homicide.25 8
257. See Kaye, supra note 5, at 589-601.
258. Kaye believes that the court in Salisbury's Case formulated this distinction
between murder and manslaughter for the first time. He believes that neither the
statute of 1390, see note 181 supra and accompanying text, nor earlier Tudor legislation mandated different treatmerit for different forms of felonious homicide. Kaye
does recognize some exceptions to this general rule. While most judges, he says, took
the traditional common law view of culpable homicide, namely, that any deliberate killing, or any killing resulting from an unlawful act of violence to the party
slain, was in the same category as killing which had been premeditated . . .
some lawyers, whether out of an attempt to interpret the somewhat shadowy distinctions drawn in the justices' manuals, or.. . out of a growing desire to interpret as strictly as possible, even to the extent of misconstruing, the statutes withdrawing benefit of clergy, had come to think that a literal interpretation must
be put on malice prepense ....
Kaye, supra note 5, at 587.
Kaye argues that before Salisbury's Case chance medley, or manslaughter, referred only to a small group of "accidental" homicides resulting from an attempt to
slay another person; all other felonious homicides were murders. Kaye relies heavily
on Herbert's Case, British Library, Harleian ms. 5141, ff. 40-41 (1558), which was
decided after Salisbury's Case, but before the latter was generally known. In Herbert's Case, the judges discussed the liability of one who had slain accidentally in
the course of a premeditated attack on a third party.
In Kaye's discussion of Herbert's Case, Kaye, supra, at 577-82, he notes that the
court discussed several cases of murder; he concludes that the discussed cases covered
virtually all felonious homicides. However all of the cases involved at least a deliberate, premeditated, wrongful act. None involved a sudden fight between two parties
neither of whom had set out to harm the other. Surely such acts must have been
common, yet none of the members of the bench made reference to them in the course
of the discussion of murder.
For his definition of chance medley as accidental homicide resulting from an attempt to slay another person, Kaye relies in particular on language of two of the
judges in Herbert's Case, Brooke and Staundford. Brooke thought the slaying in Herbert's Case was not murder: "[lilt is only homicide, because it comes by chance medley . . . ." Id. at 582 (translated from the original Law French). This is not a
"definition" of chance medley: It is merely an assertion that the slaying in Herbert's
Case was an instance of it. Staundford's views are also less than conclusive. At
one point he cited as chance medley a truly accidental homicide resulting from a sudden encounter where the slayer had not engaged in an unlawful act. Id. at 583. At
least in this context, "chance medley" was broader than the definition Kaye set forth:
either it referred to accidental homicide in general or it referred both to accidental
homicide in general and to homicide stemming from a sudden encounter. Staundford appears to have meant the latter, for at another point he stated that "murder"
was employed to designate the heinousness of the crime "to show the difference between homicide by chance medley and homicide perpetrated through intent to murder." Id. (translated from the original Law French). Now, if for Staundford "chance
medley" meant accident and nothing more, this passage would make little sense:
where, in his view, did self-defense fit in? His distinction between "homicide by
chance medley" and "homicide perpetrated with intent to murder" is consistent with
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As we have seen, several early sixteenth-century legal writers
identified murder with ambush.25" Yet, under the court's instructions, had Salisbury come to the scene knowing his master's intent
and with the thought of aiding him, it would not have mattered that
Salisbury had not lain in wait. Salisbury would have been found
guilty of murder. To what extent was this a novel view of the
difference between murder and manslaughter?
It is not surprising that the early sixteenth-century writers identified murder with ambush. Ambush, taking the victim off guard,
made the act particularly serious. As early as 1390, however, the
concept of especially serious homicide had come to include not only
homicide through stealth, but also truly premeditated attacks that in
general put the victim at a significant disadvantage. While "murder"
in the 1390 statute was closely identified with the ancient morth,
killing through stealth, it was also modified by assaut (assault) and
malice prepense (malice aforethought). 2 60 The "murderer" of the
statute acted aggressively and deliberately, his intention already
formed. His act was not merely a response to provocation at the
moment of attack.
Despite this early development of the concept of murder, "lying in
wait" remained an effective shorthand means of reference for especially serious homicide. It in fact signaled preformed intent, true
malice. The Boke of Justyces of the Peas, as we have seen, 2 61 defines
"murder" as "where a man by malice prepensed lies in wait" and
where the person slain could make no defense. But the Boke states
also that a murderer slays "according to that malicious intent and
purpose," while manslaughter is where two or more meet and "by
chance medley they fall at affray so that one of them slays the other."
In murder, according to the Boke, there is surprise but also a premeditated "intent and purpose"; in manslaughter, on the other hand,
not only is there no surprise but the falling out is sudden: The slayer
had no malicious intent at the time of the meeting. The element of
surprise does seem especially important in the Boke; this perhaps
reflects the author's dependence upon the technical definition of
"murder" in the fourteenth-century precedents. But the author also
noted the distinction between sudden falling out and prior malicious
the distinction, reflected in contemporary cases, between felonious homicide on a sudden occasion and through murder. See note 248 supra. The slaying in Herbert's
Case was admittedly of another sort; perhaps because it involved some degree of accident, Staundford assimilated it to chance medley.
259. See text at notes 227, 230, 234 supra.
260. See 13 Rich. 2, stat. 2, c. 1, quoted in note 179 supra.

261. See text at note 230 supra.
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intent, and it is this latter distinction that the sixteenth-century bench
adopted.
This distinction, the basis of the modem law of murder and
manslaughter, brought the formal rules more closely into line with
community values. By defining malice prepense as actual premeditation, the courts excluded from murder the large class of slayings
that stemmed from sudden fights. 262 These simple homicides were a
fact of daily life that the law was powerless to prevent. So long as
people drank together, argued, and fought with each other, there
would be blows that did unintended damage and wounds that became
infected. Retreat from attacks might be socially scorned. Men
would join brawls to help their relatives, friends, or masters; to stay
out of the fray might reveal a lack of loyalty. Whatever doubts may
be entertained in a later age about the wisdom of the sixteenthcentury distinction based upon "malice aforethought,"2 63 that distinction reflected powerful social mores.
An examination of the elaborations of the concept of malice
aforethought and the establishment of exceptions to the rule that
murder depended upon true premeditation lies beyond the scope of
this essay.264 I have been concerned with tracing the distinction between murder and manslaughter as it first emerged in the reported
cases. In devising that distinction, the courts were acting pursuant to
statutory formulations nearly half-a-century old. But these developments did not transpire in a vacuum. Consideration of the reasons for
the development and its success in taking hold in the law brings us
back to the problem of the jury and the nature of trial procedure
in the operation of the criminal law.
B.

Instruments of Change in the Law of Homicide26 5

The statutes defining eligibility for benefit of clergy, unlike the
262. See R. CROMPTON, L'OFFICE ET AUTHORrEE DE JusTIcEs DE PEACE f.23b
(1587) ("Manslaughter is where two fight together on the sudden, without malice
aforethought, and one kills the other, there he will have clergy"); W. LAMBARDE, EiRNARCHA 24b (1607) ("Mhe former is fitly named chance medley for that in it
men are meddled by mere chance, and upon some unlooked for occasion, without any
former malice or evil mind in one to offer hurt to the person of the other").
263. See Kaye, supra note 5, at 365, 601.
264. For an excellent discussion of the judicial elaboration of murder and manslaughter in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see id. at 587-601. Although Kaye believes Coke's discussion of felonious homicide in the seventeenth century reflected recent and novel judicial interpretation, see id. at 365, I believe it is
entirely consistent with the approach of the early sixteenth-century writers and statutes and their fourteenth-century precursors. See generally E. Conn, supra note 245,
at 47-57.
265. The argument presented in this section is highly tentative. It depends on
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statute of 1390, succeeded in making a lasting impact on the substantive law of felonious homicide. Perhaps the most important difference between these two attempts to deal with professional or otherwise serious homicide was the stage of the judicial process at which
the protection proscribed by the legislation was normally obtained. As
we have seen, pardons of grace were obtained before trial, and, until
1390, they foreclosed prosecution. Thereafter, while courts were
empowered, perhaps required, to test such pardons, they generally
took at face value almost all pardons set before them and thus, by
default, left administration of the statute of 1390 to the Crown.200
Benefit of clergy operated in a different way. Although in the
Middle Ages it initially could be pleaded either at the outset of the
trial or after an adverse verdict,26 a trial was always held, a jury
impaneled, and a verdict given. Under the original doctrine of benefit of clergy, the court turned convicted clerks over to the Church
for punishment according to canon law. 268 The jury verdict was
obtained, in the words of the rolls, in order that the royal court might
know in what condition to deliver the defendant. 2 9 As access to the
benefit broadened, the defendant was no longer turned over to the
Church. By the sixteenth century, if not before, clergy was pleaded
after conviction and before sentencing. The sentence for most successful pleaders of the benefit was branding and, at the discretion of
the court, up to a year's imprisonment.
Because many convicted defendants were now likely to attempt to
plead clergy, 71 and because clergy was not available for all offenses,
the nature of the felonious homicide became an important jury question. For the first time, it would seem, juries had to be questioned
systematically as to the specific nature of the defendant's felonious
several generally accepted but as yet largely untested assumptions about sixteenthcentury trial procedure. Important work on extant Elizabethan records is now being
done, see note 303 infra; perhaps that work will shed further light on the arguments
presented here.
266. See note 195 supra.
267. In the reign of Henry VI, it was established that the "clerk" had to be convicted before claiming the benefit. 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 53, at 460. See L
GABEL, supra note 217, at 30.
268. See L. GABEL, supra note 217, at 30-31; S. MiLsoM, supra note 29, at 368.
269. See, e.g., Jusr 3/127D, m.lld (1337).
270. 18 Eliz., c. 7, § 2 (1576).
271. Approximately one quarter of all trial defendants succeeded in pleading benefit of clergy. See J. CoCKBuRN, A HIsTORY OF ENGLISH AssIzES 129 (1972) (20
per cent of all felony defendants for the period 1558 to 1714); J. SAMAHA, supra note
220, at 62 (28 per cent of all felony defendants in Essex for the period 1558 to
1602). I found comparable figures for homicide defendants in Elizabethan Sussex
(28 per cent) and Essex (23 per cent). See text at note 288 infra.
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act.272 For the first time, a jury verdict of "felony but not murder"
might save the defendant's life, even though it would not spare him

entirely from punishment. This statutory scheme presented an opportunity for legal growth.
It appears likely that changes in the trial procedure itself also

played an essential role, both in the creation of new, more open
tensions between bench and jury and in the elaboration of the law of

homicide. The jury ceased during the later Middle Ages to be a selfinforming institution.2 73 While the process by which this occurred
and the corollary emergence of the prosecution are largely hidden

from our view, the later stages of prosecutorial development in the
middle decades of the sixteenth century are more clear. 4 The
details of which we are aware suggest how the procedural changes
resulted in changes in the law.
By the time of Salisbury's Case, the criminal jury trial differed

markedly and significantly from its late fourteenth-century progenitor.2 7 i The Marian bail and committal statutes of 1554 and 15541555 required justices of the peace to formulate depositions based on
pretrial witness testimony, and these depositions were available to the
court.27
They allowed the bench to play an active role in questioning witnesses and the defendant. Responsibility for management of

the trial was divided between prosecution and bench; the prosecutor
produced witnesses and their prepared depositions,2 77 while the judge
272. Salisbury's Case is the earliest recorded case that demonstrates this point.
See text at notes 252-56 supra. There are no gaol delivery or criminal assize rolls
for most of the fifteenth century or for the first half of the sixteenth century. My
conclusion is a conjecture based on the requirements of the procedures involved.
273. See, e.g., I. IANGBEIN, PRosEcUTiNo CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 118-22
(1974); T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 19, 129-30; J.T- YER, A PRELIMINARY TREATIsE
ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW 122-36 (1898).
274. See J.LANGBEIN, supra note 273, pt. I.
275. For a discussion of criminal trial proceedings in the period 1558 to 1714,
see J.CocKcuRN, supra note 271, at 86-133. Cockburn presents a detailed picture
of criminal proceedings, including evidence of bribery, jury-packing, and courtroom
brawls. The simpler model presented here focuses on the relationship between the
general characteristics of procedure and the law of homicide.
276. 1 & 2 Phil. & Mary, c. 13; 2 & 3 Phil. & Mary, c. 10. See J. LANGBEIN,
supra note 273, at 30. There are very few extant depositions for the period 1550
to 1650. See J. CocKBuRN, supra note 271, at 334; J. LANOBEIN, supra, at 31
nn. 21-22.
277. The assize records from the latter half of the sixteenth century provide evidence regarding the production of witnesses at trial. See CALENDAR OF AssizE REcOiwS: SUSSEX INDICTMENTS, ELZABETH I, at 263 no. 1388 (1593), 266 nos. 1400
(1593) & 1401 (1593) (J.S. Cockburn ed. 1975) [hereinafter SussEx AssIzE].
Most of the notations take the following form: "On 20 Oct. 1592 before Thomas
Bishop, J.P., Richard Collvell of Newhaven, sailor, entered a recognizance to give
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put questions to all parties and controlled the structure of, and time
78
allocation for, courtroom debate.1
In theory, the jury was still the final arbiter, and it retained power

to consider not only the evidence presented in court, but also what it
knew or had heard on its own.27 9 The origins of the modem law of
evidence, moreover, lay in the future, and there was little, if anything,

that the jury could not hear. 280

Indeed, the mid-sixteenth-century

trial has been described as an "altercation" ' 28 1 between the witnesses
for the prosecution and the defendant, who spoke in his own behalf

although neither under oath nor aided by counsel. But, while in
theory juries might still take into account what they already knew, in
practice they in most cases simply weighed the evidence presented at
trial. The judge heard this evidence at the same time as the jury and

framed his charge largely in terms of it.28 2 As in the past, the jury
retired to reach a conclusion, but now nearly all the facts that they
were to consider were known also to the bench.

The development of the prosecution must have significantly redressed the courtroom balance of power between judge and jury.

Having lost its total control over the production of evidence, the now
largely passive trial jury could no longer conceal the disparity between

its verdict and the available incriminating evidence in cases where it
wished to nullify the effects of the official rules. This alone may have

affected jury behavior in many cases where the evidence produced in
evidence against [the defendant]." Id. at 266 no. 1401 (1593). The deceased in
this case was injured on July 27 and died on August 10; the coroner's inquest was
held August 11 with trial at the assize held February 26. In none of the cases do
the records indicate whether the witness in fact appeared at the trial. See generally
J. CocKBuRN, supra note 271, at 103. Although the Sussex calendar does not systematically include the names of persons who were bound over to appear as witnesses
until the 1580's, there are enough examples from earlier years to suggest that the
binding over of witnesses was common throughout the period 1559 to 1603. See,
e.g., SussEx Assizi, supra, at 3 no. 11 (1559), 3-4 no. 14 (1559) (indictments for
grand larceny).
278. SeeT. SMrrH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 79-81 (1583).
279. See, e.g., Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, Vaughan's Rep. 135 (C.P.
1670).
280. See T. SmrrH, supranote 278, at 79-80.
281. Id. at 80.
282. In Salisbury's Case, for example, the judge charged the jury as follows:
You the members of the jury have heard -the evidence which has been given in
order to prove the prisoners guilty of murder ....
And sirs [members of the jury] we understand the law to be that, the death
of him [i.e., the servant who was slain] was murder on the part of the prisoners,
if they killed him as a result of the malice they had toward his master; thus,
if you find that they had malice -toward the Doctor, this malice made the death
of the one who was slain, who was his servant and in his company, to be murder by judgment of the law.
E. PLOWDEN, supra note 252, at f101.
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court against the defendant was substantial.

Perhaps more impor-

tant, these developments placed the judge in a far better position to
monitor verdicts, to separate those that were consistent with the
evidence from those that were not. It might not be coincidental,
therefore, that, by the middle of the sixteenth century, judges sometimes openly threatened jurors with fines or imprisonment and, in at

least some cases, brought recalcitrant jurors before the Court of Star
Chamber.2 8s

This shift from a trial dominated by the self-informing jury to a
trial based mainly on evidence produced by the prosecution not only
revolutionized the relationship between judge and jury, but also gave
greater importance to the judicial charge and made feasible the
growth of the substantive criminal law. The open confrontation

between the witnesses and the defendant must have produced far
more candid testimony than the conclusory tales that juries had
formerly recorded in their verdicts. Now close and difficult cases

came inescapably to the attention of the bench.284

Complicated

testimony of a sort not heard before forced the judges to refine and

elaborate the original rough distinction between murder and manslaughter, and in this process the modem law of homicide emerged.

The combined effects of the benefit of clergy statutes and of the
transformation of the criminal trial itself were several and profound.

Some of them are easily traceable in the reports and legal literature of
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries; others are still a
matter of speculation. One clear result of these changes was that the
283. According to Cockburn: "By the 1570's the right to threaten juries, either
before or after their verdict, in order to secure a decision in accordance with the
wishes of the bench was an accepted convention." J. CocKBURN, supra note 271,
at 123. It is unclear how frequently judges made good their threats. For a famous
example of the imposition of a fine and imprisonment by the Court of Star Chamber,
see Trial of Nicholas Throckmorton, 1 COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE Tmxs 902
(Guildhall 1554) (T. Howell ed. 1816). See 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 203 (2d ed. 1937); T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 19, at 131-34.
There are assize-calendar notations that jurors were held over "to appear at the
next assizes or, in the meantime, in Star Chamber, if required, for acquitting .. .
against the evidence." E.g., Sussax AsslzE, supra note 277, at 51 no. 240 (1568).
Such notations, however, are rare in homicide cases. Cockburn's conclusion that
"[a] display of judicial displeasure was usually sufficient to ensure the reversal of
unacceptable verdicts . . . " J. CocKgEIRN, supra, at 123, must remain tentative.
There is no clear evidence that the sixteenth-century bench frequently succeeded in
coercing guilty verdicts from juries that preferred to acquit, certainly not in homicide
cases where conviction would lead to execution. Two of the best-known seventeenthcentury incidents of successful judicial badgering of juries, however, did occur in
homicide cases. See note 304 infra.
284. Kaye's discussion is based on such cases. See Kaye, supra note 5, at 578601. Compare Herbert's Case, British Library, Harleian ms.5141, ff.40-41 (1558),
discussed in Kaye, supra, at 577-82.
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law of homicide evolved within a matter of decades into one of the
most complex areas of the substantive criminal law. For the purpose
of determining eligibility for clergy, the general rule of Salisbury's
Case, which distinguished deliberate but sudden homicide from homicide through true premeditation, was further refined.285 Inevitably,
exceptions had to be devised to govern the myriad situations for
which the general rule was awkward or unwise. For example, of all
the new doctrinal strands, none was more difficult to apply than the
rule of manslaughter committed in "hot blood. ' 280 Rules applicable
to the slaying of officials-most importantly, the rule of implied
took a heavy toll of
malice, which made such slayings murder-also
287
the once-streamlined law of intentional slaying.
A second, less easily traceable result of the benefit of clergy
statutes and the changes in trial procedure was their effect upon jury
behavior. Since assize records are primarily indictments with brief
and sometimes ambiguous notations as to the outcome at the trial
stage, they do not provide very keen insight into jury behavior.
Nevertheless, the pattern of late sixteenth-century jury verdicts is
revealing.
285. The rule that made unpremeditated homicide mere manslaughter was eventually modified in three areas: A sudden attack that caught the victim off guard might
still be murder; a sudden unpremeditated attack on an officer of justice was held to
be murder; and an unpremeditated killing resulting from another intentional unlawful
act amounted to murder. See Kaye, supra note 5, at 590-92.
286. Slaying in "heated blood" or "continuing fury" led to a verdict of manslaughter, but slaying after the fury had abated, or was thought to have abated, was
murder. See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 283, at 303; Kaye, supra note 5, at 58990. The difficulties involved in the application of the rule may be seen in a case
from an unpublished law report, Harvard Law School ms. 112, at 296, reprintedin
Baker, Criminal Justice at Newgate 1616-1627, 8 IR. Jun. 307, 315-16 (1973):
Two men were fallen out upon malice aforethought upon a particular and special
matter between them. They were reconciled and continued in love and friendship together 2 or 3 years. And afterward, upon a sudden conference about the
old business, they fell at variance again and the one killed the other. Whether
this were murder or manslaughter was the question. But clearly if the quarrel
had been about some new matter it had been but manslaughter. But it was ruled
in the King's Bench that where there was an ancient quarrel between two concerning a matter and afterward they two meet suddenly and contend about another new occasion without mention of the former, and thereupon heat grows
and the one kills the other, this is murder, because the old quarrel continued
without reconciliation.
287. Kaye suggests, "Here, it was simply the needs of public policy which prevailed over the 'sudden encounter' doctrine: attacks upon officers seldom were premeditated, for of their nature they arose only when a given officer attempted to carry
out his duties." Kaye, supra note 5, at 591. A doctrine of "malice implied by law"
developed "and, once this was done, it was a short step to 'implying malice' in cases
where an officer was engaged in the performance of duties unconnected with keeping
the peace, e.g., arresting for debt." Id. at 592.
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TABLE: VERDICTS RENDERED AT ELIZABETHAN

AssIzEs (1558-1603)2s8
Verdicts

Sussex

Guilty
To be hanged
Allowed clergy

Essex

24%

13%

28%

23%

Sentence unclear
(perhaps hanged,
perhaps clergy)
5%
14%
Total guilty
57%
50%
Excusable homicide
Self-defense
3%*
8%
Accident
2%**
3%
Insanity
1%
0%
Total excusable
6%
11%
Not guilty
37%
39%
• 6 other persons (approximately 6%) were apparently not
-triedbecause the coroner's inquest had found they had slain
in self-defense.

•* 2 other persons (approximately 2%) were apparently not
tried because the coroner's inquest had found they had slain

-byaccident.
The evidence available shows that, while as compared with the fourteenth century 2 9 the conviction rate was high (fifty per cent or more
as compared with twenty to twenty-five per cent), the percentage of
defendants actually condemned remained about the same (twenty to
twenty-five per cent)2 90 and the percentage of self-defense verdicts
288. This table shows the breakdown of verdicts in homicide cases, excluding
cases of infanticide and homicide through witchcraft, tried at the Elizabethan assizes,
1558-1603, in Sussex and Essex counties. Both these counties were part of the Home
Circuit, one of six judicial circuits and the only circuit for which Elizabethan criminal records exist. The Home Circuit "included two predominantly rural countiesSussex and Hertfordshire-and three populous shires-Essex, Kent, and Surrey.
to

J. CocxynuN, supra note 271,

at 99.

This study, then, represents

a

reasonable sample of the extant evidence. The Sussex Assize Calendar has recently
been published, see note 277 supra; for Essex, the Essex Record Office typescript calendar [hereinafter Essex Record Office Assize Calendar] was used, and my figures
are only'approximate. There were approximately 100 homicide defendants for whom
trial verdicts were rendered in each county.
Cases of infanticide and homicide through witchcraft have been excluded in order
to avoid distortion. Such cases rarely appear on the pre-1500 trial rolls. Most defendants in such cases were women, and the conviction rate was high. These cases,
which deserve extensive study, do represent new departures either in social attitudes
or in the use of the legal system to give effect to those attitudes.
289. See text at notes 62-65, 68, 72 supra.
290. It is not at all certain that in the sixteenth century every defendant for
whom a judgment of "guilty: to hang" was entered was in fact hanged. See J. CocK-
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was significantly lower (three to eight per cent as compared with ten

to forty per cent). Thus, it appears that juries, recognizing that benefit of clergy provided an alternative sanction for simple homicide, felt

free to convict in many cases that had formerly falsely been described
as acts of self-defense. The formal rules and the social response had

come closer together; more often than in the past, we may speculate,
recipients of pardons for self-defense were in fact true self-defenders.

291

Finally, judicial refinements of the law of excusable homicide
may have been a third result of the benefit of clergy statutes and the
transformation of the criminal trial. The extension of justifiable
homicide by the statute of 1532 to cover slayers of would-be murderers29 2 may have been facilitated by the diminished fear that man-

slaughterers would be acquitted along with true self-defenders. Indeed, while officially the medieval treatment of excusable homicide
was not abolished until 1828,293 there is evidence that judges frequently allowed self-defenders, whether they had slain murderers or

not, to go quit without pardon or forfeiture as early as the sixteenth
century. 294 This too may have reflected heightened judicial confidence in jury verdicts.
BuN, supra note 271, at 129-33. Judges increasingly substituted other forms of pun.
ishment, for example, transportation overseas, for execution, but this probably was
not common before 1600. Id. at 130.
291. For cases at the Sussex assizes ending in verdicts of self-defense, see SussEx
ASSIZE, supra note 277, at 281-82 no. 1475 (1594), 319 no. 1639 (1596), 333 no.
1714 (1597). Unfortunately, because the indictments are very curt, no solid conclusions can be drawn from them. Moreover, there is no indication of the nature of
the evidence actually produced at trial.
292. See text at notes 242-45 supra.
293. See 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, § 10.
294. Very little is now known (or may ever be known) about judicial treatment
of defendants for whom a jury returned a verdict of self-defense. Scholars have
assumed that even before the statute of 1828, 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, § 10, judges allowed juries to acquit such defendants, but the evidence these scholars have adduced
is inconclusive. See M. FOSTER, DIscoURSE ON HOMICIDE 288-89 (2d ed. 1776); 2
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 481 n.3.; 3 J. STEPHEN, supra note 53,
at 76-77. Beale asserts that, due to a liberal interpretation of the statute of 1532
(involving slayers of murderers and robbers), a judge allowed a defendant to go free
on a verdict of self-defense as early as 1534. Beale, supra note 245, at 571. The
Year Book report of the case is inconclusive. See Y.B. Trin. 26 Hen. 8, f.5, pl. 21
(1534).
The evidence from the assize rolls is also unclear on this point. In the late sixteenth century, there were still cases ending in verdicts of self-defense and, apparently, an order that the defendant obtain a pardon. See, e.g., SussEx AssIzE3, supra
note 277, at 319 no. 1639 (1596); Essex Record Office Assize Calendar, supra note
288, at 354 nos. 41 and 42 (1594). In other self-defense cases there is no indication
that a pardon was required. See, e.g., SUSSEX AssIZE, supra, at 281-82 no. 1475
(1594), 333 no. 1714 (1597). Whether forfeiture was incurred in any of these cases
is unclear. Other cases ending in notations of "not guilty" might be cases in which
the jury in fact gave a special verdict and the bench then acquitted the defendant
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The history of judicial treatment of accidental homicide, on -the
other hand, appears to be more complex. It is difficult to unravel the
line of development that extends in this area from the adoption, in the
fourteenth century, of the rule of automatic forfeiture for excusable
homicide to the abolition, in the nineteenth century, of both pardon
and forfeiture. At the outset of the period, the judicial handling of
accidental homicide was relatively lenient. As we have seen, the
courts granted acquittals in a wide variety of cases that had formerly
led to pardons for accidental homicide. 295 The theory most often
employed to rationalize acquittal in these cases was that the deceased,
through his own actions, had slain himself. Although this theory
was, at least once, repeated in the sixteenth century 296 and might still
have governed the outcome of some cases, it is clear from the notations of judgments on the late sixteenth-century Chancery records
that pardon procedures were followed in the majority of accidental
297
homicide cases.
The reasons for this strict treatment of accidental homicide are
not altogether clear. The most dramatic aspect of the new approach
was the insistence upon initiating the pardon procedure for deaths
resulting from shooting accidents, both by bow and arrow 29 8 and by
firearms.2 9 9 The latter devices, of recent invention and currency,
were responsible for close to forty per cent of the accidental homicides for which pardons were granted in the century 1550 to 1650.00
The dangers surrounding the use of firearms might have contributed
to judicial conservatism in accidental homicide generally, and this
and had the clerk indicate as much on the assize roll. But it is impossible to demonstrate that that is the case.
The strongest evidence for the proposition that self-defenders were not required
to obtain pardons is the fact that the Chancery class 260, which contains many
post-1550 cases in which the pardon procedure was required for accidental homicide,
contains practically none by that late date for homicide in self-defense.
295. See text at notes 115-51, supra.
296. See, e.g., W. STAuNDFORD, supra note 145, at 16a, commenting on a 1370
case, Y.B. Hil. 44 Edw. 3, p1. 94. It is likely that this problem was the subject of
some discussion in the lectures held in the Inns of Court before 1540 that Dr. John
Baker is examining in the course of preparing his work on Spelman. See note 248
supra.
297. See Chancery classes 260 and 244, passim. The hundreds of cases where
pardon procedure was followed for accidental homicide between 1550 and 1650 suggest that judges were infrequently allowing such defendants to go quit. Notations
in the SussEx AssizE, supra note 277, and the Essex Record Office Assize Calendar,
supra note 288, are inconclusive.
298. See, e.g., C 260/166, no. 20 (1573); C 260/171, no. 46 (1583).
299. See, e.g., C 260/173, no. 52 (1588); C 260/184, no. 31 (1631).
300. This estimate is based upon a study, made for me by David Clark of the
Public Record Office, of the post-1550 cases contained in Chancery classes 260 and
244.
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concern might explain the insistence on pardons in cases of unintentional slayings through the use of more traditional weapons.
It is also possible that the flow of evidence now revealed more
clearly than before the degree of negligence attributable to the defendant in accident cases. Juries, having lost most of their control
over the production of evidence, might have found it more difficult to
persuade the court that the deceased had been responsible for his own
death. Indeed, jury verdicts of excusable accidental homicide might
have been returned in cases that, according to the evidence produced
at trial, appeared to the bench to fit within the emerging category of
involuntary manslaughter. 30 1 Surely, in these cases, the bench might
have deemed insistence upon the pardon requirement entirely appropriate.
In -those (presumably) rare instances, on the other hand, where
trial testimony was consistent with a special verdict that the deceased
had slain himself in the course of an attack upon the defendant, the
bench might have felt greater confidence in assimilating the cases

with self-defense and allowing an acquittal. 0 2 If so, this was one
more example of the effect of the new trial procedure on judicial
treatment of excusable homicide. But this remains a matter of
speculation.30 Certainly, tension between judge and jury as to the
301. This category was recognized as early as 1576. See R. BROOKE, supra note
104, Corone, pl. 229; Kaye, supra note 5, at 593 (discussing Brooke's view).
302. Such cases rarely appear among those accidental homicides for which pardons were granted.
303. The history of the jury and the law of homicide after 1550 remains shrouded
in mystery. The subject requires a systematic analysis of the series of criminal assize
records that begin in the 1550's. These records are being edited for publication by
James Cockburn of the University of Maryland and the English Public Record Office.
Volume 1, for the county of Sussex, has already appeared. See SussEx AssizE,
supra note 277.
I have suggested that the emergence of a large category of noncapital felonious
homicide and the beginnings of modern trial procedure produced changes in the behavior of both bench and jury. My tentative thesis is that the conditions that had
produced the earlier pattern of jury behavior and judicial response had been substantially removed. There were fewer verdicts of self-defense, see text at note 288 supra,
and probably there was greater judicial leniency in those cases that did occur, see
note 294 supra. Factors other than the existence of a category of noncapital felony
and the new trial procedure probably played an important role. But these factors,
I believe, must be considered in relation to the formal law and trial procedure. Juries
might have been comprised of persons less inclined to save defendants through verdicts of excusable homicide, but it may still be true that, absent the category of manslaughter, they would not have been willing to convict. Judges might have threatened
and fined juries to force convictions, but it is hard to see how these measures could
easily have been applied had trial procedures remained unchanged: As in earlier
times, it would have been extremely difficult to separate the cases of honest verdicts
from the cases of pure fabrication.
I have introduced these statistics on jury verdicts to establish a relationship between the structure of formal legal categories and jury behavior, and to suggest that,
taken at their broadest, characteristics of social attitudes towards homicide remained
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border between manslaughter and excusable homicide was still com°4
mon after the middle of the sixteenth century.
V.

CONCLUSION

The emergence of a distinction in Tudor times between murder
and less serious felonious homicide was not a historical accident. Nor

was it a conceptual breakthrough that we owe to the late Tudor
fairly constant throughout the period 1300 to 1600. I do not mean to suggest that
these observations constitute an in-depth picture of the social history of the law of
homicide in Elizabethan England. Further research can shed light on a number of
important questions and provide significant refinement of the rough outline presented
here. It is possible to determine the social status of defendants and jurors in homicide cases and to correlate that information with verdicts. It may also be possible
to establish differences in the practices of justices of the peace and the bench. See,
e.g., Samaha's analysis of the extant Essex criminal records. J. SAMAHA, supra note
220.
304. The parliamentary censure of Lord Chief Justice Keeling in 1667 for his
abusive tactics with respect to trial juries provides a particularly dramatic insight into
judge/jury relations in felony cases. Keeling was charged before the House of Commons with threatening both grand and petty juries in several cases. One was described as follows:
[IThere happened a fray in which one man was slain; it was proved that the
man that killed him was set upon and so did it in his own defence, and thereupon the jury found it se defendendo. The judge would not take this verdict,
but caused them to go out again, but still they brought in the same verdict. He
caused them to go out again, and threatened them to fine them if they brought
in the same verdict; they being fearful brought it in manslaughter.
THE DIARY OF JOHN MILWARD, EQ. 160 (C. Robbins ed. 1938). In his defense,
Keeling admitted the substance of the matter. John Milward, a contemporary diarist
to whom we owe most of our knowledge of the proceedings, gives the following summary of Keeling's defense:
For that case when the jury brought in the bill or verdict se defendendo, it
was this. Two men fell out, had their swords drawn and were parted, and after
a while fell to fighting again. One of them was slain, but because it was said
he that killed the other fled to the wall and afterward slew him therefore the
jury would not find it murder, and for this he fined them.
Id. at 167.
A second case involved the conviction and execution of a weaver's servant for
killing an apprentice weaver. According to Milward, Keeling dealt with it thus:
[A] weaver . . . gave order to a servant and authority to oversee [apprentices]
and in his absence to correct the younger prentices. . . . A prentice boy not
winding his pins . . . . but neglecting his work, this servant beat him about the
head with a broomstick, . . . until blood gushed out of his nose, mouth and
ears, of which the boy died. . . . The jury would find this manslaughter; he
caused them to go out again and bring it in murder, which accordingly they did,
for which the man was condemned and hanged.
Id. at 168. The charges leveled against the Chief Justice, and the parliamentary resolution that his behavior was "illegal" are calendared in 9 JOtmRALS OF THE HousE
OF COMMONs 4, 35-37 (1667).
The Keeling incident took on heightened importance after 1670, when Chief Justice Vaughan ruled in Bushel's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, Vaughan's Rep. 135 (KB
1670), that juries could neither be threatened nor fined for returning a verdict at
variance with the judge's views. Jury tracts after 1670 frequently supported their
contentions with the argument that, in cases of homicide, the jury had an unbridled
right to decide whether the slaying was murder, manslaughter, or a form of excusable
homicide. See, e.g., H. CARE, ENGLiSH'LBERTiS 260 (1719 ed., originally published
in 1680); J. HAwLEs, THE ENGLISHMAN'S RIGHT 11 (1680).
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bench. Rather, it represented the final stage of a long process by
which the common law adapted to social views on capital felony.
Those social views, as I have argued elsewhere,805 are ultimately
traceable to the ancient Anglo-Saxon tradition making homicide
through stealth unemendable and homicide committed in the open a
matter for monetary composition. The imposition in the twelfth
century of the death penalty for all felonious homicides produced a
powerful tension between law and social attitudes. In time, the
formal rules of the law might have prevailed, or the popular notions
of culpability might have been completely adopted. Instead, the
institution of the self-informing trial jury as a method of proof
prevented either development. The jury came to play -the pivotal role
in the social history of the law of homicide. I have attempted in this
article to explain legal developments against the background of the
jury as an evidence-gathering body.
From its inception until the late Middle Ages, the trial jury
controlled the flow of evidence, limiting the area in which the judges
made decisions of law. So strict was the jury's control over judicial
proceedings that for centuries the courts were limited to mechanical
application of a few basic rules. In only a relatively small percentage
of cases did the jury return a verdict of felonious homicide. In most
cases, the jury either acquitted or produced a finding describing a
classic case of self-defense. Even if the medieval bench had been
inclined to question the wisdom of an unvarying rule of capital
felony, the jury largely withdrew from it the occasion to do so.
The systematic description of simple homicides as cases of selfdefense further stultified legal development. Close cases were infrequently presented, precluding consideration on a case-by-case basis
whether a particular act for which the existing law had no clear
resolution constituted legitimate self-defense. Moreover, because the
judiciary was aware of jury behavior, there was little incentive to
loosen the strict rules of self-defense. Thus, the medieval law of
intentional homicide retained a single clear division between excusable self-defense and all other homicides. There were no degrees of
seriousness among felonious homicides; there were at first almost no
degrees of excusability among intentional but pardonable homicides.
Development in the medieval law of homicide was stalled, but it
was not completely precluded. In cases of justifiable homicide, the
facts of defense of home or goods lay side by side with evidence of
self-defense. Judges seized upon those facts indicating defense
against the type of criminal activity that plagued society and held that
305. See Green, supranote 3, at 686-94.
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robbers and burglars might be slain without penalty. In this way, the
legal categories came to operate more rationally with respect to some
individual offenders.
The remaining group of "self-defenders" required pardon and
suffered forfeiture. With respect to this group, the medieval law was
less rational, for these slayers included both those who acted in selfdefense and truly merited pardons de cursu, and those who acted
without legal excuse, but whom society deemed guilty of less than a
capital offense. By the early decades of the sixteenth century, however, many of the latter were eligible for benefit of clergy and no
longer required jury protection in order to escape hanging. The
gradation of penalties through manipulation of benefit of clergy had
freed the way for development of legal theory.
Nevertheless, mere gradation of punishment may not have been
sufficient to cause a shift from social to judicial determination of what
constituted murder as opposed to manslaughter. So long as the jury
was self-informing, so long as it rendered a verdict that constituted
the evidence officially before the court, the determination as to the
level of offense remained in the jury's hands. What was required for
substantive legal development was the transformation of the trial
itself. When, in the course of the sixteenth century, evidence came
systematically to be produced by the justice of the peace as prosecutor, or by witnesses bound over by him, the jury ceased in fact to be
self-informing, and much of its control over legal categories was
shifted to the bench. The jury might still have returned a verdict
based on its own conception of the defendant or his deed, but the
court construed the evidence produced at trial in its instructions to the
jury, developed the law of homicide, and, where social and legal
concepts continued to diverge, badgered the jury perhaps more effectively than before into conforming with the official rules of the law.
The age of nearly unlimited jury control was passing; the age of
the law and of the bench was commencing. The conflict between
judicial and social concepts of liability remained, to be played out
perhaps less often but far more visibly in the courtroom relationship
between judge and jury. Whether the jury would return a verdict
clearly at odds with the evidence set forth by the prosecution, in the
face of the judicial charge and threat of punishment, was now the
question upon which control of the legal process depended. The
"right" of the jury to do so had now to be invented and given a place
in political and constitutional theory.
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